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Malicious attacks on computer systems attempt to obtain and maintain illicit 
control over the victim system.  To obtain unauthorized access, they often exploit 
vulnerabilities in the victim system, and to maintain illicit control, they apply various 
hiding techniques to remain stealthy.  In this dissertation, we discuss and present 
solutions for two classes of security problems: TOCTTOU (time-of-check-to-time-of-
use) and K-Queue.  TOCTTOU is a vulnerability that can be exploited to obtain 
unauthorized root access, and K-Queue is a hiding technique that can be used to maintain 
stealthy control of the victim kernel. 
The first security problem is TOCTTOU, a race condition in Unix-style file 
systems in which an attacker exploits a small timing gap between a file system call that 
checks a condition and a use kernel call that depends on the condition.  TOCTTOU 
vulnerabilities are widespread and cause serious consequences. For example, according to 
US-CERT (United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team), such vulnerabilities 
exist in a wide range of applications, affect many operating systems, and often give the 
attacker unauthorized root access. Our research contributions on TOCTTOU include: (1) 
A model that enumerates the complete set of potential TOCTTOU vulnerabilities (e.g., 
224 TOCTTOU pairs in Linux); (2) A set of tools that detect TOCTTOU vulnerabilities 
in Linux applications such as vi, gedit, and rpm; (3) A theoretical as well as an 
experimental evaluation of security risks that shows that TOCTTOU vulnerabilities can 
no longer be considered “low risk” given the wide-scale deployment of multiprocessors; 
(4) An event-driven protection mechanism and its implementation in the Linux kernel 
that defend Linux applications against TOCTTOU attacks at low performance overhead. 
 xviii
The second security problem addressed in this dissertation is kernel queue or K-
Queue, which represents a new hiding technique that can be used by the attacker to 
maintain stealthy control of the victim system after a successful break-in. K-Queue-
driven attacks can achieve continual malicious function execution without persistently 
changing either kernel code or data (from the “gold” distribution), which prevents state-
of-the-art kernel integrity monitors such as CFI and SBCFI from detecting them. We 
have studied a concrete instance of K-Queue-driven attacks that use the soft timer 
mechanism found in nearly all full-featured operating systems.  We demonstrate that an 
attacker can use soft timer interrupt requests (STIRs) to perform powerful attacks, 
including key logging, denial of service, and hidden process scheduling. To defend 
against soft-timer-driven kernel control flow attacks, we propose and implement an 
approach based on an automated static analysis of the entire kernel that identifies and 
catalogs all legitimate STIRs in a database.  At runtime, a reference monitor in a trusted 
virtual machine compares each pending STIR with STIRs in the database, allowing the 
execution of only known good STIRs.  Our defensive technique effectively mitigates 
soft-timer-driven attacks at a low cost (less than 7% for each of our benchmarks). 
As the finishing touch of this dissertation, we design and implement a solution to 
the general class of K-Queue-driven attacks which can exploit IRQ action queues, tasklet 
queues, soft timer queues, and work queues.  Our first contribution is a unified static 
analysis framework and a set of tools that can generate specifications of K-Queue 
summary signatures and the corresponding checking code in an automated way. We also 
design and implement a unified runtime reference monitor based on virtualization that 
validates K-Queue invariants and guards such invariants against tampering. Finally, we 
 xix
perform a comprehensive experimental evaluation of the scalability of our static analysis 
framework and tool set, which shows that different K-Queue analyzers have significant 
overlapping that can be exploited for better efficiency; and we carry out an evaluation of 





CHAPTER 1                                                                     
INTRODUCTION 
 Operating systems are privileged programs that hold ultimate control over the 
computing assets (e.g., CPU, memory, network bandwidth, and files) of any computing 
system. 
 However, today’s operating systems are not secure, because they contain 
numerous vulnerabilities. For example, Secunia1 has reported 2,135 vulnerabilities for 
Microsoft Windows since 2003. Such vulnerabilities are bad for security because 
attackers (often called hackers) can exploit them to obtain illicit control over the victim 
operating system and thus access to, or control over, the computing assets managed by 
the operating system.  The large number of vulnerabilities and the ease with which many 
of them can be exploited often increase the attacker’s chance of success.  For example, it 
has been reported that an unpatched Windows XP with SP1 [23] can be compromised 
within six minutes after installation. 
 The damage due to malicious compromise to an operating system has increased 
significantly in recent years. Traditional hackers exploit vulnerable systems mainly for 
showing off their technical skills. The game is over once the target system is penetrated, 
and they would like to be noticed. In some sense this style of attacking is good for 
security, because the damage is one time and remediation can be taken once the 
comproise is announced.  However, most hackers today exploit vulnerabilities for 
monetary gains, so the real game begins after the target system is conquered, and the 
hackers would like this game to last forever.  For example, once getting into a system, 
today’s attackers often collect sensitive information (e.g., credit card numbers and trading 





secrets), install key loggers to steal passwords, or install other kinds of malicious 
software or malware, which includes spyware, rootkits, virus, worms, Trojans, and 
stealthy backdoors.  Even worse, they can enlist the victim machine into botnets, large 
collections of compromised machines under the control of a bot master. The largest 
botnet to date contains more than eight million nodes [24]. These botnets are valuable for 
sending spam emails or mounting distributed DoS (Denial of Service) attacks, so they are 
often traded in underground black markets. 
 In other words, the attackers today are interested not in showing off but in the 
actual benefit of using the compromised computing system.  To maximize their gains, 
they strive to maintain a stealthy control over the victim system.  Unfortunately, 
remaining stealthy is not a tough job for the attacker, because today’s mainstream 
operating systems have a monolithic privilege system – once the attacker becomes the 
root user, he/she can freely modify any state of the system, including the operating 
system itself, to hide his/her activities. This coarse-grained access control has 
significantly lowered our confidence on long-running systems, to the extent that most 
administrators are forced to completely re-install a computer system to regain trust if they 
suspect that a root compromise has happened.  Unfortunately, it is a difficult decision to 
re-install a computing system in active use.  So we are often forced to live with 
potentially compromised operating systems. 
 The thesis of this dissertation is to increase our trust on long-running computing 
systems by improving the security of operating systems.  Obviously this is a big topic; 
therefore we approach it by two concrete case studies.  Specifically, we discuss and 
present solutions for two classes of security problems: TOCTTOU (time-of-check-to-
time-of-use) and K-Queue (Kernel Queue), in which TOCTTOU is a race condition 
vulnerability that can be exploited for privilege escalation and K-Queue is a kernel 
mechanism that can be misused to maintain stealthy control of the victim kernel. By these 
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cases studies, we hope to gain insights in how to systematically improve the runtime 
security of modern operating systems. 
 We choose TOCTTOU and K-Queue because both of them enable non-obtrusive, 
stealthy attacks that are of interest to today’s hackers.  Both of them touch fundamental 
system software design philosophies that are unfornately bad for security.  TOCTTOU, 
an inherent design flaw (i.e., the lack of transactional support) in modern file systems, has 
been around for more than 30 years, yet such vulnerabilities continue to be discovered in 
widely-used applications and the adoption of multi-cores aggravates the security threat 
represented by such vulnerabilities.  K-Queue reflects an inherent lack of fine-grained 
access control of the CPU inside a modern operating system kernel, which allows a 
malicious extension to easily inject illicit control flows into the kernel. 
 Our solutions to both problems are inspired by the concept of para-transactional 
invariants (PTIs).  PTIs, runtime properties that remain true throughout the execution of a 
block of program statements, are a general and unifying concept for understanding and 
preserving runtime properties.  We extract and express runtime properties whose 
violations are the root cause for TOCTTOU and K-Queue.  By adding the missing logic 
into the vulnerable system to eliminate the root causes, we provide effective and efficient 
solutions to these security problems. Our work helps improve the security of modern 
operating systems. 
1.1. Contributions 
 This dissertation makes the following contributions in the TOCTTOU problem. 
 An abstract model that is capable of enumerating the complete set of potential 
TOCTTOU vulnerabilities (e.g., 224 TOCTTOU pairs in Linux). 
 A systematic search for potential TOCTTOU vulnerabilites in Linux system 
utility programs, which reveals unknown TOCTTOU vulnerabilities in widely-
used applications such as vi, gedit, and rpm. 
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 A detailed experimental and theoretical study of successfully exploiting 
TOCTTOU vulnerabilities in real-world applications, on both uniprocessors 
and multiprocessors, which significantly advances our understanding of 
TOCTTOU attacks. 
 A modular and event-driven defense mechanism (EDGI) and its Linux 
implementation that defend applications against TOCTTOU attacks at low 
performance overhead and do not require existing applications to change. 
 
 In terms of the K-Queue problem, this dissertation makes the following 
contributions. 
 A definition of K-Queue-driven transient control flow attacks as a new attack 
class that maintains stealthy control of the victim kernel, and an empirical study 
of attacks that leverages the soft timer queue. 
 An authentication model that uses summary signatures to differentiate K-Queue 
requests from legitimate and malicious software. 
 A unified static analysis framework and a set of tools that can generate 
specifications of K-Queue summary signatures and the corresponding checking 
code in an automated way. 
 A runtime reference monitor based on virtualization that validates K-Queue 
invariants and guards such invariants against tampering, which effectively 
defends potential K-Queue-driven attacks. 
1.2. Outline 
 The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 discusses our 
solution to the TOCTTOU (time-of-check-to-time-of-use) problem. Chapter 3 presents 
our solution to K-Queue driven transient control flow attacks. Chapter 4 discusses future 
work and draws the conclusion. 
 5
1.3. Mapping From This Dissertation to Existing Publications 
 This dissertation is based on several published papers by the author. Specifically, 
the result in Section 2.3 was published in paper [61], the result in Section 2.4 was 
published in paper [62], the solution in Section 2.5 was published in [44], and Sections 
3.2 and 3.3 are based on paper [63]. 
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CHAPTER 2                                                                       
TOCTTOU 
 The first contribution of this dissertation research is a complete solution to the 
well-known and long-standing TOCTTOU problem.  We propose the CUU model that is 
capable of enumerating the complete set of potential TOCTTOU vulnerabilities, and our 
modular and event-driven defense mechanism (EDGI) and its Linux implementation are 
also complete. 
2.1. Problem Statement 
 TOCTTOU (time-of-check-to-time-of-use) is a well-known security vulnerability 
[2] in file systems lacking strong synchronization support (e.g., the Unix file system). A 
TOCTTOU vulnerability is characterized by two distinct operations [6]. First, a 
vulnerable program checks for a file condition. Second, the program uses (operates on) 
the file, assuming that the established file condition remains invariant during execution. 
An illustrative vulnerable program is sendmail, which used to check for a specific 
attribute of a mailbox file (e.g., it is not a symbolic link) in step one and append new 
messages (as root) in step two. However, the checking and appending operations do not 
form an atomic unit. Therefore, a local attacker (the mailbox owner) can exploit the 
window of vulnerability between the two operations by deleting his/her mailbox and 
replacing it with a symbolic link to /etc/passwd.  If the replacement is completed within 
the window and the new messages happen to be syntactically correct /etc/passwd entries 
with root access, then sendmail may unintentionally give unauthorized root access to a 
normal user (the attacker). 
 The sendmail example shows the structural complexity of a TOCTTOU attack, 
which requires (unintended) shared access to a file by the attacker and the victim (the 
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sendmail program), plus the two distinct steps (check and use) in the victim.  This 
complexity plus the non-deterministic nature of TOCTTOU attacks make the detection 
difficult.  For example, TOCTTOU attacks usually result in escalation of privileges, but 
no immediately recognizable damage.  Furthermore, TOCTTOU attacks are inherently 
non-deterministic and not easily reproducible, making post mortem analysis also difficult. 
These difficulties are illustrated by the TOCTTOU vulnerabilities recently found in vi 
and emacs (Section 2.3.2), which appear to have been in place since the time those 
venerable programs were created. 
 TOCTTOU vulnerabilities are a very significant problem. In fact, CERT [58] 
released 20 advisories on TOCTTOU vulnerabilities between 2000 and 2004. These 
advisories covered a wide range of applications from system management tools (e.g., 
/bin/sh, shar, tripwire) to user level applications (e.g., gpm, Netscape browser), and they 
affected many operating systems, including Caldera, Conectiva, Debian, FreeBSD, HP-
UX, Immunix, MandrakeSoft, RedHat, Sun Solaris, and SuSE.  In 11 of these CERT 
advisories, the attacker was able to gain unauthorized root access.  A similar list compiled 
from the BUGTRAQ [11] mailing list is shown in Table 1.  TOCTTOU vulnerabilities 
are widespread and cause serious consequences. 
Table 1: Reported TOCTTOU vulnerabilities 
Domain Application Name 
Enterprise applications Apache, bzip2, gzip, getmail, Imp-webmail, procmail, openldap, openSSL, Kerberos, OpenOffice, StarOffice, CUPS, SAP, samba 
Administrative tools at, diskcheck, GNU fileutils, logwatch, patchadd 
Device managers Esound, glint, pppd, Xinetd 
Development tools make, perl, Rational ClearCase, KDE, BitKeeper, Cscope 
 
2.2. The CUU Model of TOCTTOU 
 Although in general TOCTTOU problems are not limited to file access [14], in 
this dissertation we focus on file-related TOCTTOU problems. We first propose an 
abstract model of such TOCTTOU problems (called CUU –“C” stands for “Check” and 
“U” stands for “Use”) that captures all potential vulnerabilities.  The model is based on 
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two mutually exclusive invariants: a file object either does not exist, or it exists and is 
mapped to a logical disk block.  For each file object, one of these invariants must remain 
true between the check and use steps of every program. Otherwise, potential TOCTTOU 
vulnerabilities arise.  This model allows us to enumerate all the file system call pairs of 
check and use (called exploitable TOCTTOU pairs), between which the invariants may 
be violated.  Guided by this model, we are able to detect concrete TOCTTOU 
vulnerabilities in real-world applications.  From this model we also derive a protection 
mechanism, which maintains the invariants across all the exploitable TOCTTOU pairs by 
preventing access from other concurrent processes/users. The practical value of CUU is 
demonstrated by the mapping of concrete Unix-style file systems to it. We have 
exhaustively analyzed the file system calls of POSIX and Linux and classified them 
according to the CUU model.  From this classification we enumerated all the exploitable 
TOCTTOU pairs for POSIX (485 pairs) and Linux (224 pairs). 
2.2.1. The Abstract File System 
 Due to the complexity of the TOCTTOU problem in real file systems, in this 
section we define a simplified Abstract File System (AbsFS), on which we define the 
TOCTTOU problem (see Section 2.2.2) and design a defense mechanism (see Section 
2.5).  In Section 2.2.3 we map concrete file systems (POSIX and Linux) to AbsFS and 
translate the results from the AbsFS to the concrete file systems. 
2.2.1.1. Definition of Abstract File System 
 The Abstract File System (AbsFS) manages a set of file system (FS) objects.  
Each file system object consists of a pathname, an ordered set of logical disk blocks, and 
a mapping of the pathname to the corresponding set of logical disk blocks.  For simplicity 
we assume the AbsFS to contain only contiguous files, i.e., the set of logical disk blocks 
is sequential for every file, and the AbsFS only needs to map the pathname to the address 
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(block number) of the initial logical disk block.  Let F denote the set of all pathnames and 
B denote the set of all logical disk blocks, the pathname mapping function resolve is 
defined by:  
Β⊄∅∅},∪→ {: BFresolve . 
 Given a pathname Ff ∈ , if the AbsFS object corresponding to f exists, with the 
initial logical disk block number Bb∈ , then we define bfresolve =)( .  If the AbsFS 
object corresponding to f does not exist, we define ∅=)( fresolve . 
 The AbsFS defines an Application Programming Interface consisting of 4 
operations on file objects. 
 Definition 1: creation(pathname) is the operation that creates new FS objects in 
the AbsFS by changing the mapping for pathname f from ∅=)( fresolve  to 
bfresolve =)( , for some Bb∈ . 
 Definition 2: removal(pathname) is the operation that changes the mapping for 
pathname f from bfresolve =)(  to ∅=)( fresolve . 
 Definition 3: normal use(pathname) is the operation that works on an existing file 
system object and does not remove it.   
 Definition 4: check(pathname) is the operation that returns a predicate about the 
named FS object.  The predicate may be bfresolve =)(  or ∅=)( fresolve . The file f has 
to be in one of these two states. 
 An application uses the creation operation to create a new FS object, the check 
operation to determine the invariant bfresolve =)(  or ∅=)( fresolve , the normal use 
operation to read or write the FS object, and the removal operation to delete an FS object.  
These four kinds of operations (creation, normal use, removal, and check) are all the 
currently defined AbsFS operations.  The creation and removal operations change the 
resolve mapping, while the check and normal use operations do not change the resolve 
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mapping.  The AbsFS operations and FS object states can be represented in a state 
transition diagram shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: State Transition Diagram for FS Object f 
2.2.1.2.Concurrent Access to AbsFS 
 Since the TOCTTOU vulnerability happens with concurrent access by a victim 
process and an attacker process, we extend the notation above to include explicit 
modeling of concurrent file system object access. 
 Definition 5: Safe sequence of AbsFS operations.  Given a sequence O of AbsFS 
operations invoked by a process/user on FS object f, )(),...,(),()( 21 fofofofO n= , 1>n , if 
11, −≤≤∀ nii , )( fresolve  remains an invariant between )( foi and )(1 foi+ , we say the 
sequence )( fO  is a safe sequence of AbsFS operations (from the concurrency point of 
view).  Since in most cases all the operations in the sequence belong to the same 
process/user, for notational simplicity, we omit the process/user id from the sequence. In 
case of interleaved operations, we will add a superscript to denote the different 
processes/users. 
 It is straightforward to see that the exclusive access by a single process to files is 
safe, i.e., the state of each FS object persists from the end of each AbsFS operation to the 
beginning of the next AbsFS operation under exclusive access.   
 Definition 6: Unsafe sequence of AbsFS operations: Given a sequence of 
operations )(),...,(),()( 21 fofofofO n= , 1>n , if 11, −≤≤∃ nii , )( fresolve  is not invariant 
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between )( foi and )(1 foi+ , i.e., )()( 1 fresolvefresolve ii oo +≠ , )( fO  is an unsafe sequence of 
AbsFS operations.  
2.2.2. The CUU Model 
2.2.2.1.Exclusion of Careless Programming 
 Before we start the discussion of the TOCTTOU problem, we point out that the 
TOCTTOU vulnerability is not due to a naively careless programming style.  Consider 
the sendmail example.  Hypothetically, the sendmail could simply open the file name that 
is the user’s mailbox by naming convention (e.g., /usr/mail/username) and then append 
emails to that file.  This simplistic approach fails immediately because the naming 
convention may or may not hold for all names (e.g., a user may have created a symbolic 
link from /usr/mail/username to /etc/passwd).  To avoid this kind of problems, many 
system programmers have adopted a more careful programming style.  In case of files, 
this careful programming style establishes a predicate on the file before using it.  For 
example, sendmail establishes the predicate bfresolve =)( , where b belongs to a regular 
file, not a symbolic link, before appending messages to f.  The predicate bfresolve =)(  is 
an invariant that should remain true as long as the sendmail keeps appending messages.  
We call the predicate an invariant instead of pre-condition, because the normal 
connotation of pre-condition is that it must be true before entering a function, but it may 
become false after the function has started.  In contrast, our invariant must remain true 
through the duration of file usage. 
 In the rest of this dissertation we exclude the careless programming style and 
assume that all system utilities of interest will establish an invariant on a pathname before 
using it.  This is represented in our notation by dividing a sequence of AbsFS 
operations )(),...,(),(),...,()( 11 fofofofofO nii +=  into two subsequences. The first 
subsequence )(),...,(1 fofo i  is called the “Check” part, and the second subsequence  
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)(),...,(1 fofo ni+  is called the “Use” part.  The “Check” part establishes the invariant  
)( fresolve
io
 and the “Use” part of the sequence relies on the invariant remaining true, 
i.e., )( fO is a safe sequence of AbsFS operations.  
2.2.2.2.TOCTTOU Attacks in AbsFS 
 Definition 7: A TOCTTOU (Time-Of-Check-To-Time-Of-Use) attack on file 
object f consists of two concurrent processes, victim v and attacker a, with interleaved 
AbsFS operations that make v’s sequence unsafe.  Consider the victim v executing the 
sequence )()...,(),(),...,()( 11 fofofofofO vnvivivv += , divided into the “Check” and “Use” parts.  
Concurrent with v, attacker a is able to change the mapping )( fresolve
io
 established by v 
during the execution of the sequence )( fOv , transforming it into an unsafe sequence.  This 
is achieved by inserting the sequence )(),...,(),()( 21 fofofofO
a
k
aaa =  between the 












 To illustrate the definition with concrete scenario, we temporarily move from 
AbsFS to a Unix-style file system environment.  Suppose the invariant established by v is 
bfresolve
io
=)( , the attack sequence )( fOa  of a can be: first remove f and then create a 
symbolic link named f which points to another file object t ( ',')( bbbtresolve ≠= ), resulting 
in ')( bfresolveaok = . If the invariant established by v is ∅=)( fresolve io , a possible attack 
sequence )( fOa  is to create the file object f, making ∅≠)( fresolveaok . 
 The TOCTTOU attack is successful if )()( fresolvefresolve aovo ki ≠  and victim v 









i+  (the “Use” part) will execute under the assumption of the original invariant, 
which is no longer true. 
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 The side effect of v executing the “Use” subsequence )()...,(1 fofo vnvi+  after a 
successful TOCTTOU attack is that v is actually working on some other unintended file 
object.  For example, if t = /etc/passwd in the sendmail example, emails may be 
appended to /etc/passwd.  
 Proposition 1: Violation of an invariant is a necessary condition for a successful 
TOCTTOU attack. 
 The proposition 1 follows from Definition 7.  If there is no violation of invariants, 
the sequence )( fOv  is a safe sequence, so there would be no TOCTTOU attack.  
Consequently, through the entire duration of )( fOv , we can prevent TOCTTOU attacks 
by preserving the invariant established by )( fOv and making the sequence a safe 
sequence. 
2.2.2.3. An Enumeration of TOCTTOU pairs 
 Definition 8: Consider an unsafe sequence of AbsFS operations 
)(),...,(),()( 21 fofofofO n= , where )()( 1 fresolvefresolve ii oo +≠ .  The two operations 
surrounding the violation of the original invariant (the last operation of the “Check” part 
and the first operation of the “Use” part), )( foi and )(1 foi+ , are called a TOCTTOU pair.   
 It is useful to identify the TOCTTOU pairs explicitly, since the combinations that 
yield such pairs are non-trivial but manageable.  The diagram in Figure 1 shows all the 
AbsFS operations and the two states in which a file may be.  On the left side of diagram 
is the non-existent state, denoted by ∅=)( fresolve  and on the right side of the diagram is 
the existent state, denoted by bfresolve =)( .   
 Let us consider first the non-existent state and the invariant ∅=)( fresolve .  The 
first term of a TOCTTOU pair is an operation that results in the non-existent state of f.  
From the state transition diagram in Figure 1, we see that two operations lead to the non-
existent state: {check, removal}.  The removal operation explicitly makes f non-existent, 
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while the check operation also ends in the non-existent state if it does not find the 
pathname mapping.  The second term of the TOCTTOU pair is an operation that starts 
from the invariant ∅=)( fresolve  (the non-existent state). The two operations that start 
from the non-existent state are: {check, creation}.  Therefore, the TOCTTOU pairs 
associated with the non-existent state are contained in the set produced by the Cartesian 
product of {check, removal}×{check, creation}.   
 While the Cartesian product contains all the TOCTTOU pairs, we will refine the 
second term, which corresponds to the “Use” part of the TOCTTOU pair.  For an attacker 
to exploit a TOCTTOU vulnerability for some gain (e.g., escalation of privileges), the 
victim must be tricked into doing something useful for the attacker in the “Use” part.  
Examples of useful actions are: (1) set or modify the status information of an existing file 
object (e.g. make /etc/passwd world-writable); (2) modify the runtime environment of the 
victim application (e.g. change the current directory); and (3) release the content of a 
sensitive file object (e.g. read the content of /etc/shadow into memory).  Since the check 
operation does not produce any useful results for the attacker, we define exploitable 
TOCTTOU pairs by eliminating the check operation from the second term of TOCTTOU 
pairs. 
 Now we consider the existent state of f, characterized by the invariant 
bfresolve =)( . The state transition diagram in Figure 1 shows that the set of operations 
that lead into the existent state is {creation, check, normal use}, and the set of operations 
that start from the existent state is {check, normal use, removal}.  So the TOCTTOU 
Table 2: Exploitable TOCTTOU pairs (AbsFS) 
Invariant TOCTTOU Pairs 
∅=)( fresolve  <check, creation> 
<removal, creation> 
bfresolve =)( <creation, normal use> 
<check, normal use> 
<normal use, normal use> 
<creation, removal> 
<check, removal> 
<normal use, removal> 
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pairs associated with this invariant are in the set {creation, check, normal use}×{check, 
normal use, removal}.  As a second term of the TOCTTOU pairs, check will not produce 
useful results for the attacker.  Consequently, we also eliminate check from the list of 
exploitable TOCTTOU pairs. 
 By deleting check from the second terms, the exploitable TOCTTOU pairs are 
{check, removal}×{creation} for the first invariant and {creation, check, normal 
use}×{normal use, removal} for the second invariant.  Since there are only two invariants 
in AbsFS, we have enumerated all the exploitable TOCTTOU pairs in Table 2. 
 Proposition 2: The enumeration of TOCTTOU pairs in Table 2 is complete, i.e., 
it contains all the exploitable TOCTTOU pairs in AbsFS. 
Proof: by construction we have enumerated all the exploitable TOCTTOU pairs in Table 
2.  There are only two invariants in the state diagram in Figure 1, and we have analyzed 
all the state transitions in Figure 1. 
2.2.2.4. Prevention of TOCTTOU Attacks 
 In the rest of this section, we will focus on the preservation of invariants across 
the exploitable TOCTTOU pairs.  This protection will be done in two steps.  First, we 
will maintain explicitly the invariant holder for each file object.  Second, for every file 
system operation that may change the invariant, we check whether the invoker of the 
operation is the holder.  The operation is allowed if it’s invoked by the holder.  It is 
disallowed if it belongs to another process/user. 
 In Figure 1, we described the state transitions of a file with a single process/user. 
Figure 2 shows the state transitions of a file under concurrent access by multiple 
processes/users.  Without loss of generality, we adopt the policy that the first process/user 
accessing the file object becomes the invariant holder.  (Intuitively, we consider the 
invariant as an exclusive lock.)  The goal of our protection mechanism is to reject any 
changes to the invariant except by the invariant holder.   
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Figure 2: The Enhanced State Transition Diagram with Two Users 
 The main difference between Figure 1 and Figure 2 is the addition of three states.  
Two of the states (on the top part of Figure 2) are due to the explicit representation of the 
cases of invariants with a holder (same as Figure 1) and without a holder (new states).  
These transitions are allowed, since the pathname is free and the invariant holder is not in 
competition with any other process/user.  The third new state is at the bottom of Figure 2, 
representing a potential attack since those transitions would change the invariant for the 
holder.  These transitions are rejected as an error. The original invariant holder maintains 
the hold on the invariant and the invariant remains unchanged. 
 The implementation of invariant holder lock relies on a lock table and maps the 
invariant holder id to the invariant across all TOCTTOU pairs.  Consider a TOCTTOU 
pair < 21,oo >.  When a process u accesses a pathname f through )(1 fo , u becomes the 
invariant holder, moving from the top states of Figure 2 to one of the middle states.  
(Note that all four AbsFS operations are allowed in this step.)  Our protection mechanism 
uses the lock table to remember this invariant/holder mapping.  The lock is released when 
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the invariant holder process ends. These state transitions are denoted as exit(u), in which 
case u releases the invariant. 
 While the pathname f is in one of the middle states, with invariant holder u, 
another process/user (u’) may attempt to change the invariant, which will result in 
“error”. Other operations that do not affect the invariant (e.g., check and normal use) are 
allowed, as shown in Figure 2.  Thus this mechanism implements the assumption 
required in Proposition 2 to protect the invariants across TOCTTOU pairs. 
 For practical purposes, we note that our protection mechanism does not require 
explicit request and release of invariant-related locks.  The management of invariant 
locks can be done automatically on behalf of applications.  Furthermore, the 
implementation can be simplified with the following proposition. 
 Proposition 3: Blocking the creation and removal of a file object f across a 
sequence )(),...,(),( 21 fofofo n  is sufficient to make the sequence safe. 
 By Definition 5, a sequence of execution )(),...,(),( 21 fofofo n  is safe if 
11, −≤≤∀ nii , )( fresolve  is an invariant between )( foi and )(1 foi+ . If we forbid any creation 
or removal of f across )(),...,(),( 21 fofofo n , we forbid creation or removal of f 
between )( foi and )(1 foi+ , and since creation and removal are the only operations that can 
change )( fresolve , )( fresolve  must be an invariant between )( foi and )(1 foi+ . So 
)(),...,(),( 21 fofofo n  is guaranteed to be a safe sequence of execution. 
 This proposition is the basis for the EDGI defense in Section 2.5. 
 Proposition 4: Making all exploitable TOCTTOU pairs safe is sufficient to make 
all file access sequences safe and prevent TOCTTOU attacks. 
 Proof: Proposition 3 shows the preservation of invariants through a file operation 
sequence suffices in making the sequence safe.  Proposition 2 shows that all exploitable 
TOCTTOU pairs have been enumerated.  Combining the two propositions we have the 
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assurance that making all file operation sequences safe (for each process/user) can 
prevent all TOCTTOU vulnerabilities from being exploited. 
2.2.3. Concrete File System Examples 
2.2.3.1. Exclusion of Careless File Attribute Settings 
 The AbsFS contains a simplified model of file system objects, with a very simple 
mapping of pathname to logical disk blocks, without any additional file system attributes 
such as access permission.  In concrete file systems, appropriate access control attributes 
need to be set to prevent trivial unauthorized file access.  For example, Unix files with 
world writable settings can be easily exploited by many kinds of attacks.  In our modeling 
and analysis of TOCTTOU attacks, we assume that appropriate file access control 
settings are being used by careful system administrators. 
2.2.3.2. Unix-Style File Systems 
 Table 2 gives a complete list of TOCTTOU pairs in AbsFS.  Now we map the 
AbsFS into Unix-style file systems.  The first observation in the mapping is that Unix-
style file systems have several kinds of file system objects: regular files, directories, and 
links.  The second observation is that the abstract operations of check, creation, normal 
use, and removal may be implemented by several system calls.  Therefore, we map these 
abstract operations into sets of system calls (CreationSet, NormalUseSet, RemovalSet 
and CheckSet) and divide these sets into operations on each kind of file system objects. 
CreationSet = FileCreationSet ∪ DirCreationSet ∪ LinkCreationSet 
NormalUseSet2 = FileNormalUseSet ∪ DirNormalUseSet 
                                                 
 
 
2 On Unix-style file systems, the normal use of a link (symbolic or hard) is actually on the regular file or directory that 
the link refers to, so we do not need to define a separate NormalUseSet for link. 
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RemovalSet = FileRemovalSet ∪ LinkRemovalSet ∪ DirRemovalSet 
CheckSet = FileCheckSet ∪ LinkCheckSet ∪ DirCheckSet 
Table 3: Enumeration of exploitable TOCTTOU pairs (Unix-Style file systems) 
Invariant Exploitable TOCTTOU Pairs 
∅=)( fresolve  
(FileCheckSet × FileCreationSet) ∪ (FileRemovalSet × 
FileCreationSet) ∪ 
(DirCheckSet × DirCreationSet) ∪ (DirRemovalSet × 
DirCreationSet) ∪ 
(LinkCheckSet × LinkCreationSet) ∪ (LinkRemovalSet × 
LinkCreationSet) 
bfresolve =)(  
(FileCheckSet × FileNormalUseSet) ∪ (FileCreationSet × 
FileNormalUseSet) ∪ (LinkCreationSet × FileNormalUseSet) ∪ 
(FileNormalUseSet × FileNormalUseSet)∪ 
(DirCheckSet × DirNormalUseSet) ∪ (DirCreationSet × 
DirNormalUseSet)  ∪ (LinkCreationSet × DirNormalUseSet) ∪ 
(DirNormalUseSet × DirNormalUseSet) 
  
 The third observation is that the removal operation in Unix-style file systems does 
not produce any useful results for the attacker. This is because in Unix-style file systems, 
under the assumption of careful file attribute settings (Section 2.2.3.1), there are only two 
ways for the attacker to make )()( tresolvefresolve =  in a TOCTTOU attack (t is an existing 
security sensitive file object such as /etc/passwd and f is the file object accessed by a 
TOCTTOU pair >< 21 , oo in the victim application): via symbolic link or hard link. If the 
attacker replaces f with a symbolic link to t, then the victim’s removal operation on f only 
removes f itself, but not t; If the attacker replaces f with a hard link to t, this will increase 
the number of hard links of t by 1, and when the victim performs the removal operation 
on f, it decreases the number of hard links of t by 1 (restores the original hard link 
number of t, but never decreases it). Since t is physically removed only when its hard link 
number becomes 0, given t’s initial hard link number is nonzero, the attacker can not 
cause t to be removed. 
 Thus for Unix-style file systems we can eliminate those TOCTTOU pairs with 
removal as the second term from Table 2.  The remaining AbsFS TOCTTOU pairs can be 
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mapped to Unix-style file systems as shown in Table 3. For an actual file system, we can 
map the actual file system calls to these sets to obtain the concrete TOCTTOU pairs. 
 
Figure 3: POSIX File Operations 
 
Figure 4: Linux File Operations 
2.2.3.3. Study of POSIX and Linux 
 We focus on POSIX [30] and Linux as representative examples of Unix-style file 
systems with TOCTTOU vulnerabilities.  We believe the same mapping can be done with 
the other flavors of Unix file systems.  The POSIX mapping is shown in Figure 3 and the 
Linux mapping is shown in Figure 4. Compare Figure 4 to Figure 3 we can see that the 
sets are almost the same due to the fact that Linux is POSIX-compliant. We do see some 
discrepancy though, notably the FileNormalUseSet. For example, POSIX has 6 different 
system calls on executing a program (execl, execle, execlp, execv, execve, execvp), but 
Linux only has one (execve). A closer look at the Linux implementation reveals that 
Linux implements only execve as a system call and uses library calls to implement the 
remaining 5 POSIX interfaces, which are different wrappers on top of this basic system 
call. 
FileCreationSet = {creat, open, mknod, 
rename} 
DirCreationSet = {mkdir, rename} 
LinkCreationSet = {link, symlink, 
rename} 
FileNormalUseSet = {chmod, chown, 
truncate, utime, open, execve} 
DirNormalUseSet = {chmod, chown, 
utime, mount, chdir, chroot, pivot_root} 
FileRemovalSet = {unlink, rename} 
DirRemovalSet = {rmdir, rename} 
LinkRemovalSet = {unlink, rename} 
FileCheckSet = {stat, access} 
DirCheckSet = {stat, access} 
LinkCheckSet = {stat, access} 
FileCreationSet = {creat, open, mknod, mkfifo, 
rename} 
DirCreationSet = {mkdir, rename} 
LinkCreationSet = {link, symlink, rename} 
FileNormalUseSet = {chmod, chown, truncate, 
utime, open, fopen, fdopen, popen, execl, execle, 
execlp, execv, execve, execvp, pathconf} 
DirNormalUseSet = {chmod, chown, utime, 
chdir, pathconf} 
FileRemovalSet = {remove, unlink, rename} 
DirRemovalSet = {remove, rmdir, rename} 
LinkRemovalSet = {remove, unlink, rename} 
FileCheckSet = {access, stat} 
DirCheckSet = {access, stat} 
LinkCheckSet = {lstat, readlink} 
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 Applying the mapping of Figure 3 to the mapping in Table 3, we have identified 
485 exploitable TOCTTOU pairs for POSIX. Similarly, by applying Figure 4 to the 
mapping in Table 3, we get 224 exploitable TOCTTOU pairs for Linux   
 Proposition 5: If the classification of a concrete file system’s operations is 
complete, then the enumeration of exploitable TOCTTOU pairs is complete for the 
concrete file system.  By complete we mean the classification contains all the concrete 
file system calls that operate on file objects, and all the concrete file system calls are 
classified into check, creation, normal use, and removal functions on the file objects.  
(File system calls that have multiple functions appear in multiple categories.) 
 Proof: The Proposition 2 guarantees the completeness of exploitable TOCTTOU 
pairs for the AbsFS.  Assuming that we have exhaustively analyzed the concrete file 
system calls and classified them, Proposition 5 follows from Proposition 2. 
 By exhaustively analyzing the POSIX file system calls (Figure 3), we can apply 
Proposition 5 to the enumeration of exploitable TOCTTOU pairs based on Table 3 and 
Figure 3 and conclude that we have enumerated all the exploitable TOCTTOU pairs in 
POSIX.  Analogously, we apply Proposition 5 to the enumeration of exploitable 
TOCTTOU pairs in Linux, based on Table 3 and Figure 4, and the result is in Table 28 of 
the Appendix. 
2.2.3.4. Example of TOCTTOU Attacks 
 We have studied some real world programs with known TOCTTOU 
vulnerabilities on Unix-style systems. The results are shown in Table 4. For example, in 
sendmail, the TOCTTOU vulnerability is a <stat, open> pair, the invariant is 
bumboxresolve =)( , and the attack is first removing umbox and second creating a 
symbolic link under the name umbox. 
 Logwatch Vulnerability.  logwatch is an open-source script for monitoring log 
files in Linux.  logwatch 2.1.1 running as root was reported [52] to allow a local attacker 
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to gain elevated privileges, e.g., write access to /etc/passwd.  This attack consists of the 
following steps: 
1) Get the running process ID {pid} of logwatch; 
2) Create a temporary directory named /tmp/logwatch.{pid}; 
3) Create a symbolic link with a specific name in the temporary directory, which 
points to /etc/log.d/scripts/logfiles/samba/`cd etc;chmod 666 passwd #` 
4) Wait for logwatch to use the temporary symbolic link.  Although logwatch 
only opens it for writing, the tricky file name causes the shell to execute it as a 
command line later. 
Table 4: Some existing TOCTTOU vulnerabilities on Unix-style systems 
Applications TOCTTOU pair Classification and Invariant 
BitKeeper, Cscope 15.5, CUPS, 
getmail 4.2.0, glint, Kerberos 4, 
openldap, OpenOffice 1.0.1, 
patchadd, procmail, samba, 
Xinetd 
<stat, open> FileCheckSet ×  FileCreationSet 
∅=)( fresolve  
Rational ClearCase, pppd <stat, chmod> FileCheckSet × FileNormalUseSet 
bfresolve =)(Sendmail <stat, open> 
logwatch 2.1.1 <stat, mkdir> DirCheckSet × DirCreationSet 
∅=)( fresolve
bzip2-1.0.1, gzip, SAP <open, chmod> FileCreationSet × FileNormalUseSet
bfresolve =)(  Mac OS X 10.4 – launchd <open, chown> 
StarOffice 5.2 <mkdir, chmod> DirCreationSet × DirNormalUseSet 
bfresolve =)(
 
 The TOCTTOU pair in logwatch is <stat, mkdir>. logwatch first checks whether 
the directory /tmp/logwatch.{pid} exists (stat) before creating it. However, an attacker 
may create that directory (as shown above) between the stat and mkdir system calls.  In 
this case, logwatch’s mkdir fails, but since logwatch does not check the return value of 
its mkdir, it continues blindly and uses the temporary directory.  The invariant in 
logwatch is ∅=)(tmpdirresolve  and the attack is a creation operation (mkdir) by the 
attacker. (Here the tmpdir is /tmp/logwatch.{pid}) 
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 Table 4 summarizes the TOCTTOU pairs and their associated invariants for a 
number of known TOCTTOU vulnerabilities. 
2.3. Detection of TOCTTOU Vulnerabilities 
 In this part of the dissertation, we implement CUU model-based software tools 
that systematically search for potential TOCTTOU vulnerabilities in Linux system utility 
programs. They are able to detect previously reported TOCTTOU vulnerabilities as well 
as finding some unknown ones (e.g., in the rpm software distribution program, the vi/vim 
and emacs editors).  We conduct a detailed experimental study of successfully exploiting 
these vulnerabilities and analyze the significant events during a TOCTTOU attack against 
the native binaries of rpm and vi.  By repeating the experiments, we also evaluate the 
probability of these events happening, as well as the success rate of these non-
deterministic TOCTTOU attacks. These analyses provide a quantitatively better 
understanding of TOCTTOU attacks.  
2.3.1. Model-Based TOCTTOU Detection 
2.3.1.1. Components of Practical Attacks 
 An actual TOCTTOU vulnerability consists of a victim program containing a 
TOCTTOU pair (described in Section 2.2.2.3) and an attacker program trying to take 
advantage of the potential race condition introduced by the TOCTTOU pair.  The attacker 
program attempts to access or modify the file being manipulated by the victim through 
shared access during the vulnerability window between the “Check” call and the “Use” 
call.  For example, by adding a line to an unintentionally shared script file in the rpm 
attack (Section 2.3.2.2), the attacker can trick the victim into executing unintended code 
at a higher privilege level (root). In general, we say that a TOCTTOU attack is profitable 
if the victim is running at a higher level of privilege. In Unix-style OSs, this means the 
victim running as root and the attacker as normal user.   
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 An important observation is that even though the victim is running at a higher 
level of privilege, the attacker must have sufficient privileges to operate on the shared file 
attributes, e.g., creation or deletion. This observation narrows the scope of potential 
TOCTTOU vulnerabilities. Table 5 shows a list of directories owned by root in Linux. 
Since normal users cannot change the attributes or content of files in these directories, 
these files are safe. 































2.3.1.2. CUU Model-Based Detection Tools 
 Based on the CUU model, we design a software framework and implement 
software tools to detect actual TOCTTOU vulnerabilities in Linux.  Figure 5 shows the 
four components of our detection framework, based on dynamic monitoring of system 
calls made by sensitive applications (e.g., those that execute with root privileges).  The 
first component of our framework is a set of plug-in Sensor code in the kernel, placed in 
file-related system calls such as those in Figure 4.  These Sensors record the system call 
name and its arguments, particularly file name (full path for unique identification 
purposes). For some system calls, other related arguments are also recorded to assist in 
later analysis, e.g., the mode value of chmod(path, mode).  Some environmental variables 
are also recorded, including process id, name of the application, user id, group id, 
effective user id, and effective group id.  This information will be used in the analysis to 
determine if a TOCTTOU pair can be exploited. We do not use standard Linux trace 
facilities such as strace for two reasons: First, strace does not output full pathname for 
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files referred to using relative pathnames; second, strace does not give enough 
environmental information such as effective user id. 
 
Figure 5: Framework for TOCTTOU detection 
 The Sensors component also carries out a preliminary filtering of their log. 
Specifically, they identify the system calls on files under the system directories listed in 
Table 5 and filter them out, since those files are immune to TOCTTOU attacks.  After 
this filter, remaining potentially vulnerable system calls are recorded in a circular FIFO 
ring buffer by printk. 
 The second component of our framework is the Collector, which periodically 
empties the ring buffer (before it fills up).  The current implementation of the Collector is 
a Linux daemon that transforms the log records into an XML format and writes the 
output to a log file for both online and offline analysis. 
 The third component of our framework is the Analyzer, which looks for 
TOCTTOU pairs (listed in Table 3) that refer to the same file pathname.  For offline 
analysis, this correlation is currently done using XSLT (eXtensible Stylesheet Language 
Transformations) templates.  This analysis proceeds in several rounds as follows. 
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 Round 1: First, the Analyzer sorts the log records by file name, grouping its 
operation records such as the names and locations (sequence numbers) of system calls. 
 Round 2: Second, system calls on each file are paired to facilitate the matching of 
TOCTTOU pairs. 
 Round 3: Third, system call pairs are compared to the list in Table 3. When a 
TOCTTOU pair is found, an XSLT template is generated to extract the corresponding log 
records from the original log file.  
 Round 4: Fourth, the log records related to TOCTTOU pairs found are extracted 
into a new file for further inspection.  
 The fourth component of our framework is the Inspector, which identifies the 
actual TOCTTOU vulnerability in the program being monitored.  The Inspector links the 
TOCTTOU pair with associated environmental information, including file pathname, 
related arguments, process id, program name, user id, group id, effective user id, and 
effective group id. The Inspector decides whether an actual exploitation can occur.  
 For each TOCTTOU pair, the Inspector does the following steps: 
 Check the arguments of the calls to see if these calls can be profitable to an 
attacker. For example, if the “Use” call is chmod, then a value of 0666 for the 
mode argument falls into this category because this chmod can be used to make 
/etc/passwd world-writable. On the other hand, a mode value of 0600 is not 
profitable because it will not give the attacker any permission on a file that 
he/she does not own. In this case the TOCTTOU pair in question is not a 
TOCTTOU vulnerability. 
 Check the file pathname. For the chmod example, if the file is stored under a 
directory writable by an ordinary user, like his/her home directory, then 
continue to the next step; otherwise the TOCTTOU pair is not a TOCTTOU 
vulnerability. 
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 Check the effective user id. Continuing with the chmod example, if the 
effective user id is 0 (root), then report this TOCTTOU pair as a vulnerability; 
otherwise, the TOCTTOU pair is not a vulnerability. 
 It should be noted that the steps described above give only an outline of the 
Inspection process based on one attack scenario for one particular TOCTTOU pair. For 
different TOCTTOU pair and different attack scenario, the details of these checks can be 
different. For example, the same TOCTTOU pair as the above with a mode value of 0644 
and the same other conditions is also considered a vulnerability because it can be 
exploited to make /etc/shadow readable by an attacker. Thus the Inspector requires a 
template (or signature) for each kind of attack scenario. Table 6 shows the set of 
templates used by the current implementation of the Inspector. For brevity, this table does 
not show the file pathname and effective user id which are checked in every template. 
This set may be expanded as new attack scenarios are found. 
Table 6: Templates used in the Inspector 
“Use” call Arguments to check Sample attack scenarios 
chmod mode Gain unauthorized access rights to 
/etc/passwd 
chown owner, group Change the ownership of /etc/passwd 
chroot  Access information under a restricted 
directory 
execve  Run arbitrary code 
open mode, flag Mislead privileged programs to do things for 
the attacker, or steal sensitive information 
truncate length Erase the content of /etc/passwd 
 
2.3.2. Analysis of Real TOCTTOU Attacks 
2.3.2.1. Experimental Setup 
 We applied our detection framework and tools to find previously unreported 
TOCTTOU vulnerabilities in Linux.  Although the CUU model describes all the 
TOCTTOU pairs in Linux file systems, it is impractical to test all the execution paths of 
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all the system software (or even a single program of any complexity).  Our intent is to 
learn as much as possible about real TOCTTOU vulnerabilities through a detailed 
analysis.  The experiments show that significant weaknesses can be found relatively 
easily using our framework and tools. 
 From the discussion in Section 2.3.1.1, we focus our attention on system software 
programs that use file system (outside the directories listed in Table 5) as a root. Each 
program chosen is downloaded, installed, configured, and deployed.  Furthermore, we 
also build a testing environment which includes the design and generation of a 
representative workload for each application, plus the analysis of TOCTTOU pairs 
observed.  Although this is a laborious process that requires high expertise, one could 
imagine incorporating such testing environments into the software release of system 
programs, facilitating future evaluations and experiments. 
 Our tools were implemented on Red Hat 9 Linux (kernel 2.4.20) to find 
TOCTTOU vulnerabilities in about 130 commonly used utility programs. The script-
based experiments consist of about 400 lines of shell script for 70 programs in /bin and 
/sbin.  This script takes about 270 seconds to gather approximately 310K bytes of system 
call and event information. The other 60 programs were run manually using an interactive 
interface.  From this sample of Linux system utilities, we found five potential TOCTTOU 
vulnerabilities (see Table 7). 
 The experiments were run on an Intel P4 (2.26GHz) laptop with 256M memory. 
The Collector produces an event log at the rate of 650 bytes/sec when the system is idle 
(only background tasks such as daemons are running), 11KB/sec during the peak time a 
large application such as OpenOffice is started, and 2KB/sec on average. The Analyzer 
processes the log at the speed of 4KB/sec. 
 From the list in Table 7, we wrote simple attack programs that confirmed the 
TOCTTOU vulnerabilities in rpm, emacs and vi.  We discuss the attack on rpm and vi in 
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detail (Sections 2.3.2.2 and 2.3.2.3, respectively), and outline the others in Section 
2.3.2.4. 
Table 7: Potential TOCTTOU vulnerabilities 
Application TOCTTOU errors Possible exploit 
vi <open, chown> Changing the owner of /etc/passwd to an 
ordinary user 
rpm <open, open> Running arbitrary command 
emacs <open,chmod> Making /etc/shadow readable by an 
ordinary user 




<mkdir, chmod> Gaining full access to another user’s 
home directory 
2.3.2.2. rpm 4.2 Temporary File Vulnerability 
 rpm is a popular software management tool for  installing,  uninstalling,  
verifying,  querying, and  updating software packages in Linux. When rpm installs or 
removes a software package, it creates a temporary script file in directories such as 
/var/tmp or /var/local/tmp. This shell script is used to install or remove help 
documentation of the software package.  Since the access mode of this file is set to 666 
(world-writable), an attacker can insert arbitrary commands into this script. Given the 
privileges required for installing software (usually root), this is a significant vulnerability.  
The TOCTTOU pair involved is <open, open>: the first open creates the script file for 
writing the script; and the second open is called in a child process to read and execute the 
script. 
2.3.2.2.1 Baseline Analysis of rpm 
 In our evaluation of the TOCTTOU vulnerability in rpm, we start by measuring 
the total running time of rpm (denoted by t) and the window of vulnerability (the time 
interval between the two opens, denoted by v).  We ran rpm (as root) 100 times, 
alternatively installing and uninstalling a package named sharutils-4.2.1-14.i386.rpm, 
and measured t and v for each invocation.  From Table 8 we can see that the window of 
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vulnerability is relatively narrow (less than 5%), since the two opens are separated only 
by a few milliseconds. 
Table 8: Baseline vulnerability of rpm 
Package Operation Install (rpm -i) Uninstall (rpm -e) 
Average Stdev Average Stdev 
t  (μsec) 125,188 9,930 110,571 10,961
v (μsec) 5,053 20 4,218 102
v/t 4.1% --- 3.8% --- 
2.3.2.2.2 An Experiment to Exploit rpm 
 The second part of our evaluation is to measure the effectiveness of an attack 
trying to exploit this apparently small window of vulnerability.  This experiment runs a 
user-level attack process in a loop.  It constantly checks for the existence of a file name 
with the prefix “/var/tmp/rpm-tmp”. A victim process (rpm run by root) installs a 
software package and creates a script file of that name.  Note that rpm inserts a random 
suffix as protection against direct guessing, but a directory listing command bypasses the 
need to guess the full pathname.  If a file name of the expected prefix appears, the 
attacker appends the command “chown attacker:attacker /etc/passwd” to it.  If the append 
happens during the window of vulnerability, then the child process of rpm will execute 
the script and the inserted command line, making the attacker the owner of /etc/passwd.  
When rpm finishes, the test program checks whether the attacker has become the owner 
of /etc/passwd. 
 Due to the non-deterministic nature of these experiments, we ran the experiment 
100 times in a batch. After running several batches, we found a surprisingly high average 
number of 85 successful attacks per batch, considering the apparently narrow window of 
vulnerability shown in Table 8. 
2.3.2.2.3 Event Analysis of rpm Exploit 
 To fully understand what happened during the TOCTTOU attack, we analyze the 
important system events during the experiment. Figure 6 shows the events in a successful 
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exploit of rpm.  In Figure 6, the dark (upper) line shows the events of the rpm process, 
and the lower line shows the events of the attacker process.  The attacker process stays in 
a loop looking for file names of interest.  When the rpm process creates the file (just 
before the 200 msec clock tick), the attacker detects it and appends the chown line to the 
temporary script and goes back to the loop.   
 
Figure 6: Event Analysis of rpm Exploit 
 
 The two timelines show that even though the CPU consumption during the 
window of vulnerability is relatively small, the rpm process causes interrupts that 
lengthen the window, represented by dotted upper line. Specifically, there are at least two 
scheduling actions within the rpm vulnerability window: rpm creates a new process to 
execute bash, which creates another new process to execute an external executable file 
(/sbin/install-info).  Each process creation causes rpm to yield CPU to the scheduler.  
Figure 6 shows that the attacker process is scheduled as a result and the attack succeeds.  
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Consequently, the two scheduling actions created by rpm make the attack more likely to 
succeed because rpm yields the CPU in the window of vulnerability. 
 In our experiments, we also found another reason more attacks succeed than 
indicated by the short window of vulnerability.  Specifically, we observed that in some 
cases the appending to the script file by the attacker happened after the second open of 
rpm (outside the window), but the attack still succeeds. In these cases, we believe that 
append started after bash opened the script file (the second open of rpm), but it finished 
before bash reached the end of the script.  Since bash interprets the script line by line, 
there is a good chance of executing the newly appended line. These two explanations 
(CPU yielding and slow interpretation of the script) help explain the lengthening of the 
window of vulnerability and the high attack success rate of 85%. 
2.3.2.3. vi 6.1 Vulnerability 
 The Unix “visual editor” vi is a widely used text editor in many UNIX-style 
environments.  For example, Red Hat Linux distribution includes vi 6.1.  Using our tools, 
we found potential TOCTTOU vulnerabilities in vi 6.1.  Specifically, if vi is run by root 
to edit a file owned by a normal user, then the normal user may become the owner of 
sensitive files such as /etc/passwd. 





if (rename (temp_filename, real_filename) != 0) 
{ … } 
chmod (real_filename, st.st_mode); 
chown (real_filename, st.st_uid, st.st_gid); 
(b) 
Figure 7: (a) vi 6.1 vulnerability (fileio.c), (b) gedit 2.8.3 vulnerability (gedit-document.c) 
 
 The problem can be summarized as follows.  When vi saves the file being edited, 
it first renames the original file to a backup, then creates a new file under the original 
name (wfname in Figure 7(a)). The new file is closed after all the content in the edit 
buffer has been written to it. If vi is running as root, the initial owner and group of this 
new file is root, so vi needs to change the owner and group of the new file to its original 
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owner and group.  This forms an <open, chown> window of vulnerability every time vi 
saves the file (Figure 7(a)).  During this window, if the file name can be changed to a 
link to /etc/passwd, then vi can be tricked into changing the ownership of /etc/passwd to 
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2.3.2.3.1 Baseline Analysis of vi 
 Using the same method of the rpm study, we measured the percentage of time 
when vi is running in its vulnerability window as it saves the file being edited. In vi, this 
depends on the edited file size.  In our experiments, we bypass the user typing time to 
avoid the variations caused by human participation. 
 We define the save window t as the time vi spends in processing one “save” 
command, and the vulnerability window v during which TOCTTOU attack may happen.  
We measured 60 consecutive “saves” of the file for t, and timestamp the open and chown 
system calls for v.  Since the “save” time of a file depends on the file size, we did a set of 
experiments on different file sizes.  Figure 8 shows the time required for a “save” 
command for files of sizes from 100KB to 10MB.  We found a per file fixed cost that 
takes about 14msec for the small (100KB) file and an incremental cost of 9msec/MB (for 
files of size up to 10MB). 
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 Since chown happens after the file is completed, the window of vulnerability v 
follows approximately the same incremental growth of 9msec/MB (see Figure 8).  Figure 
9 shows the window of vulnerability to be relatively long compared to the total “save” 
time.  It gradually grows to about 80% of the “save” total elapsed time for 10MB files.  
This experiment tells us that vi is more vulnerable when the file being edited is larger.  
For a small file (100KB size) the window of vulnerability is still about 5% of the “save” 
time.  
 
Figure 10: A program to attack vi 
2.3.2.3.2 An Experiment to Exploit vi 
 Unlike a batch program such as rpm, which is easily run from a script, vi is 
designed for interactive use by humans. To eliminate the influence of human “think time” 
in the experiments, we wrote another program to interact with vi by sending it commands 
that simulate human typing.  This reduces the runtime and the window of vulnerability to 
minimum.  The experiment runs a vi (as root) editing a file owned by the attacker in the 
attacker’s home directory.  The editing consists of either appending or deleting a line 
from the file and the experiment ends with vi exiting.  
 The attack (Figure 10) consists of a tight loop constantly checking (by stat-ing) 
whether the owner of the file has become root, which signifies the start of the window of 
vulnerability. Once this happens, the attacker replaces the file with a symbolic link to 
/etc/passwd (as shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11).  When vi exits, it should change the 
1  while (!finish){ 
2     if (stat(wfname, &stbuf) == 0){ 
3        if ((stbuf.st_uid == 0) && (stbuf.st_gid == 0)) 
4          {    
5               unlink(wfname); 
6               symlink(“/etc/passwd”, wfname); 
7               finish = 1; 
8          } 
9     } 
10 } 
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ownership of /etc/passwd to the attacker. If vi finishes and /etc/passwd is still owned by 
root, the attack fails. 
 Contrary to the surprisingly high probability of success in the rpm case, we found 
a relatively low probability of success in the vi case (see Figure 12 and Figure 13), 
despite a relatively wide window of vulnerability.  This leads to a more careful analysis 
of the system events during the attack. 
 
Figure 11: Event Analysis of the vi Exploit 
2.3.2.3.3 Event Analysis of vi Exploit 
 Although the window of vulnerability may be wide, an attack will succeed only 
when: 
1. vi has called open to create the new file, 
2. vi has not called chown, 
3. vi relinquishes CPU, voluntarily or involuntarily, and the attacker is scheduled 
to run, and 
4. the attacker process finishes the file redirection during this run. 
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 The first two conditions have been studied in the baseline experiment.  The fourth 
condition depends on the implementation of the attacker program.  For example, if the 
attacker program is written in C instead of shell script, it will be less likely to be 
interrupted. 
 The third condition is the least predictable.  In our experiments, we have found 
several reasons for vi to relinquish CPU.  First, vi may suspend itself to wait for I/O. This 
is likely since the window of vulnerability includes the writing of the content of the file, 
which may result in disk operations. Second, vi may use up its CPU slice. Third, vi may 
be preempted by higher priority processes such as ntpd, kswapd, and bdflush kernel 
threads. Even after vi relinquishes CPU, the second part of the condition (that the attacker 
process is scheduled to run) still depends on other processes not being ready to run.   
 This analysis illustrates the highly non-deterministic nature of a TOCTTOU 
attack.  To achieve a statistically meaningful evaluation, we repeat the experiments and 
compute the probability of attack success.  To make the experimental results 
reproducible, we eliminated all the confounding factors that we have identified.  For 
example, in each round of experiments, we ran vi at least 50 times, each time on a 
different file, to minimize file caching effects.  We also observed memory allocation 
problems after large files have been used.  To relieve memory pressure, we added a 2-
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 Figure 12 shows the success rate for file sizes ranging from 100KB to 1MB 
averaged over 500 rounds. We see that for small files, there is a rough correlation 
between the size of window of vulnerability and success rate.  Although not strictly 
linear, the larger the file being edited, the higher the probability of successfully attacking 
vi. 
 Figure 13 shows the results for file sizes ranging from 2MB to 4MB, with a 
stepping size of 20KB, averaged over 100 rounds.  Unlike the dominantly increasing 
success rate for small file sizes, we found apparently random fluctuations on success rates 
between file sizes of 2MB and 3MB, probably due to race conditions.  For example, files 
of size 2MB have success rate of 4%, which is lower than the 8% success rate of file size 
500KB in Figure 12.  The growing success trend resumes after files become larger than 
3MB. 
2.3.2.4. Other Vulnerabilities 
 In our experiments, we identified 5 TOCTTOU pairs (see Table 7) and confirmed 
3 of them through direct attacks (rpm, vi, and emacs). Due to its similarity to the vi 
experiments (Section 2.3.2.3), the analysis of the attack of emacs is omitted here.   
 We also tried to attack gedit, the fourth vulnerability discovered. gedit [25] is a 
text editor for the GNOME desktop environment, and version 2.8.3 of gedit has a 
<rename, chown> TOCTTOU vulnerability (See Figure 7(b)). Like vi, gedit becomes 
vulnerable when it is run by root to edit a file (real_filename) owned by a normal user 
(also the attacker), and it saves the file.  Unlike vi, gedit writes to a temporary scratch 
file, then renames the scratch file to the original file name, and calls chown. Thus the 
window of vulnerability is between the rename and the directly following chown, a very 
short time that reduces the probability of successful attack. Not surprisingly, our attack 
experiment (using the program in Figure 14) found no success on a uniprocessor.  
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However, as we will discuss in more detail in section 2.4.4, this is not the case once gedit 
is running on multiprocessors. 
 The fifth vulnerability is the Enlightened Sound Daemon (esd), which creates a 
directory /tmp/.esd and then changes the access mode of this directory to 777, giving full 
permissions (read/write/execute) to all users. Besides, this directory is under /tmp, a place 
where any user can create files or directories. So a possible attack is to create a symbolic 
link /tmp/.esd before the mkdir call of esd and let the link point to some directories 
owned by the running user (such as his/her home directory). If esd does not check 
whether its mkdir call succeeds, then it will change the access mode of the running 
user’s home directory to 777. Then an attacker has full access to the running user’s home 
directory.  We postponed our experiments on esd since this TOCTTOU vulnerability has 
been reported in BUGTRAQ [12]. 
 
Figure 14: gedit attack program version 1 
 Overall, we consider the CUU model-based detection framework to be a success.  
With a modest number of experiments, we confirmed known TOCTTOU vulnerabilities 
and found several previously unreported ones.  However, this offline analysis only covers 
the execution paths exercised by the workloads, so it cannot guarantee the absence of 
TOCTTOU vulnerabilities when none is reported. 
2.3.3. Evaluation of Detection Method 
2.3.3.1. Discussion of False Negatives 
1  while (!finish){ 
2     if (stat(real_filename, &stbuf) == 0){ 
3        if ((stbuf.st_uid == 0) && (stbuf.st_gid == 0)) 
4          {    
5               unlink(real_filename); 
6               symlink(“/etc/passwd”, real_filename); 
7               finish = 1; 
8          } 
9     } 
10 } 
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 As mentioned in Section 2.3.2.1, our tools are not designed for exhaustive testing. 
While we attempted to generate representative workloads for the 130 programs tested, we 
cannot guarantee coverage of all execution paths.  The coverage problem may be 
alleviated by improvements in the testing technology and documentation. 
 More fundamentally, the CUU-Model covers pairs of file system calls, assuming 
that a precondition is established by the “Check” call before the “Use” call relies on it.  In 
programs where preconditions are not explicitly established (a bad programming 
practice), e.g., a program creates a temporary file under a known name without first stat-
ing the existence of the file, exploits may happen outside the CUU model.  The problem 
of complex interactions among more than a pair of system calls is an open research 
question.  (Currently, there are no known examples of such complex vulnerabilities.) 
2.3.3.2. Discussion of False Positives 
 Tool-based detection of vulnerabilities typically does not achieve 100% precision.  
The framework described in Section 2.3.1 is no exception.  There are some technical 
sources of false positives: 
1. Incomplete knowledge of search space: The list of immune directories (Table 5) is 
not complete because of the dynamic changes to system state (e.g. newly created 
root-owned directories under /usr/local), which leads to false positives. 
2. Artifacts of test environment: If the test cases themselves uses /tmp or the home 
directory of an ordinary user, our tools have to report related TOCTTOU pairs, which 
are false positives. For example, the initial test case for cpio uses a temporary 
directory /tmp/cpio, so the tools reported a <stat, chdir> on this directory. 
3. Coincidental events: Because our tools do system-wide monitoring, they capture file 
system calls made by every process. Sometimes two unrelated processes happen to 
make system calls on the same file that appear to be a TOCTTOU pair. 
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4. Incomplete knowledge of application domain: Not every TOCTTOU pair is profitably 
exploitable. For example, the application rpm invoked by “--addsign” option contains 
a <stat, open> pair, which can open any file in the system for reading, such as 
/etc/shadow. However, rpm can not process /etc/shadow because it is not in the 
format recognizable by rpm. So it is unlikely that this pair can be exploited to 
undermine a system. 
 By improving the kernel filter (source 1), re-designing test cases (source 2), and 
reducing concurrent activities (source 3), we reduced the false positive of our tools; for 
example, in one experiment testing 33 Linux programs under /bin, the false positive rate 
fell from 75% to 27%.  However, source 4 is hard to remove due to the differences 
among application domains. 
2.3.3.3. Overhead Measurements 
 To evaluate the overhead of our detection framework, we ran a variant of the 
Andrew benchmark [28].  The benchmark consists of five stages. First, it uses mkdir to 
recursively create 110 directories. Second, it copies 744 files with a total size of 12MB. 
Third, it stats 1715 files and directories. Fourth, it greps (scan through) these files and 
directories, reading a total amount of 26M bytes. Fifth, it does a compilation of around 
150 source files. For every stage, the total running time is calculated and recorded. We 
run this benchmark for 20 rounds and get the average. To mitigate the interference from 
other processes during the run, we start Red Hat Linux in single-user mode (without X 
window system and daemon processes such as apmd, crond, cardmgr, syslogd, gpm, cups 
and sendmail). To get an estimation of the overhead of our system, we run this 
experiment on a Linux box without modifications to get the baseline results, and then a 
Linux box with our monitoring tools (without the Analyzer and the Inspector which are 
used offline). For the latter case, we ran the experiment under two different directories to 
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see the influence of file pathname to the overhead. The total running time of these five 
stages for the experiments is shown in Figure 15 and Table 9. 












































Figure 15: Andrew Benchmark Results 
 The results show a relatively higher overhead for mkdir, copy and stat when the 
benchmark is run under an ordinary user’s home directory (denoted Vulnerable Dir in 
Figure 15 and Table 9). But when the benchmark is run under /root  (denoted Immune 
Dir in Figure 15 and Table 9), the overhead becomes much lower (dropping from 144% 
to 14% for stat). This difference shows that printks in the kernel and the Collector 
daemon process contribute significantly to the overhead, because the filter in kernel 
suppresses most log messages caused by the benchmark when it runs in a directory 
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immune to TOCTTOU (Table 5), therefore the printks and Collector have much less 
work to do. The other source of overhead comes from the Sensor (including the filter and 
a query of the internal /proc file system data structure to map a process id to the complete 
command line to assist the Inspector). However, the overhead of our detection tools is 
amortized by application workload, as shown for compilation. 
 PostMark benchmark [43] is designed to create a large pool of continually 
changing files and to measure the transaction rates for a workload approximating a large 
Internet electronic mail server. Since mail server software such as sendmail had well 
known TOCTTOU problems, PostMark seems to be another representative workload to 
evaluate the performance overhead of our software tools.  
 When PostMark benchmark is running, it first tests the speed of creating new 
files, and the files have variable lengths that are configurable. Then it tests the speed of 
transactions. Each transaction has a pair of smaller transactions, which are either 
read/append or create/delete. 
 On the original Linux kernel the running time of this benchmark is 30 seconds. 
On our modified kernel, with all the same parameter settings, the running time is 30.35 
seconds when the experiment is run under /root (an immune directory), and 35 seconds 
when the experiment is run under a vulnerable directory. So the overhead is 1.17% and 
16.7% for these two cases, respectively. This result also shows that the printks and the 
Collector contribute significantly to the overhead. 
2.4. Probabilistic Analysis of TOCTTOU Attacks 
 Traditionally, attacks exploiting race conditions such as TOCTTOU have been 
condidered rare and “low risk”. Our TOCTTOU attack experiments against vi on 
uniprocessors (Section 2.3.2.3) seem to support this belief.  However, one major reason 
for the low attack success rate is that the CPU is a bottleneck – the attacker simply cannot 
get a chance to run.  Once the CPU is no longer the bottleneck, the situation may change.  
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For example, a multiprocessor will give the attacker the option of running on a dedicated 
processor and actively seeking attack opportunities. So the attacker may achieve a higher 
rate of success on a multiprocessor. 
 In this section, we present a probabilistic analysis of TOCTTOU attacks taking 
multiprocessors into account. We first propose a probabilistic model which shows that 
multiprocessors increase the success rate of TOCTTOU attacks, especially when the 
victim program is rarely suspended in the vulnerability window. Then we perform a 
detailed experimental and event analysis of TOCTTOU attacks on multiprocessors, to 
confirm the applicability of our model.  We use vi and gedit as the victim programs in the 
attack experiments, which contain new TOCTTOU vulnerabilities that were found by our 
detection tools (Section 2.3.2). 
2.4.1. A Probabilistic Model for Predicting TOCTTOU Attack Success Rate 
2.4.1.1. The Basic General Model 
 A TOCTTOU attack succeeds when the attacker is able to modify the mapping 
from file name to disk block within the vulnerability window. In order to succeed, the 
attacker must first find the vulnerability window, and then change the file mapping. 
Therefore, our model divides the attacker program into two parts: (1) a detection part that 
finds the beginning of the vulnerability window, and (2) an attack part that modifies the 
file mapping. 
 One of the critical issues is whether the victim is suspended within the 
vulnerability window, since the suspension increases substantially the success rate.  
Based on the law of total probability, the attack success rate: 
 
P(attack succeeds) = P(victim suspended) * P(attack succeeds | victim suspended) + 
P(victim not suspended) * P(attack succeeds | victim not suspended) 
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 In addition, in order for the attack to succeed, the attacker program must be 
scheduled within the vulnerability window and the attack must finish within the 
vulnerability window, so 
 
 We can derive P(attack succeeds | victim not suspended) in a similar way and get 
the refined probability in Equation 1. 
 In Equation 1, all the events are under the context of the victim vulnerability 
window. e.g. “attack finished” means “attack finished within the vulnerability window”. 
 
Equation 1: The probability of a successful TOCTTOU attack 
2.4.1.2. Attack Success Rate on a Uniprocessor 
 On a uniprocessor, P(attack scheduled | victim not suspended) = 0 since it is 
impossible to schedule the attacker when the victim is running. Therefore on a 
uniprocessor the second part of Equation 1 contributes nothing to the success rate. I.e., 
P(attack succeeds) = P(victim suspended) * P(attack scheduled | victim suspended) * 
P(attack finished | victim suspended). 
 Several observations can be made about P(attack succeeds) on a uniprocessor: 
• P(attack succeeds) ≤ P(victim suspended).  This means that the probability 
that the victim is suspended within its vulnerability window gives an upper 
bound for the attack success rate.  If the victim is always suspended (e.g. rpm 
in 2.3.2.2), the attacker can achieve a success rate as high as 100%.  In 
contrast, if the victim is rarely suspended (e.g. gedit in Section 2.3.2.4), the 
attack success rate can be near zero. 
P(attack succeeds | victim suspended) = P(attack scheduled * attack finished | victim 
suspended)  
= P(attack scheduled | victim suspended) * P(attack finished | victim suspended) 
P(attack succeeds) = P(victim suspended) * P(attack scheduled | victim suspended) * 
P(attack finished | victim suspended)  
+ P(victim not suspended) * P(attack scheduled | victim not suspended) * P(attack 
finished | victim not suspended) 
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• P(attack scheduled | victim suspended) is the probability that the attacker 
process gets scheduled when the victim relinquishes CPU. This value depends 
on several factors such as the readiness of the attacker, the system load (if 
round-robin scheduling is used), or the priority of the attacker (if priority-
based scheduling is used). Typically in a lightly loaded environment this value 
can be nearly 100% if the attacker program uses an infinite loop actively 
looking for the exploit opportunity. 
• P(attack finished | victim suspended) is the probability that the attacker 
successfully modifies the file mapping while the victim is suspended. Since 
there is only one CPU, as long as the attack part is not interrupted, this 
probability can be 100%. Typically this is the case because modifying the file 
mapping requires very short processing time and needs not block on I/O. 
 Based on the above analysis, the attack success rate is mainly determined by 
P(victim suspended) on a uniprocessor system, and the implementation of the attack part 
is relatively less critical. 
2.4.1.3.Attack Success Rate on Multiprocessors 
 On multiprocessors, the attacker can run on a different processor than the victim 
when the victim is running within its vulnerability window.  This makes the second part 
of Equation 1 non-zero, i.e., P(attack scheduled | victim not suspended) > 0.  This fact 
increases the success rate of TOCTTOU attacks on multiprocessors as compared to 
uniprocessors.  If P(victim suspended) is relatively large, then the success rate on 
multiprocessors may not increase significantly.  However, if P(victim suspended) is very 
small (approaching 0), then P(victim not suspended) approaches 1, and the gain due to 
the second part of P(attack succeeds) may become very significant. 
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 Therefore for an attacker, the benefit of having multiprocessors is maximized 
when the victim is rarely suspended in the vulnerability window.  An analysis of the 
second part of Equation 1 shows that: 
• P(attack scheduled | victim not suspended) is similar to P(attack scheduled | 
victim suspended) discussed in Section 2.4.1.2. The conclusion is that it can 
be as high as 100%. 
• P(attack finished | victim not suspended) is the probability that the attack is 
finished within the vulnerability window.  Since the victim is running 
concurrently with the attacker, the result of the attack depends on the relative 
speed of the attacker and the victim, a more detailed analysis is needed (next 
Section). 
2.4.1.4. Probabilistic Analysis of P(attack finished | victim not suspended) 
 In order to predict P(attack finished | victim not suspended) in more detail, we 
analyze the race condition at different levels: the first level is CPU, which is the main 
contention in uniprocessor attacks; the next level is file object, because the file system 
already has a synchronization mechanism to regulate shared accesses. In Unix-style file 
systems, the modifications to an inode are synchronized by a semaphore. Since the 
operations of the victim and the attacker on the shared file modify the same inode, they 
both need to acquire the same semaphore.  In this case, the race is reduced to the 
competition for the semaphore and we can model the success rate of the attack in the 
following way. 
 In this model, we assume that the attacker runs in a tight loop (the detection part), 
waiting for the vulnerability window of the victim to appear. Let D be the time consumed 
by each iteration of detection part, and let 1t be the earliest start time for a successful 
detection and 2t  be the latest start time for a successful detection followed by a 
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successful attack (e.g. the attacker acquires the semaphore first). 1t and 2t  are determined 
by the victim process. Some observations can be made as follow (Figure 16): 
 
Figure 16: Different attack scheduling on a 
multiprocessor 
 A successful attack starts with a successful detection as its precondition. This 
successful detection may start as early as 1t  (Figure 16, case (a)), and as late as Dt +1  
(Figure 16, case (f)). Then the interval ),[ 11 Dtt +  is our sample space. Out of this interval 
),[ 11 Dtt + , if the detection is started before 2t , the attack succeeds (Figure 16, cases (a) 
through (c)); otherwise the attack fails (Figure 16, cases (d) through (f), because the 
attack is launched too late). Let’s assume a uniform distribution for the start time of the 
detection part, the success rate is thus 
D
tt 12 − . 
 In Figure 16 we assume that ),[ 112 Dttt +∈ . Two other cases are: 
• If 12 tt < , then the success rate is 0; 
• If Dtt +≥ 12 , then the success rate is 1. 
 Let 12 ttL −= , and we get: 















               (1) 
 In formula (1), L measures the laxity of the successful attacks, which is a 
characterization of the victim: the larger L, the more vulnerable the victim. D is a 
characterization of the detection part of the attacker: the smaller D, the faster the attacker, 
Failed detection Successful detection
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and the higher success rate. So L/D gives a very useful measurement of the relative speed 
of the victim and the attacker. 
 It should be noted that L and D in formula (1) are not strictly constant, because 
the executions of the victim as well as the attacker are interleaved with other events (e.g. 
kernel timers) in the system. That is, the running environment imposes variance on these 
parameters. So formula (1) only offers a statistical guidance about the attack success rate. 
2.4.2. Baseline Measurements of TOCTTOU Attacks on Uniprocessors 
 For comparison purposes, in this section we summarize the measured success 
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Figure 17: Success rate of attacking vi (small files) on a uniprocessor 
2.4.2.1. vi Attack Experiments on Uniprocessors 
 Since the vi vulnerability window includes the writing of a whole file, the size of 
the window naturally depends on the file size. The measured success rates for file sizes 
ranging from 20KB to 10MB are the following: 
• When the file size is small (from 100KB to 1MB), there is a rough correlation 
between attack success rate and file size, as shown in Figure 17.  However, 
the correlation disappears for larger file sizes (e.g., between 2MB to 3MB), 
showing that file size alone does not determine the success rate completely.  
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• Besides file size, we studied other factors (e.g., I/O operation, CPU slicing, 
and preemption by higher priority kernel threads) that corroborate the non-
deterministic nature of TOCTTOU attacks on a uniprocessor (Section 2.3.2.3). 
 From Figure 17 we can see that for normal file sizes (Using vi to edit a 2MB text 
file is considered rare in real life), the success rate can be as low as 1.5% and as high as 
18%. Furthermore, when the file size approaches 0, the success rate also approaches 0. 
2.4.2.2. gedit Attack Experiment on Uniprocessors 
 The experiments in which a TOCTTOU attack was carried out against the gedit 
vulnerability saw no successes. This is because the gedit vulnerability window (Figure 
7(b)) does not include the writing of the new file as in vi, so it is much shorter and bears 
no relationship to the file size. These factors reduced the success rate for gedit attacks to 
essentially zero on a uniprocessor. 
2.4.3. vi Attack Experiments on SMP 
 We repeated the vi attack experiments described in Section 2.3.2.3 on a SMP 
machine (2 Intel Xeon 1.7GHz CPUs, 512MB main memory, and 18.2GB SCSI disk with 
ext3 file system). 
 First we tried different file sizes ranging from 20KB to 1MB with a stepping size 
of 20KB, and observed the success rate of 100% for all file sizes.  This confirms the 
probabilistic predictions in Section 2.4.1.3 and shows that a multiprocessor greatly 
increases the attacker’s chance of success compared to a uniprocessor (Figure 17 in 
Section 2.4.2.1).   We did a detailed event analysis to confirm the attacker and victim 
processes ran on separate CPUs during the vulnerability window. We also eliminated the 
possibility that the attack success is due to the victim being blocked on I/O operations 
(which would have made the attack easier).  Consequently, we conclude that the attack 
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success is due to the length of vi vulnerability window being much larger than the time it 
takes the attacker to finish the attack steps (file name redirection).  
 Figure 18 shows the L and D values (Section 2.4.1.4) for the vi attack experiments 
that we conducted on the SMP. We can see that L >> D when the file is large (e.g.1MB); 
and the difference (L – D) decreases as the file size decreases. But (L – D) is always 
positive, even when the file size becomes very small. Therefore we can say with almost 
certainty that for vi attack experiments, L > D. By formula (1) we know that the success 
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Figure 18: The L and D values for vi SMP attack experiments 
 
 One thing to notice from Figure 18 is that as the file size approaches 0, the 
difference (L – D) also approaches 0. Is it possible that L becomes smaller than D? Then 
according to formula (1) the attack success rate will be smaller than 100%. 
 To see this we run the experiment again with the smallest files (only 1 byte each). 
And the success rate we get is around 96%. Again we did a detailed event analysis of this 
experiment. We measure the average L and D values and put them in Table 10. We can 
see that although L > D in these attacks, they have become very close. If we consider the 
fact that the values for L and D are not strictly constant due to the environmental 
influence, we realize that whether L > D all the time becomes questionable when they are 
close enough (When L >> D the inaccuracy introduced by the environment does not 
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change the relationship). This helps to explain why the success rate can not be 100% 
when the file contains only 1 byte. 
Table 10: The average L and D values (in microseconds) for vi SMP attack experiments 
(file size = 1 byte) 
 Average Stdev 
L 61.6 3.78 
D 41.1 2.73 
 
 Another point is that so far we actually treat P(attack finished | victim not 
suspended) in Section 2.4.1.4 as the sole basis for predicting the success rate, which is 
not always accurate (Equation 1). The justification is that when the vi vulnerability 
window is large enough, the effect of other factors in Equation 1 is negligible. For 
example, P(attack scheduled | victim not suspended) < 100% in general which means that 
the attacker may not be scheduled during sometime in the vulnerability window. 
However, if the vulnerability window is very large, the attacker is still within it when 
he/she is scheduled eventually. That is, the temporary suspension does not affect the 
result of the attack. However, when the vulnerability window becomes small enough (e.g. 
L and D become close enough), the suspension may cause the attacker to miss the 
vulnerability window. In such a case the attack fails, thus the suspension changes the 
attack result. 
 In several of the failed 1-byte vi experiments, we find that some other processes 
prevents the attacker from being scheduled on another CPU during the vi vulnerability 
window. 
 This analysis tells us that although using a multiprocessor can greatly increase the 
attack’s chance of success, the success is still not guaranteed: the attack is still influenced 
by other environmental factors such as kernel activities and system load. However, 96% 
is more than enough for an attacker. 
2.4.4. gedit Attack Experiments on Multiprocessors 
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2.4.4.1. gedit SMP Attack Event Analysis 
 As mentioned in Section 2.4.2.2, our attack experiments against gedit on 
uniprocessors saw no successes. However, when we try this attack on a SMP (the same 
machine as in Section 2.4.3), we get roughly 83%, a surprisingly high success rate. A 
detailed event analysis is thus conducted to understand this result. 
 For the gedit attack, we have observed that if the attacker’s unlink is invoked 
before gedit’s chmod (Figure 7(b) and Figure 14), then attack succeeds. This is because 
these two system calls compete for the same semaphore, so if unlink wins, chmod as 
well as the following chown will be delayed. As a result the attacker’s unlink and 
symlink can have enough time to finish before gedit’s chown. On the other hand, if 
unlink loses, unlink and the following symlink of the attacker will be delayed, so the 
attack will fail. So there is an interesting cascading effect in gedit attack experiment. 
Therefore, for gedit attacks, 1t  is somewhere within the execution of rename (the 
attacker does not need to wait until the end of rename to see that real_filename has been 
created), D is the interval between the start of stat and the start of unlink. Let 3t  be the 
start of chmod, then Dtt −= 32 , and 1312 tDtttL −−=−= . We experimentally get the L 
and D values as in Table 11. 
Table 11: L and D values for gedit attacks on a SMP (in microseconds) 
 Average Stdev 
L 11.6 3.89 
D 32.7 2.83 
 
 The calculation of L here is not accurate because the estimation of 1t  is not 
accurate. Currently 1t  is established as the earliest observed start time of stat which 
indicates a vulnerability window. So it may not be optimal. An earlier (thus smaller) 
1t will result in a larger L. So the success rate indicated by Table 11 (35%) may be overly 
conservative compared to the observed success rate. 
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 An important contributing factor to L is the computation time between the end of 
rename and the start of chmod. The average length of this computation is 43 
microseconds. As we will see in Section 2.4.4.2, this factor is very important for the high 
success rate of gedit attack on the SMP. 
 There is another contributing factor. Usually when gedit’s chmod is blocked, the 
Linux kernel will try to schedule something else to run (e.g. internal kernel events such as 
soft IRQs, kernel timers and tasklets), which further lengthens gedit vulnerability 
window (but this contributes just a little to the delay compared with that due to the 
semaphore). 
2.4.4.2. gedit Multicore Attack Experiment 
2.4.4.2.1 Attack one 
 We repeat the gedit attack (Figure 14) on a multi-core (Dell Precision 380 with 2 
Intel Pentium D 3.2 GHz dual-core and Hyper-Threading CPUs, 4GB main memory, and 
80GB SCSI disk with ext3 file system). We get very different result: now we see almost 
no success in the same attack experiment. The main change in the situation is that the 
victim spends much less time between rename and chmod (3 microseconds vs. 43 
microseconds), so chmod happens before unlink of the attacker, but in the SMP 
experiment (Section 2.4.4.1) situation is the opposite. 
 
Figure 19: Failed gedit attack (program 1) on a multi-core 
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 Figure 19 shows the important system events during one failed attack on the 
multi-core. The upper bar corresponds to the execution of gedit (rename, chmod, 
chown) and the lower bar corresponds to that of the attacker (stat, unlink, symlink). 
Notice that the gap (the computation) between rename and chmod of gedit is only 3 
microseconds, but the gap between stat and unlink of the attacker is 17 microseconds. It 
is because of this relatively larger gap that the attacker’s unlink is called later than the 
victim’s chmod. Actually we can see that unlink is called later than chown and as a 
result unlink has to wait on the semaphore during its execution. The 17 microsecond gap 
of the attacker includes 11 microseconds of computation and 6 microseconds of system 
trap processing (page fault). Speaking in terms of D, these 17 microseconds are counted 
so D is around 22. On the other hand L is around 193 −=− D , so according to formula 
(1) the attack success rate is probably 0. Putting this in another way, the victim is now 
much faster than the attacker, so it is very difficult for the attacker to win the race. 
2.4.4.2.2 Attack Two 
 We think that the 17 microsecond gap in Figure 19 is mainly responsible for the 
low success rate. If we could reduce the length of this gap then the situation may change. 
A source code analysis tells us that before the vulnerability window the true branch of 
statement 3 in Figure 14 (statements 5 to 7) is never taken. Once the vulnerability 
window starts, the true branch of statement 3 is taken, and then statement 5 (unlink) is 
about to be executed. Right at this point the attacker program encounters a trap (page 
fault). We figure out that this effect is due to the memory management for shared 
libraries in Linux.  Specifically, in Linux all system calls are through libc, which is a 
dynamic library shared among user-level applications. To save physical memory, Linux 
kernel keeps only one copy of libc in physical memory, and its virtual memory 
mechanism maps the pages of this copy to the address space of an application on demand. 
For example, the physical page containing the wrapper for unlink is mapped into an 
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application’s address space when this application first invokes unlink. This mapping is 
preceded by a trap (page fault) and the corresponding handler routine carries out the 
mapping. This is exactly what happens in Figure 14, where unlink is first invoked when 
the true branch of statement 3 is taken. As a consequence, if we intentionally invoke 
unlink (and symlink although it seems to be on the same page as unlink) before the true 
branch of statement 3 is taken, we may remove the trap (page fault). 
 So we re-implement the attacker program as shown in Figure 20. Now unlink and 
symlink are called no matter the vulnerability window appears or not. The only trick is to 
switch in the correct file name when it does appear. 
 Then we perform the gedit attack experiment again using the program in Figure 
20. And we begin to see many successes! 
 
Figure 20: gedit attack program version 2 
 We plot the important system events during one successful gedit attack in Figure 
21, similar to Figure 19. We can see that now the gap between stat and unlink of the 
attacker has decreased to 2 microseconds: the trap has disappeared. On the other hand, 
the gap between rename and chmod of gedit is 2 microseconds. So the attacker has a 
very narrow chance of winning the race. In this particular case, the attacker wins because 
his/her stat starts well before the end of rename, so he/she identifies the vulnerability 
1    while (!finish){  /* argv[1] holds real_filename */ 
2      if (stat(argv[1], &stbuf) == 0){ 
3         if ((stbuf.st_uid == 0) && (stbuf.st_gid == 0)) 
4           { 
5              fname = argv[1]; 
6              finish = 1; 
7           } 
8         else 
9              fname = dummy; 
10 
11       unlink(fname); 
12       symlink(“/etc/passwd”, fname); 
13    }//if stat(argv[1] .. 
14  }//while 
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window at the first moment, and invokes unlink ahead of chmod. Has the attacker been 
2 microseconds later, the attack would fail. 
 
Figure 21: Successful gedit attack (program 2) 
on a multi-core 
 Notice that during this attack the running time of stat has been lengthened to 26 
microseconds (typically it needs 4 microseconds), probably due to some other more 
complicated race condition (For example the contention for directory entries along the 
path name). We are not quite clear about the reason but this does not change the 
applicability of formula (1) because now we have a much earlier 1t  (27 microseconds 
into rename), which makes a L value of at least 1 microseconds. 
 This experience tells us that on multiprocessors the implementation of the attacker 
program can be very critical in determining the attack success rate, especially when the 
vulnerability window is very narrow. 
2.4.5. Pipelining Attacker Program 
 The multi-core gedit experiment highlights the importance of the implementation 
of the attacker program. Concretely, we found that among the three steps of the attack 
(stat, unlink, symlink), unlink is the most time-consuming.  A closer look into the file 
system source code shows that actually symlink needs not wait on the completion of 
unlink. Instead symlink can begin once the inode has been detached from the directory 
by unlink, which happens relatively early.  (The main part of unlink is spent physically 
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truncating the file.)  This observation shows that on a multiprocessor, the attacker can 
distribute its attack steps to multiple CPUs to speed up the attack part and increase its 
success rate. 
 
Figure 22: The effect of parallelizing the attack program 
 To confirm this hypothesis, we implemented a multithreaded gedit attack program 
with two threads: the first thread carries out the stat, unlink steps and the second thread 
carries out the symlink step asynchronously. Figure 22 shows the effect of parallelizing 
the attack program for three different file sizes. For each file size (e.g. 500KB), there are 
three bars: the first two bars correspond to the execution of the two threads in a 
parallelized attack program, and the third bar corresponds to the execution of the normal 
sequential attack program.  In the parallelized attack, symlink can finish (and so does the 
attack) well before the end of unlink.  This is in contrast to the sequential attack, where 
symlink has to wait until unlink finishes.  The comparison between the end times of 
symlink shows that leveraging on the parallelism provided by a multiprocessor can 
greatly reduce the amount of time needed for a successful attack.  This is especially 
important when the vulnerability window is very narrow so the attacker needs to be very 
fast. This experiment shows one feasible way of doing it. 
2.5. A Methodical Defense against TOCTTOU Attacks: The EDGI Approach 
 In this part of the dissertation, we present the design, implementation, and 
evaluation of an event-driven defense mechanism (called EDGI) that prevents 

















exploitation of TOCTTOU vulnerabilities. The EDGI defense has several advantages 
over previously proposed solutions.  First, based on the CUU model (Section 2.2), EDGI 
is a systematically developed defense mechanism with careful design (using ECA rules) 
and implementation.  Assuming the completeness of the CUU model, EDGI can stop all 
TOCTTOU attacks.  Second, with careful handling of issues such as inference of 
invariant scopes and time-outs, EDGI allows very few false positives.  Third, it does not 
require changes to applications or file system API.  Fourth, our implementation on Linux 
kernel and its experimental evaluation show that EDGI carries little overhead. 
2.5.1. The Design of EDGI 
2.5.1.1.Overview 
 We propose an event driven approach, called EDGI (Event Driven Guarding of 
Invariants), to defend applications against TOCTTOU attacks. The design requirements 
of EDGI are:  
1. It should solve the problem within the file system, and does not change the API, so 
that existing or future applications need not be modified. 
2. It should solve the problem completely, i.e., no false negatives. 
3. It should not add undue burden on the system, i.e., very low rate of false positives. 
4. It should incur very low overhead on the system.  
 EDGI consists of three design steps (described in the rest of this section), a 
concrete implementation (Section 2.5.2), and an experimental evaluation (Section 2.5.3).  
The first design step is to map the CUU model into invariants in a concrete file system 
(Linux in our case) and the kernel calls that preserve the invariants.  The second design 
step uses ECA (event-condition-action) rules [26, 36] to model the concrete invariant 
preservation methods, so we can have reasonable assurance the invariants are indeed 
preserved.  The third design step completes the design by addressing the remaining issues 
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such as the automated inference of invariant scope and inheritance of invariants by 
children processes. 
 Under the CUU model’s assumption, the “Check” part of a sequence of 
operations on a file object creates an invariant that should be preserved through to the 
corresponding “Use” part. Specifically, a file certified to be non-existent ( ∅=)( fresolve ) 
by the “Check” operations should remain non-existent until the “Use” operations create 
it.  Similarly, a file certified to be existent ( bfresolve =)( ) by the “Check” operations 
should remain the same file until the “Use” part (by the same user) accesses it.  
Identifying and preserving these two invariants ( ∅=)( fresolve  or bfresolve =)( ) are the 
main goals of EDGI approach. 
 The EDGI design treats an invariant as a sophisticated lock. The user invoking a 
“Check” call becomes the owner of the lock, and the lock is usually held by the same user 
through the “Use” call.  Due to the complications of Unix file system, the invariant 
handling is more complicated than a normal lock compatibility table.  Therefore, we 
represent the invariant handling using ECA rules, as explained in the following section. 
We note that we only use ECA rules as a model, since our implementation does not 
support general-purpose rule processing. 
2.5.1.2. Invariant Maintenance 
 The EDGI approach adopts a modular design and implementation strategy by 
separating the EDGI invariant processing from the existing kernel. The invariant-related 
information is maintained as extra state information for each file object.  When an 
invariant-related event is triggered, the corresponding set of conditions is evaluated and if 
necessary, appropriate actions are taken to maintain the invariant. 
 The invariant-related information for each file object includes its state (free or 
actively used), a tainted flag, invariant holder user id and a process list.  In detail: 
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• refcnt – the number of active processes using the file object. When refcnt = 0, the file 
object is free. 
• tainted – when refcnt > 0, this flag means whether the name to disk object binding 
can be trusted. 
• fsuid – the user id of the processes that are actively using the file object. 
• gh_list – a doubly-linked list, in which each node contains a process id and the 
timestamp of the last system call made by the process on the file object. 
 Two kinds of events trigger condition evaluation: 
• File system calls such as access, open, and mkdir. 
• Process operations: fork, execve, exit. 
 The conditions evaluated by each event and their associated actions are 
summarized in Table 12 (f denotes the file object). The conditions refer to the file object 
status (whether the invariant is ∅=)( fresolve  or bfresolve =)( ), and actions include the 
creation, removal and potentially more complex invariant maintenance actions. 
2.5.1.3. Inferring Invariant Scope 
 EDGI prevents TOCTTOU attacks by making the sequence of system calls on a 
file object safe. As suggested by Proposition 3 (Section 2.2.2.4), the invariant 
maintenance rules in Table 12 are not restricted to a TOCTTOU pair, but extend to a 
sequence of file system calls. During the time such a sequence of accesses exists, the file 
object is said to be actively used. Otherwise the file object is said to be free. 
 The interval during which the file object is actively used forms the scope of its 
invariant.  The scope varies in length, depending on the number of consecutive “Use” 
calls made by the application.  Consequently, a significant technical challenge is to 
correctly identify this scope - the boundaries of the TOCTTOU vulnerability window of 
the application. Since current Unix-style file systems are oblivious to such application-
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level semantics, we need to infer the scope, so no changes are imposed on the 
applications or the file system interfaces. 
Table 12: Invariant Maintenance Rules in EDGI 
 
 The inference of invariant scope is guided by the CUU model, which specifies the 
initial TOCTTOU pair explicitly.  The “Use” call of the initial pair becomes the “Check” 
call of the next pair, completed by the following “Use” call.  According to Proposition 2, 
the CUU model correctly captures the TOCTTOU problem. The invariant of the initial 
pair is maintained from the “Check” call through the “Use” call, and then to the 
additional “Use” calls. The sequence continues until the program ends, a time-out or 
Name Event Condition Action 
Incarnation rule Any system 
call on f 
refcnt == 0 Set f’s state as actively used (refcnt++); set its 
tainted flag as false, fsuid as current user id, record 




call on f 
refcnt > 0 and 
fsuid == current user id and 
tainted == false 
Record current pid and current system time in the 
gh_list. 
Abort rule Any system 
call on f 
refcnt > 0 and 
fsuid == current user id and 
tainted == true 
Record current pid and current system time in the 




call on f 
refcnt > 0 and 
fsuid != current user id and 
current user id == root 
Remove all invariant holders information from the 
gh_list; set f’s fsuid as current user id, set refcnt as 1, 
tainted as false, record current pid and current 




call on f 
refcnt > 0 and 
fsuid != current user id and 
current user id != root and 
fsuid != root and 
current user is the owner of  f 
Remove all invariant holders information from the 
gh_list; set f’s fsuid as current user id, set refcnt as 1, 
tainted as false, record current pid and current 





call in the 
RemovalSet 
(Section 
2.2.3.2) on f 
refcnt > 0 and  
fsuid != current user id 
Traverse the gh_list to get the latest timestamp t, 
compute the interval between t and current time, if it 
is less than threshold MAX_AGE, deny the current 
request, otherwise grant the current request and set 





call in the 
CreationSet 
(Section 
2.2.3.2) on f 
refcnt > 0 and  
fsuid != current user id 
Traverse the gh_list to get the latest timestamp t, 
compute the interval between t and current time, if it 
is less than threshold MAX_AGE, deny the current 
request, otherwise grant the current request and set 
tainted as true. 
Clone rule Fork (parent, 
child) 
True For each file object that has parent in its gh_list, 




Exit True Remove current pid from the gh_list of each file 
object that has it on its gh_list, and decrement the 
corresponding refcnt. 
Distract rule Execve True Remove current pid from the gh_list of each file 
object that has it on its gh_list, and decrement the 
corresponding refcnt. 
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preemption occurs (see Section 2.5.1.4). In summary, the scope of an invariant is a safe 
sequence of system calls (Definition 5 in Section 2.2.1.2). 
2.5.1.4. Remaining Issues 
 There are some additional issues that need to be resolved for an actual 
implementation.  First, if we consider the invariants as similar to locks, then the question 
of dead-lock and live-lock arises.  For example, it is possible that an invariant holder is a 
long-running process which only touches a file object at the very beginning and then 
never uses it again.  Consequently, a legitimate user may be prevented from 
creating/deleting the file object for a long time, resulting in denial of service. This 
problem can be addressed by a time out mechanism.  If an invariant holder process does 
not access a file object for an exceedingly long time, the invariant will be temporarily 
disabled to allow other legitimate users to proceed.  (Timeout is discussed in Section 
2.5.3.2.) 
 If the time-out results in simple preemption (i.e., breaking the lock), then this 
method may be used to attack very long application runs.  To prevent the preemption-
related attack, we use a tainted bit to mark the preemption. After a preemption-related file 
creation or deletion, the invariant no longer holds. EDGI marks the file object as tainted, 
so the next access request from the original invariant holder will be aborted.  
 The second and related problem is the relationship between the current invariant 
holder and the next process attempting to access the file object.  Up to now, we have 
assumed a symmetric relationship, without distinguishing legitimate users from attackers.  
In reality, we know some processes are more trustworthy than others. Specifically, in 
Unix environments we trust the file object owner and root processes completely.  
Consequently, we allow these processes to “break the lock” by preempting other 
invariant holders. Concretely, when the file object owner or root process attempt to 
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access a file object, they immediately become the invariant holder, and the invariant for 
the former holder is removed. 
 The third issue is the inheritance of invariants by children processes.  For 
example, after a user process checks on a file object and becomes an invariant holder, it 
spawns a child process, and terminates. In the mean time, the child process continues, and 
uses the file object.  In the simple solution, the invariant is removed when the owner 
(parent) process terminates.  In this case an attacker can achieve a TOCTTOU attack 
before the child process uses the file. Thus we must extend the scope of invariants to the 
child process at every process creation. This invariant inheritance extension is analogous 
to the invariant scope extension discussed in Section 2.5.1.3. 
 A final question is whether the EDGI approach is a complete solution, capable of 
stopping all TOCTTOU attacks. For every file system call, the rules summarized in Table 
12 are checked and followed.  The first time a “Check” call is invoked on a file object, 
that user becomes the file object’s invariant holder. At any given time there is at most one 
invariant holder for each file object.  Users other than the invariant holder are not allowed 
to create or remove the file object (including changes to mapping between the name and 
disk objects). Therefore, the EDGI defense is able to stop all TOCTTOU attacks 
identified by the CUU model. 
2.5.2. Linux Implementation of EDGI 
 We have implemented the design described in the previous section in the Linux 
file system.  The implementation consists of modular kernel modifications to maintain 
the invariants for every file object and its user/owner. We outline the process that 
remembers the invariant holder of each file object (Section 2.5.2.1) and then the 
maintenance of the invariants (Section 2.5.2.2). 
2.5.2.1. Invariant Holder Tracking 
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 Invariant holder tracking is accomplished by maintaining a hash table of 
pathnames that keeps track of the processes that are actively using each file object. The 
index to this hash table is the file pathname, and for each entry, a list of process ids is 
maintained.  Our modular implementation augments the existing directory entry (dentry) 
cache code and extends its data structures with the fields introduced in Section 2.5.1.2: 
fsuid, refcnt, tainted, gh_list. 
 Before a system call uses a file object by name, it first needs to resolve the 
pathname to a dentry. Our implementation instruments the Linux kernel to call the 
invariant holder tracking algorithm after each such pathname resolution. There are two 
possible approaches to implementing this algorithm.  The first is to instrument the body 
of every system call (e.g., sys_open) that uses a file pathname as argument. The second is 
to instrument the pathname resolution functions themselves (in the Linux case, 
link_path_walk and lookup_hash). 
 The first approach has the disadvantage that instrumented code has to spread over 
many places, making testing and maintenance difficult. Although techniques such as 
Aspect Oriented Programming (AOP) [31] could help, we were unable to find a 
sufficiently robust C language aspect weaver tool that can work on Linux kernel. The 
second approach has the advantage that only a few (in the Linux case, exactly two) places 
need to be instrumented, making the testing and maintenance relatively easy. We chose 
the second approach for our implementation. 
 The invariant holder tracking algorithm GH is shown in Figure 23. This algorithm 
effectively implements the rules summarized in Table 12, and it is called right before 
link_path_walk and lookup_hash successfully returns. 
 Line 1-2 of the invariant holder tracking algorithm addresses the situation where a 
new invariant holder is identified: invariant related data structure is initialized, including 
the invariant holder user id (fsuid), the invariant holder process id, the tainted flag, and a 
timestamp. After these steps, the invariant maintenance part (Section 2.5.2.2) will start 
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applying this invariant. We can see that the same sequence also occurs in Lines 10 and 
























Input: dentry d 
Output: 0 – succeed, -1 – the binding of d is tainted. 
if d.refcnt = 0 
then d.fsuid ← current user id, record current pid and current time in d.gh_list,  
d.refcnt++, d.tainted ← false, return 0. 
else  
    if d.fsuid = current user id 
    then record current pid and current time in  d.gh_list, if d.tainted = false 
                        then return 0 
                         else  return -1. 
    else 
       if current user id = root 
       then remove all invariants on d.gh_list,  d.fsuid ← root, record current pid  
and current time in d.gh_list, d.refcnt ←1, d.tainted ← false, return 0. 
       else 
             if d.fsuid = root 
             then return 0. 
             else  
                   if current user id is the owner of d 
                   then remove all invariants on d.gh_list, d.fsuid ← current user id,  
record current pid and current time in d.gh_list, d.refcnt←1, d.tainted ← false,  
return 0. 
                   else return 0. 
Figure 23: Invariant Holder Tracking Algorithm 
 Lines 4-7 address the situation in which an existing invariant holder accesses the 
file object again. Notice that the tainted flag is checked to abort the invariant holder 
process if the name to disk binding of the file object has been changed by another user’s 
process (Section 2.5.2.2). 
 Lines 9-10 correspond to the preemption of invariant from a normal user to the 
root discussed in Section 2.5.1.4. Similarly, lines 15-16 handle the preemption by file 
object owner. 
 The invariant holder tracking algorithm needs the current process id and current 
user id runtime information, which are obtained from the current global data structure 
maintained by the Linux kernel. 
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2.5.2.2. Invariant Maintenance 
 The second part of implementation is invariant maintenance by thwarting the 
attacker’s attempt to change the name to disk binding of a file object, which in turn is 
achieved by deleting or creating a file object.  We instrumented two kernel functions to 
perform invariant checks: 
• may_delete(d): this function is called to do permission check before deleting a file 
object d. We add invariant checking after all the existing checks have been passed: If 
d.refcnt > 0 and the current user id is not the same as d.fsuid, traverse d.gh_list to get 
the last access timestamp; if it is younger than MAX_AGE, return –EBUSY (file 
object in use and cannot be deleted). Otherwise set d.tainted as true and return 0. 
• may_create(d): this function is called to do permission check before creating a file 
object, similar invariant checking is added after all the existing checks have been 
passed. 
 
 The may_create kernel function is called by all the system calls in the 
CreationSet (Section 2.2.3.2) and the may_delete function is called by all the system 
calls in the corresponding RemovalSet.  These invariant checks implement the Invariant 
Maintenance Rules 1 and 2 in Table 12. 
2.5.2.3.Engineering of EDGI Software  
 Table 13 shows the size of EDGI implementation in Linux kernel 2.4.28.  The 
changes were concentrated in one file (dcache.c), which was changed by about 55% 
(LOC means lines of code).  The other changes were small, with less than 5% change in 
one other file (namei.c), plus single-line changes in three other files.  This 
implementation of less than 1000 LOC was achieved after careful control and data flow 
analysis of the kernel, plus some tracing. We consider this implementation to be highly 
modular and relatively easily portable to other Linux releases.  
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 From top-down point of view, the methodical design and implementation process 
benefited from the CUU model as a starting point.  Then, the ECA rules facilitated the 
reasoning of invariant maintenance.  The rules were translated into the Invariant Holder 
Tracking algorithm.  These steps give us the confidence that the invariants are maintained 
by EDGI software. 
 Conversely, from a bottom-up point of view, the Linux kernel was organized in a 
methodical way.  For example, it has exactly two functions (may_delete and 
may_create) controlling all file object status changes. By guarding these two functions, 
we were able to guard all 224 TOCTTOU pairs identified by the CUU model.  This kind 
of function factoring in the Linux kernel contributed to the modular implementation of 
EDGI. 
Table 13: Linux Implementation of EDGI 





fs/dcache.c 4 1,307 749 
fs/namei.c 5 2,047 84 
fs/exec.c 1 1,157 1 
kernel/exit.c 1 602 1 
kernel/fork.c 1 896 1 
2.5.3. Experimental Evaluation of EDGI  
2.5.3.1. Discussion of False Negatives 
 The EDGI system design follows the CUU model.  In Section 2.5.1.4 we included 
an informal argument for the completeness of the CUU model, details of which can be 
found in Section 2.2.2.  If the ECA rules summarized in Table 12 captures all the 
TOCTTOU pairs identified by the CUU model, and the invariant holder tracking 
algorithm in Figure 23 implements all the rules in Table 12, and our Linux kernel 
implementation (Section 2.5.2) is correct, then our implementation should have zero false 
negatives. 
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 We have run all the attack experiments we could find, including known 
TOCTTOU vulnerabilities such as logwatch 2.1.1 [52] and new vulnerabilities recently 
detected, including rpm, vi/vim, and emacs. In all the experiments the EDGI system is 
able to stop the attacker program. 
 One exception to the invariant maintenance rules is the preemption by programs 
running as root, which are allowed to gain the invariant and change file object status at 
will.  We consider this exception to be safe, since if an attacker has already obtained root 
privileges, there is no further gain for using TOCTTOU attacks. 
2.5.3.2. Discussion of False Positives 
 As mentioned in Section 2.5.1.4, our conservation maintenance of invariants may 
introduce long delays, if an invariant holder runs for a long time. These long delays can 
be considered a kind of false positives, since they may or may not be necessary. Our 
implementation introduces a time-out mechanism to mitigate this problem.  If another 
user’s process wants to create/delete the file object and encounters the last access time by 
the invariant holder to be older than the time-out period, the new process is allowed to 
preempt the invariant and the file object is marked as tainted.  If the original invariant 
holder attempts to use the file object again, then we have found a real conflict.  The 
current implementation aborts the original invariant holder, although other design choices 
are possible. 
 The determination of a suitable time-out period, called MAX_AGE in Table 12, is 
probably dependent on each specific workload and a research question. If it is too short, 
an attacker may use it to abort a long running legitimate process by attempting to 
create/delete a shared file.  If it is too long, another legitimate process may be delayed for 
a long time. We have experimentally chosen a MAX_AGE of 60 seconds. 
2.5.3.3. Overhead Measurements 
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 To evaluate the overhead introduced by our EDGI defense mechanism, we run the 
same variant of the Andrew benchmark as used in Section 2.3.3.3. The experiments were 
run on a Pentium III 800MHz laptop with 640MB memory, running Red Hat Linux in 
single user mode.  We report the average and standard deviation of 20 runs for each 
experiment in Table 14, which compares the measurements on the original Linux kernel 
and on the EDGI-augmented Linux kernel.  The same data is shown as bar chart in Figure 
24. 
Table 14: Andrew Benchmark Results (in milliseconds) 



























Figure 24: Andrew Benchmark Results 
 The Andrew benchmark results show that EDGI generally has a moderate 
overhead.  The only exception is stat, which has 47% overhead. The explanation is that 
stat takes less time than other calls (such as mkdir), but the extra processing due to 
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invariant holder tracking (now part of pathname resolution) has a constant factor across 
different calls.  This constant overhead weighs more in short system calls such as stat.  
Fortunately, stat is used relatively rarely, thus the overall impact remains small. 
 We also evaluate the overhead of EDGI using the PostMark benchmark 
mentioned in Section 2.3.3.3. On the original Linux kernel the running time of this 
benchmark is 40.0 seconds. On EDGI-augmented kernel, with all the same parameter 
settings, the running time is 40.1 seconds (Again these results are averaged over 20 
rounds). So the overhead is 0.25%. This result corroborates the moderate overhead of 
EDGI. 
2.6. Related Work 
 Bishop and Dilger [6, 7] were the first to explore the TOCTTOU problem and 
developed a prototype analysis tool that used pattern matching to look for TOCTTOU 
pairs in the application source code. They suggested several solutions to the TOCTTOU 
problem, including modifications of file system interfaces. Several research projects have 
tried to prevent subsets of TOCTTOU vulnerabilities. RaceGuard [18] prevents the 
temporary file creation race condition in UNIX systems, specifically the <stat, open> 
TOCTTOU pair.  Dean and Hu [19] proposed a probabilistic approach to another specific 
TOCTTOU pair: <access, open>.  Interestingly however, Borisov [8] described an 
effective attack that can defeat Dean and Hu’s approach, which demonstrates the 
challenging nature of the TOCTTOU problem. 
 Tsyrklevich et al. proposed a more generic defense mechanism called pseudo-
transactions [57], which can be used to prevent some classes of TOCTTOU 
vulnerabilities from being exploited.  Pseudo-transactions work by wrapping known 
susceptible TOCTTOU pairs inside pseudo-transactions.  Their implementation of 
pseudo-transactions supports a flexible specification of allowed and denied file system 
call pairs.  However, they were only able to generate a set of specifications from 
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empirical refinement through practical use.  The main difference between the CUU 
model and pseudo-transactions is the complete enumeration of exploitable TOCTTOU 
pairs by the CUU model.  To the best of our knowledge, this complete enumeration has 
not been achieved before. 
 Static analysis of source code has recently shown some success in finding bugs in 
systems software. For example, Meta-compilation [20] and RacerX [21] use compiler-
extensions to find software bugs, and MOPS [13, 51] uses model checking to verify that a 
program preserves certain security properties.  These static analysis tools could be used to 
detect TOCTTOU pairs in programs.  However, they are limited in the detection of real 
TOCTTOU problems because of dynamic states (e.g., file names, ownership, and access 
rights). 
 In contrast to static analysis, dynamic detection monitors application execution to 
find software bugs without access to source code. These tools can be further classified 
into dynamic online analysis tools such as [34, 50] and post mortem analysis tools such 
as the one proposed by Ko et al. [33]. However, [33] can only detect the result of 
exploiting a TOCTTOU vulnerability, but not locate the error.  
 The difficulty of detection contrasts with the simplicity of some of the technical 
suggestions in advisories and reports on TOCTTOU exploits from US-CERT [58] and 
BUGTRAQ [11], including setting proper file/directory permissions and checking the 
return code of function calls.  However, some other suggested programming fixes are 
varied and non-trivial: using random numbers to obfuscate file names, replacing 
mktemp() with mkstemp(), and using a strict umask to protect temporary directories.  






 Our solution to the TOCTTOU problem illustrates one example of para-
transactional invariants (PTIs) that the mapping from the file pathname to the disk block 
number must remain invariant between the check call and the use call.  The EDGI 
defense against TOCTTOU attacks preserves this invariant by wrapping the check and 
use operations into an atomic execution unit similar to a database transaction, which 
guarantees that the invariant is preserved despite any concurrent processes (including the 
attack process). 
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CHAPTER 3                                                                       
K-QUEUE DRIVEN TRANSIENT KERNEL CONTROL FLOW 
ATTACKS 
 The second contribution of this dissertation research is a solution to K-Queue-
driven transient kernel control flow attacks.  We identify such attacks as a new hiding 
technique that can be used by an attacker to maintain stealthy control of the kernel 
(Section 3.1). Having addressed a representative subclass of such attacks (Section 3.3), 
we solve the complete class of K-Queue-driven attacks as a final step of this thesis 
(Section 3.4). 
3.1. Overview 
 Internet-scale attacks, such as botnets, often utilize malicious software (malware) 
to hide their presence and extract information from their host systems.  Rootkits, for 
example, are a common type of kernel-level malware that intercept and modify system 
events with the goal of hiding illicit activity [10, 29].  Other kernel-level malware can 
collect sensitive data, cause a denial of service, or open backdoors into the system.  In 
this chapter we present an attack technique that allows an attacker to execute kernel-level 
malware while evading detection from existing defensive tools.  We then focus on 
techniques for detecting and mitigating the attack. 
 We divide attacks designed to maintain stealthy control of the victim kernel into 
three broad and sometimes overlapping categories: (1) detour attacks, (2) persistent 
kernel control flow attacks, and (3) transient kernel control flow attacks. The first 
category consists of malware (malicious software) that changes code on a disk or in 
memory.  These changes can be detected by trusted security tools that compare the 
current state of the system code against a known good state (e.g., a “gold” distribution 
version).  The second category consists of attacks that are capable of invoking malicious 
 74
functions during execution by changing data (e.g., function pointers in the interrupt 
handler table).  The attacks in this category do not make any changes to the kernel code, 
but they can be detected by control flow integrity (CFI) [1] and state-based control flow 
integrity (SBCFI) [42].  However, the attacks in the third category are capable of evading 
current defensive techniques. 
 This category, transient kernel control flow attacks, can achieve continual 
malicious function execution without persistently changing either kernel code or data 
(from the “gold” distribution).  One class of transient kernel control flow attacks is K-
Queue-driven attacks that use existing kernel interfaces (called K-Queues) to 
dynamically schedule executions of malicious functionality in the kernel space. K-
Queues are dynamic schedulable queues in the kernel that can be used to inject transient 
control flows.  All instances of K-Queues share some common properties. For example, 
they all provide APIs for submitting an execution request for some callback function, and 
they all have a dispatch engine that takes the request from the queue and invokes the 
callback function.  A kernel level malware can abuse these APIs to request that its 
malicious code be invoked as a callback function.  We have confirmed that this is feasible 
for the soft-timer queue, one type of K-Queue (Section 3.2.3). K-Queue-driven attacks 
are difficult to detect because malicious requests of the malware are hidden among the 
many other requests from legitimate kernel components, which prevents CFI and SBCFI 
from detecting them in this scenario. 
 To defend against K-Queue-driven transient control flow attacks, we verify and 
preserve a class of para-transactional invariants (PTIs) at runtime: A legitimate K-Queue 
callback function and its callees (functions it calls) should always target trusted code of 
the kernel during the execution of the callback function. In other words, the control flow 
resulting from a legitimate K-Queue request should never include the malware code.  If 
we can preserve these invariants, we can guarantee that control will never go to the 
malware code as a result of invoking a K-Queue callback function, which suggests that 
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K-Queue-driven transient control flow attacks can be defeated by preserving the related 
invariants. 
 Our defense encodes the PTIs associated with K-Queues into a whitelist of K-
Queue summary signatures.  Each K-Queue summary signature is a two-element tuple: 
<function, assertion>.  function represents a legitimate K-Queue callback function, and 
assertion represents properties of the legitimate data passed to the legitimate callback 
function as input.   We add a reference monitor to the system that verifies each pending 
K-Queue request (represented by a function attribute and a data attribute) before invoking 
the callback function.  Specifically, the function attribute is used to look up a summary 
signature database.  If a matching signature is found and the data attribute satisfies the 
matching assertion, the verification is successful, and the callback function is invoked.  
Otherwise, the callback function is not invoked. 
 Although our basic idea is straight-forward, completely implementing it is 
challenging.  The first challenge is the building of the summary signature database.  In 
order to find out all legitimate uses of a particular K-Queue, the entire code base of the 
kernel, including device drivers, needs to be studied.  However, a modern kernel is very 
complex, which means that hundreds of places may submit requests to a particular K-
Queue. Obviously, it is impractical to find all such K-Queue uses manually.  Fortunately, 
significant amount of information is already embedded in the kernel source code 
concerning the uses of K-Queues.  For example, there are certain “contract” (e.g., calling 
conventions, APIs, or helper functions) between the K-Queues and their requesters. So 
we can infer K-Queue usage by searching for such “contract” patterns in the kernel 
source code.  By applying static code analysis, we perform this kind of inference in an 
automated way. 
 Another challenge is the development of a checker program based on the result of 
the static analysis.  Again it is impractical to write the code manually because the 
verification can be very complex.  For example, a top-level K-Queue callback function 
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may need to be compared against hundreds of candidate functions, and depending on the 
candidate function the data attribute may need to be tested in many different ways. 
Obviously, manually writing and maintaining such code is tedious and error prone.  
Fortunately, this tediousness can be alleviated by applying automated code generation.  
The observation is that most of the checker code can be generated as a by-product of the 
static analysis process. 
 Our approach significantly reduces the amount of human labor in the summary 
signature generation and coding of the K-Queue checker.  For example, out of 46 
legitimate soft timer callback functions in a particular kernel of 482,369 lines of code, 
only one callback function is missed by the static analyzer. If the static analyzer is not 
used, all 46 callback functions would have to be manually recognized and their checker 
code manually written. 
3.2. K-Queue Driven Transient Control Flow Attacks 
3.2.1. Overview of Kernel Control Flows 
 We use Linux as a concrete and representative multi-threaded kernel.  The Linux 
kernel can have a number of control flows (listed in Figure 25): exception handlers, 
interrupt service routines, Softirqs, and kernel threads such as work queues [9]. 
 Of the various kinds of kernel control flows, exception and interrupt handlers 
execute at the highest priority, usually with interrupts disabled.  Exceptions such as 
system calls are a result of process invocation.  Interrupts are used by hardware (e.g., I/O 
devices) to notify the kernel of urgent events (for example, arrival of a packet in the 
network interface card that needs to be copied to kernel/user buffers). 
 Some exception and interrupt handler operations are interruptible and executed in 
Softirqs, for example, sending the keyboard line buffer to the terminal handler process.  
Softirqs are invoked in interrupt context (e.g. when the service routine for an I/O interrupt 
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is finished), but with interrupt enabled. Softirqs reduce the kernel response time to 
exceptions and interrupts. 
 Furthest from hardware, kernel threads execute in process context and are 
therefore fully interruptible.  They are interleaved with user processes, with the main 
difference being that kernel threads execute in kernel context while user processes 
execute in user process context.   
 
Figure 25: Kernel Control Flows with Schedulable Queues (Linux Kernel 2.6) 
3.2.2. K-Queues in the Linux Kernel 
 The kernel control flows outlined in Figure 25 are executed by the kernel through 
kernel schedulable queues or K-Queues for short.  These K-Queues are implemented as 
linked lists.  Representative K-Queues (with descending execution priorities) include IRQ 




3.2.2.1. IRQ Action Queues 
 When an interrupt happens, the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) is used to find 
the corresponding Interrupt Service Routine (ISR), which may in turn delegate the 
interrupt handling to several IRQ actions. This is because multiple I/O devices can share 
an interrupt pin; therefore each of them may have its own way of handling the shared 
interrupt. The Linux kernel uses IRQ action queues to support such interrupt sharing.  
Each element of an IRQ action queue is a structure irqaction (Figure 26), which contains 
a handler field, a dev_id field, a pointer to the next element in the queue (the next field), 
and other information.  The handler field is a function pointer to the handler routine, and 
the dev_id field is used to uniquely identify the device that provides the handler routine.  
When an interrupt happens, the ISR invokes all handler routine in the corresponding IRQ 
action queue. 
3.2.2.2. Tasklet Queues 
 Compared to Interrupt Service Routines, tasklets are the preferred way to 
implement deferrable functions in I/O device drivers.  For example, a gigabit network 
interface card driver may dynamically adjust the size of receive buffers according to their 
fill level (e.g., allocate more buffer space when the fill level exceeds certain threshold).  
The expansion of receive buffers can be time consuming due to allocation of more kernel 
struct work_struct { 
        unsigned long pending; 
        struct list_head entry;  
        void (*func)(void *); 
        void *data; 
        void *wq_data;   
        struct timer_list timer; 
 }; 
Figure 28: The Definition of 




        struct tasklet_struct *next; 
        unsigned long state; 
        atomic_t count; 
        void (*func)(unsigned long); 
        unsigned long data; 
}; 
Figure 27: The Definition of 
tasklet_struct in Linux Kernel 
2.6 
struct irqaction {       
        irqreturn_t (*handler)(int, 
void *, struct pt_regs *); 
        unsigned long flags; 
        cpumask_t mask;  
        const char *name;  
        void *dev_id; 
        struct irqaction *next; 
        int irq;         
        struct proc_dir_entry *dir; 
};
Figure 26: The Definition 
of irqaction in Linux 
Kernel 2.6 
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memory, and it should be interruptible, being an optimization that does not affect the 
correct reception of packets.  Consequently, the device driver can request a tasklet to 
expand receive buffers, instead of doing it in the receive interrupt handler. 
 As Figure 27 shows, a tasklet request contains a callback function pointer (in the 
func field) and a data pointer.  In Linux, the tasklet request is inserted into one of two 
tasklet queues, implemented by two Softirqs (numbers 0 and 5).  When the do_softirq 
function comes across a tasklet structure (Figure 27) during the traversal of the two 
queues, it invokes the callback function and passes on the data field as the input 
parameter. 
3.2.2.3. Work Queues 
 Work queues are used to schedule kernel threads that interleave with user 
processes.  Compared to tasklets, which execute in interrupt context, work queues 
execute kernel threads in kernel context.  Consequently, work queues run at lower 
priority than tasklets. 
 A work queue is a linked list of work requests (Figure 28), dynamically inserted 
through functions such as queue_work. Similar to a tasklet, each work request has a 
callback function (the func field) and a data field. The server for a work queue is a kernel 
thread such as events/0, which executes each element in the list by invoking its callback 
function with the data field passed on as the input parameter. 
 Linux kernel may have multiple work queues.  Two predefined work queues are 
the events work queue that can be used by all device drivers and the kblockd work queue 
used by the block device layer.  Additional work queues can be created at runtime. 
3.2.2.4. Soft Timer Queues 
 Since the attack scenarios described in Section 3.2.3 use soft timer queues, we 
provide more background information here.  Dynamic soft timer is a well-established 
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mechanism used by many kernel components to schedule the execution of timed-event 
handling functions. Common uses of soft timers include retries when polling a physical 
device, retransmission of data, and handling of network protocol timeouts. Figure 29 
shows one concrete example in Linux kernel 2.6.16, where a soft timer interrupt is used 
to implement the retransmission of data when the device is temporarily not ready.  
 
Figure 29: Use of soft timer in Linux-
2.6.16/drivers/char/isicom.c; the function 





Figure 30: A simplified view of the data 
structures related to soft timers 
 
 In the Linux kernel, the requester of a soft timer first prepares an instance of soft 
timer interrupt request (STIR) of type struct timer_list (such as tx in Figure 29), which 
contains information about the callback function (the function field), a data pointer (the 
data field), and the expiration time, among others. The add_timer function is invoked to 
add this instance of STIR into a linked list of pending timers: tvec_bases (Figure 30). 
 The soft timer queue is implemented by a Softirq (number 1) and STIRs executed 
in interrupt context (Figure 25).  When a STIR in the linked list expires, it is removed 
from the list, its callback function is invoked, and the data pointer is passed along to the 
callback function as the input parameter.  Typical callback functions also create the next 
















static struct timer_list tx; 
static void isicom_tx(unsigned long _data) 
{      ….. 
        init_timer(&tx);   
        tx.expires = jiffies + HZ/100;   
        tx.data = 0; 
        tx.function = isicom_tx; 
        add_timer(&tx); 
        return;  
} 
static int __devinit isicom_setup(void) 
{  
        …… 
        init_timer(&tx); 
        tx.expires = jiffies + 1;  tx.data = 0; 
        tx.function = isicom_tx; 
        add_timer(&tx);  
        …… 
} 
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3.2.3. Example Attacks Driven by K-Queues 
 A common feature among the K-Queues described in Section 3.2.2 is that they all 
contain some callback functions, and upon invocation such functions inject control flows 
into the main kernel control loop. Under the assumption that everything in the kernel 
space is equally trusted, such transfers of control are acceptable.  However, if one of the 
requesters is malicious, the K-Queue mechanism can be turned into a reliable way of 
maintaining stealthy control: an attack can be divided into a sequence of K-Queue 
requests and executed using successive callback functions.  In this section, we 
demonstrate that such an attack is possible by leveraging the soft timer queue (Section 
3.2.2.4). 
 For ease of presentation, we adopt a simple and informal model of kernel-level 
malware that executes useful work for a botnet owner or renter.  Under this model, the 
malware’s lifecycle can be divided into three steps: (1) system penetration, (2) interpose 
on the kernel control flow, and (3) continually execute malicious functionality.  
Penetration methods (step 1) such as buffer overflows [17] are well known and omitted 
from this discussion.  Previous persistent kernel control flow attacks (e.g., the rootkits 
listed in [42]) change kernel data structures (step 2) to force the kernel to branch/jump to 
malicious functionality (step 3).  Like persistent attacks, our new transient attacks 
interpose on the kernel’s control flow (step 2) at the time of the attack.  However, unlike 
persistent kernel control flow attacks, which typically replace a permanent function 
pointer in the kernel, a transient kernel control flow attack simply installs a malicious 
STIR (Section 3.2.2.4).  In our demonstration, malicious functionality is implemented 
using a Linux loadable kernel module (LKM) initialization function that requests the first 
STIR. When the malicious LKM is loaded, the kernel invokes its initialization function, 
and step 2 is completed.  The malware’s persistent execution (step 3) is possible because 
each STIR can request the next STIR that references the callback function.  For added 
stealth, the location of this callback function can change with each STIR execution. 
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 To understand the effectiveness of transient kernel control flow attacks, this 
section outlines the design of three soft timer driven attacks to show that they can 
perform a wide variety of malicious objectives.  These attacks are implemented as LKMs 
and run through the soft timer facility.  More specifically, they invoke the kernel API 
add_timer to request a STIR in their initialization function. add_timer takes as input a 
parameter that points to a data structure of type struct timer_list, and the function field 
of this structure is set to a callback function. A callback function is specific to the 
corresponding malware, but all such functions request the next STIR before they return, 
e.g., by calling add_timer. 
 The three soft-timer based malware examples below demonstrate violation of the 
three basic security properties: the stealthy key logger violates confidentiality, and the 
cycle stealer and the alter-scheduler violate both availability and integrity. 
3.2.3.1. Stealthy Key Logger 
 A typical class of malware steals sensitive information from the host node. A 
straightforward but easily detected malware implementation intercepts the kernel 
functions that process such sensitive information.  For example, a key logger [45] can 
replace the keyboard interrupt handler (e.g., IRQ 1) with a malicious handler that records 
the keyboard input.  The following implemented example shows that persistent kernel 
modifications are not needed for this type of malicious functionality. 
 
 
 A timer-driven key logger keeps kernel code and interrupt-related data structures 
intact.  It periodically looks at various buffers in the kernel, where the keyboard input 








kernel space user space
Figure 31: Flow of keyboard input information in Linux 
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generates an interrupt. The keyboard interrupt handler fetches the key stroke information 
and temporarily stores it in the TTY flip buffer before transferring it into the TTY line 
discipline buffer. Finally, when a user-level application reads from the standard input 
device, the keystroke information is copied into the user’s buffer. 
 The sampling rate determines whether or not a timer-driven key logger can 
capture every keystroke.  The key logger can obtain keystroke information from the TTY 
flip buffer, the TTY line discipline buffer, or the user’s buffer.  The TTY flip buffer has a 
very short retention time relative to the TTY line discipline buffer, which is a large 
circular buffer (normally 4096 bytes).  Since each keystroke generates 2 bytes of 
information, the TTY line discipline buffer can keep information on up to 2048 
keystrokes. Since it can take several minutes for the average user to fill up the line 
discipline buffer, the key logger malware only needs to inspect the buffer periodically 
(e.g., once per minute should be good enough) to collect all of the user’s keystrokes. In 
the event that more frequent sampling is required, the key logger can request faster soft 
timer interrupts.  In this case, techniques for hiding the higher resource consumption 
should be employed (see Section 3.2.3.2) to keep the key logger stealthy. 
 We have implemented the sampling key logger on Linux to collect key strokes 
from an X Window desktop. It captures keystrokes entered into X Window applications, 
including the gedit editor, the Firefox web browser, and terminal window emulators.  
These applications handle many security-critical keystrokes including usernames, 
passwords, and credit card numbers. 
3.2.3.2. Stealthy Denial of Service Attack (CPU Cycle Stealer) 
 A second common type of attack causes a denial of service (DoS) or lowered 
quality of service.  In a soft timer-driven attack, the call back function can perform 
computationally intensive work to steal system resources thereby slowing down or 
halting any legitimate application.  One simple CPU cycle stealer has been implemented 
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by inserting a program to compute the factorial of a given number in the call back 
function. By adjusting the value of the number and the timer’s period, different 
slowdown factor can be obtained. We measure the CPU usage during such an attack 
where the timer's period is fixed at one second, as shown in Figure 32. When the value of 
the number is below 25, the CPU consumption by the malware is negligible. As the value 
becomes larger, there is an exponential increase in the CPU consumption by the malware.  
For example, when the value is 36, the CPU consumption is about 54%, and when the 
value grows to 42, the CPU consumption is close to 100%.  Note that the actual algorithm 
used to steal CPU cycles is irrelevant to the attack.  Instead, this attack shows that a 
resource-exhaustion attack can be stealthily deployed, preventing the system from 
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Figure 32: CPU Consumption by Computing 
Factorials of Different Numbers 
 The attack becomes effective when the malware is able to hide itself and its 
effects from detection for a significant amount of time.  One problem with typical DoS 
attacks is that the wasted CPU cycles are detectable by system tools such as top.  This is 
because the kernel maintains performance accounting information for different sources of 
computation. For example, the CPU time consumed by the above malicious call back 
function is attributed to “software interrupt”. To hide this attack, the malicious call back 
function further manipulates the kernel accounting data (e.g., kstat_cpu(0).cpustat) such 
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that the CPU time used by the malicious STIR is attributed towards the idle CPU time. 
Therefore, it is not immediately obvious why the system performance is degrading. 
 Our CPU cycle stealer violates the availability of CPU resources and the integrity 
of the performance accounting information. However, since the performance accounting 
information is dynamic, there is no easy notion of what is normal. Under such attacks, a 
system may report slowdown of a service, but there can be many other reasons for poor 
performance (network congestion, server overload, retries due to device error, etc). 
Therefore, this type of attack is not easily discovered. 
3.2.3.3. Running a Hidden Process: the Alter-Scheduler 
 A third kind of malware, called alter-scheduler, is capable of running a malicious 
process without relying on the legitimate kernel scheduler.  Some existing malware can 
hide a malicious process by removing its entry from the all-task linked list of the kernel.  
However, this malware must leave the malicious task structure in the run queue in order 
for it to be scheduled.  Therefore, a detection tool such as [41] that cross-checks the all-
task linked list and the run queue is able to detect the malicious process. 
 The alter-scheduler malware implements a special scheduler exclusively for the 
malicious process.  It keeps a record of the malicious process structure and detaches it 
from both the all-task list and the standard run queue.  Within the STIR call back 
function, the alter-scheduler preempts the currently running task, as if a higher-priority 
process has become runnable.  Then it forces a context switch to the malicious process, as 
if the malicious process has been chosen as the new task to run.  The standard scheduler 
is resumed when the malicious process surrenders the CPU. 
 This style of attack is very powerful because the malicious process is made 
independent of (and thus invisible to) the legitimate kernel scheduler and other relevant 
routines, and the malicious alter-scheduler instead supplies the missing functionality 
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(e.g., giving the malicious process opportunities to run).  Therefore, malware based on 
the alter-scheduler can remain stealthy against state-of-the-art detectors such as [41]. 
3.3. A Specialized Defense against Soft-Timer-Driven Transient Kernel Control 
Flow Attacks 
3.3.1. Introduction 
 In this section, we discuss the design, implementation, and evaluation of a static 
analysis based tool that detects soft-timer driven attacks.  Under our security 
assumptions, this tool detects all soft-timer attacks with less than 7% performance 
overhead. 
 The static analysis tool uses summary signatures to differentiate STIRs from 
legitimate and malicious software.  Summary signatures characterize legitimate STIRs 
using callback functions and other constraints, and are derived through automated static 
analysis of the kernel source code.  At runtime, a reference monitor mediates STIR 
execution based on the summary signatures.  We take several measures to protect the 
reference monitor, including executing it in a different virtual machine and using memory 
protections to prevent an attacker from bypassing the mediation step.  Section 3.3.2 
provides a complete discussion of our architecture and its security properties. 
 In the rest of this section, we present our defense mechanism against such attacks.  
We describe the Xen-based prototype implementation of the defense and its evaluation in 
terms of effectiveness and performance overhead. 
3.3.2. Soft Timer Attack Detection and Defense 
 As described in Section 3.2.3, a soft timer based attack must usurp kernel control 
flow in order to execute malicious code.  Soft timers can be leveraged to do this in one of 
two ways: (Type 1) supply a malicious timer callback function, or (Type 2) supply a 
legitimate timer callback function but a malicious data pointer such that the control flow 
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of the legitimate callback function is modified to invoke malicious functionality as a 
subroutine (similar to the “jump-to-libc” style attacks [55]). The latter option is possible 
because when a STIR callback function is invoked, a data pointer embedded in the STIR 
is passed as the input parameter.  In some cases, the STIR callback function may derive a 
function pointer from this input, thereby allowing the data to alter the control flow. 
3.3.2.1. Security Assumptions and Threat Model 
 Our defensive techniques against soft timer attacks are based on four standard 
security assumptions.  First, since we use a virtualization-based architecture, we assume 
that the virtual machine manager (VMM) and the security virtual machine (VM) are part 
of the trusted computing base.  This assumption is based on the idea that the VMM code 
base can be small, and therefore auditable, and the interface between the guest VM and 
the VMM can be narrow and protected.  Our second assumption is that the legitimate 
kernel code in the guest VM’s memory can not be tampered with by malicious code.  In a 
production setting, this must be enforced by existing security tools such as Copilot [40] 
or SecVisor [53]. Third, we assume that the source code of the kernel and all kernel 
extensions are available for the static analysis portion of our tool.  Note that closed source 
operating system vendors could perform the static analysis and make the results available 
to the end-users.  For open source operating systems, the entire procedure can be 
performed by end-users. Lastly, in order to provide protections for this system, we 
require that the system can be booted into a known good state (i.e., secure boot [3]).  We 
then perform a brief initialization phase to setup our defensive system and then the guest 
VM is open to outside events and may be placed under attack at any time.   
 Our threat model allows an attacker to install malicious code on this system 
running at the highest privilege level.  The attacker is able to perform kernel-level 
attacks, but we assume that protections are in place to prevent tampering with kernel code 
as described above.  Under this model, the attacker is powerful and able to run soft timer 
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attacks unless our defensive system prevents them. This is a realistic threat model and no 
more constraining to an attacker than previous work in this space [42]. 
 
Figure 33: Illustration of a malicious STIR with a legitimate callback function 
(dev_watchdog in Linux kernel 2.6.16) and a malicious data pointer (Shaded area means 
malicious).  Here dev_watchdog may invoke a function pointer derived from the data 
field of the STIR. 
3.3.2.2. Legitimate STIR Identification 
 The basic idea of our proposed defense is to validate each STIR before its 
execution, thereby preventing the execution of malicious STIRs.  Based on the “fail-safe 
defaults” principle [49], we use a white list of STIR summary signatures to distinguish 
legitimate STIRs from malicious ones.  An unknown STIR that does not have a matching 
STIR summary signature is considered suspect and denied execution.   
3.3.2.2.1 STIR Summary Signatures 
 Recall that a malicious STIR can induce kernel control flow in two ways: (1) 
supply a malicious timer callback function, or (2) supply a legitimate timer callback 
function but a malicious data pointer.  In order to detect type 1 malicious STIRs, we only 
need to check their callback functions against a white list of legitimate timer callback 
functions.  However, in order to detect type 2 malicious STIRs, we must check the data 
pointer in addition to checking the callback function.  Figure 33 illustrates a type 2 
malicious STIR (in shaded color). This figure shows that the tx_timeout field of the 
data structure (in shaded color) referenced by the data pointer of the malicious STIR is 




















malicious STIR by comparing the tx_timeout field against a white list of legitimate 
functions (for example e1000_tx_timeout) that can be assigned to this field for the 
legitimate STIRs. 
 Consequently, we choose the STIR summary signature as a two-element tuple 
<function, assertion>, where function represents a legitimate timer callback function 
(e.g., dev_watchdog), and assertion represents properties of legitimate data passed to 
the legitimate callback function as input.  Specifically, an assertion is the logical AND of 
0 or more parameterized predicates.  Each predicate has the form “deref equals 
functionlist”, where deref specifies a way to dereference a function pointer (e.g., 
data−>tx_timeout), and functionlist is the logical OR of one or more legitimate 
functions that can be assigned to the dereferenced function pointer.  An example assertion 
associated with dev_watchdog is: 
 
 Figure 34 shows the overall processing of the STIR summary signatures, divided 
into three phases corresponding to compile time, initialization time and evaluation time, 
respectively.  In the first phase, Linux kernel source code is statically analyzed by the 
STIR Analyzer to generate the symbolic STIR summary signatures.  These signatures are 
symbolic because the addresses of the functions in them may be unknown at compile 
time (e.g., due to dynamic kernel module loading).  The actual mappings of these 
functions to their runtime addresses happen in the second phase, when the symbolic 
summary signatures become resolved summary signatures. This process is in some way 
similar to partial evaluation [16]. Finally, during the normal operation of the guest VM 
(e.g., the evaluation time), the STIR Checker (Section 3.3.2.3) uses the resolved summary 
signatures to prevent control transfers due to malicious STIRs. 
 In the first phase, the STIR Analyzer performs a top-level analysis to derive the 
function part of the STIR summary signatures and a transitive closure analysis to generate 
the assertion part of the STIR summary signatures.  The latter analysis identifies all 
(data−>tx_timeout equals (el000_tx_timeout OR xircom_tx_timeout)) 
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function pointer dereferences of the input parameter in the legitimate STIR callback 
functions, as well as all legitimate functions that they target. 
  
Figure 34: Overall processing of the STIR summary signatures 
3.3.2.2.2 Top-Level Analysis 
 We first consider the collection of legitimate STIR callback functions, which we 
call LegitTimerfuncs. These are the top-level functions that require validation 
before execution. Each function in LegitTimerfuncs will become the function part 
of a STIR summary signature after the transitive closure analysis. 
Table 15: Different ways of assigning timer 
callback functions in the Linux kernel 
t.function = fn; 
t = TIMER_INITIALIZER (fn, expires, data); 
DEFINE_TIMER(t, fn, expires, data); 
setup_timer(&t, fn, data); 
 
 
 LegitTimerfuncs is constructed by scanning the kernel source code to 
identify all legitimate instances of soft timer callback functions. Table 15 shows the four 
techniques to link soft timer callback functions, denoted fn, to the timer_list 
structure, denoted t.  The first is by assignment.  The second and third techniques are 





























the same way: the STIR Analyzer traverses each assignment statement (lval = rval) 
of each function in the Linux kernel, and if lval ends with a field named function within 
a structure of type timer_list, then rval is recognized as a soft timer callback 
function.  The last technique to link a soft timer callback function is to use the 
setup_timer procedure.  This technique is handled by traversing each function call to 
setup_timer and collecting the second parameter in the function call. 
 We assume that benign programmers follow the standard APIs in Table 15 to 
request STIRs. Since the top-level analysis considers all 4 ways in Table 15, it can 
capture all legitimate STIR callback functions. 
3.3.2.2.3 STIR Callback Transitive Closure Analysis 
 Verification of the top-level LegitTimerfuncs is insufficient to guarantee 
defense because it only addresses type 1 malicious STIRs and not type 2. To detect 
potential attacks in lower level subroutines, the second part of the STIR Analyzer checks 
the function calls within each callback function in LegitTimerfuncs to see if any of 
them allows indirect control transfers.  Concretely, if function pointers are derived from 
the input parameter of a callback function and the callback function further branches to 
one of those pointers, then the analyzer raises a flag to indicate that the callback function 
needs a transitive closure analysis of all such pointers. 
 Figure 35 shows the high-level algorithm for the transitive closure analysis. Given 
a callback function fn with parameter arg, the STIR Analyzer first traverses each 
assignment statement of fn to compute the set of variables (tainted_vars) whose 
value can be influenced by arg, directly or indirectly. Next, the STIR Analyzer searches 
every function call statement of fn to see if the target function or its parameter is 
influenced by any variable in tainted_vars. Existence of such a function call means 
that control can go to places decided by arg, which could be exploited by malware. 
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 If the STIR Analyzer does not raise a flag for a callback function in the transitive 
closure analysis, a signature <function, assertion> is completed where function is the 
name of the callback function, and assertion is simply the boolean value true (which 




 If the STIR Analyzer raises a flag, a further step is performed to compute the 
assertion. This step can be further subdivided into three cases. 
 Case 1: Only the function name part of a function call statement (e.g. f in 
f(params) of Figure 35) is influenced by the input parameter (arg), which means that 
arg is used to derive a function pointer. In this case, the third step decides the legitimate 
functions that can be assigned to the function pointer derived from arg. For each distinct 
way of dereferencing arg, a predicate “deref equals functionlist” is generated, where 
deref specifies the way to dereference arg, and functionlist is the logical OR of 
legitimate functions that can be assigned to the dereferenced function pointer. The 
assertion then is the logical AND of all such predicates. The process of deriving 
legitimate functions in a predicate is similar to the top-level analysis (section 3.3.2.2.2) 
which identifies the timer callback functions. 
 Case 2: Only the parameter part of a function call statement (e.g. params in 
f(params) of Figure 35) is influenced by the input parameter arg. In this case, the 
same analysis in Figure 35 is applied to f, and all resultant predicates are appended 
(ANDed) to the assertion. 
Transitive closure analysis of fn(arg): 
    - Initially arg is added to tainted_vars; 
- For each assignment statement lval = rval or lval = f’(rval) in fn: 
       If any part of rval is in tainted_vars, then lval is added to tainted_vars. 
    - For each function call statements f(params) in fn: 
         If any part of f(params) is in tainted vars, then raise a flag for fn.
Figure 35: Analysis of each STIR callback function 
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 Case 3: Both the function name and the parameter of a function call statement are 
influenced by arg.  The third step treats this case as a composition of case 1 and case 2. 
E.g., it first processes the function name part to derive the legitimate functions and then 
processes the parameter part on each of the identified legitimate functions. 
 The STIR Analyzer relies on accurate type information to recognize function 
pointer dereferences.  In the Linux kernel (written in C), addresses could be calculated by 
pointer arithmetic operations.  In practice, we have found no such unsafe pointer 
arithmetic operations in all of the STIR related kernel functions we have inspected.  Due 
to the threat represented by kernel control flow attacks (both persistent and transient), we 
encourage kernel developers to continue avoiding pointer arithmetic operations in 
legitimate kernel functions.  This will help to support comprehensive kernel code analysis 
that depends on type information. 
3.3.2.2.4 Generation of Resolved STIR Summary Signatures 
 The outcome of the STIR Analyzer is the symbolic STIR summary signatures. 
These contain symbols (e.g., STIR callback function names) whose runtime addresses 
may not be determined statically. Specifically, Linux supports loadable kernel modules 
(LKMs) that can be added to the kernel at runtime. If a legitimate LKM uses a soft timer, 
the address of its callback function cannot be known until after the module is loaded (at 
runtime). Therefore, we provide a mechanism for registering such symbol-address 
mappings at runtime. 
 Because we employ a VMM-based detection architecture (described in Section 
3.3.2.3), the registration mechanism is split into two components: a guest VM component 
(called a STIR Symbol Mapper) and a security VM component (called a STIR Symbol 
Resolver), as shown in Figure 34. At the guest VM initialization time, the STIR Symbol 
Mapper first generates mappings from function names in the symbolic STIR summary 
signatures to virtual addresses in the guest kernel’s address space. It then informs the 
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STIR Symbol Resolver about these mappings through an inter-VM communication. 
When the STIR Symbol Resolver receives the mapping list, it merges the addresses with 
the corresponding symbolic STIR summary signatures, which become resolved STIR 
summary signatures that can be used to check the legitimacy of pending STIRs. 
3.3.2.3. The STIR Checker 
 Because soft timer attacks are at the kernel-level, a defense mechanism inside the 
same kernel would be vulnerable to tampering by an attacker.  Consequently, an effective 
defense must be isolated from the victim kernel.  Virtual machine managers (VMMs) are 
one environment that provides such isolation, allowing us to run the defensive 
mechanism in a VM that is isolated from the guest VM. Our implementation uses Xen [4] 
for these isolation properties. 
 
Figure 36: Defense against soft timer attacks 
 
 As shown in Figure 36, our architecture places the STIR Checker outside of the 
victim guest kernel in a separate domain (called the security VM).  The purpose of the 
STIR Checker is to prevent control transfers from the guest kernel to malicious 
functionality such as those outlined in Section 3.2.3.   Specifically, the software timer 
dispatcher of the guest kernel is modified to inform the STIR Checker about the callback 
function and related data when a pending STIR expires, and invoke the callback function 
only if the STIR Checker returns true (yes).  During the time when the STIR Checker is 











making a decision, the guest kernel is suspended waiting for the decision.  The 
communication between the STIR Checker in the security VM and the guest VM is 
facilitated by an inter-VM communication channel.  The small modification to the guest 
kernel is protected from tampering using the memory-protection capabilities from the 
Lares architecture [39]; therefore the STIR Checking cannot be trivially bypassed.  
 The STIR Checker module compares the next STIR to be dispatched against a list 
of resolved STIR summary signatures (Section 3.3.2.2).  As Figure 36 shows, all STIR 
summary signatures are stored in a database, indexed by their function element (Section 
3.3.2.2). Given a STIR, the STIR Checker first uses its function field as the index to look 
up the summary signature database. If a signature is found, and the located assertion 
evaluates to true on the data field, the STIR is considered legitimate. Otherwise it is 
considered malicious. 
3.3.3. Linux Implementation and Evaluation 
3.3.3.1. Implementation and Evaluation of the STIR Analyzer 
 We use the Common Intermediate Language (CIL) [37] to implement a prototype 
STIR Analyzer, which consists of several program analysis modules that implement the 
algorithms in section 3.3.2.2.  These modules receive high-level representations of the 
kernel source files generated by CIL, analyze them, and output the results into a text file. 
 The STIR Analyzer can analyze the entire Linux kernel 2.6.16 in about one hour 
on our test system (a 2.4 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo with 2 GB of RAM).  The analyzer found 
a total of 365 legitimate STIR callback functions in the 3688 kernel source files analyzed. 
 A majority of these STIR callback functions (333 out of 365) do not derive 
function pointers from the input parameter; therefore they can not be used to construct 
type 2 malicious STIRs (Section 3.3.2.2). 
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 On the other hand, 32 of the 365 top-level callback functions do derive function 
pointers from their input parameter.  Transitive closure analysis was carried out for these 
32 functions to identify the legitimate subroutines to which the derived function pointers 
can point.  We describe them in some detail, since they represent potential vulnerabilities 
(e.g., type 2 malicious STIRs) that are difficult to defend against. 
Table 16: Representative STIR callback functions that need transitive closure analysis 
(Linux-2.6.16) 
Source file Timer Callback Function Function Pointers Derived From Input 







gameport *d) d->poll_handler 
drivers/isdn/hisax/isdnl3.c l3ExpireTimer (struct L3Timer *t) t->pc->st->lli.l4l3 
drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c timer_intr_handler (unsigned long indx) queued_arr[indx].done_funct 
net/sched/sch_generic.c dev_watchdog (struct net_device *arg) arg->tx_timeout 
 
 Table 16 lists some of the 32 STIR callback functions that derive function 
pointers from the input parameter. From these functions, we can make the following 
observations.  First, the dereferences in some functions are complicated. For example, the 
input parameter private in db9_timer goes through 4 layers of indirection before 
reaching a function pointer (private−>pd−>port−>ops−>read_data).  Second, it 
is normal for a STIR callback function (such as db9_timer) to dereference the input 
parameter in multiple ways.  Correspondingly the assertion part of the STIR summary 
signature for such a function will have multiple predicates (Section 3.3.2.2). Finally, most 
of the callback functions interpret the input parameter as a pointer to a structure.  The 
only exception is timer_intr_handler in drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c, which uses the 
input parameter as an index into a global array of structures. A function pointer is in turn 
retrieved from the array element indexed by the input parameter. 
 When a callback function such as dev_watchdog is encountered, the STIR 
Analyzer goes through a further step of transitive closure analysis.  For 
dev_watchdog, the STIR Analyzer reveals 113 functions in the Linux kernel that can 
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be assigned to dev−>tx_timeout. Due to space limitations, only 4 of them are shown 
in Table 17. 
 
 Uses of the Symbolic STIR Summary Signatures. As shown in Figure 34, the 
output of the STIR Analyzer is the symbolic STIR summary signatures.  We use this 
information to implement the rest of our defense.  The usage falls into two categories: 
first, the function names in the symbolic summary signatures are retrieved and 
incorporated into the STIR Symbol Mapper in the guest kernel and the STIR Symbol 
Resolver (Section 3.3.3.2) in the security VM; second, the function pointer dereference 
information in the symbolic summary signatures are transformed into offsets within data 
structures (through an offline type analysis) and then incorporated into the STIR Checker 
(Section 3.3.3.2). 
3.3.3.2. Implementation of the STIR Defense 
 Our implementation uses the Lares architecture [39] to transfer control to the 
STIR Checker in the security VM and to ensure that the STIR Dispatcher cannot be 
circumvented.  Lares provides the infrastructure needed to place hooks into the guest 
kernel, which divert execution into the security VM.  Lares also provides protections to 
ensure that the hooks in the guest VM are not tampered or circumvented. 
 This functionality is supported, in part, by a new hypercall (lares_op) that is 
effectively a system call from an operating system kernel into the VMM.  The security 
VM first invokes lares_op to register a shared memory region for exchanging 
information between itself and the VMM.  When the hook in the guest VM is triggered, a 









VMCALL to lares_op is made with input parameters that contain the hook’s location 
and function arguments.  Upon receiving the VMCALL, lares_op pauses the guest 
VM, copies the parameters from the guest VM to the memory region shared with the 
security VM, and triggers a virtual IRQ.  The security VM handles the virtual IRQ by 
copying the event context from the guest into its address space.  It then performs its 
monitoring function and places the response in the shared memory block.  Next, 
lares_op is invoked again to inform the VMM that the response is ready.  Upon 
receiving this hypercall, the VMM unpauses the guest and enforces the response from the 
security VM in the guest VM. 
 For this work, we extended Lares by defining a new parameter structure passed 
through the VMCALL from the guest kernel to the security VM. Two commands are 
defined in this structure: REGISTER_STIR_SYMBOLS, and CHECK_STIR. The first 
command is used by the STIR Symbol Mapper, and the second command is used by the 
modified soft timer dispatching logic. 
3.3.3.2.1 Implementation of the STIR Symbol Mapper 
 The STIR Symbol Mapper is implemented in the guest VM as a loadable kernel 
module that notifies the STIR Symbol Resolver about symbol-address mappings through 
a VMCALL with the command REGISTER_STIR_SYMBOLS, and the address and 
length of an array of <symbol id, address> tuples. The return value of this VMCALL is a 
boolean (success or failure).  
 Our implementation of the Symbol Mapper first performs a filtering of available 
kernel and module symbols before invoking the VMCALL, such that only STIR-related 
symbol-address mappings are passed to the Symbol Resolver. In order to perform the 
filtering, the STIR Symbol Mapper is initialized with a static list of STIR-related 
symbols, which is derived from the symbolic STIR summary signatures generated by the 
STIR Analyzer (Section 3.3.3.1). 
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3.3.3.2.2 Implementation of the STIR Symbol Resolver 
 The STIR Symbol Resolver is the security VM component to support STIR 
related symbol registration.  The main task of this component is to handle the 
REGISTER_STIR_SYMBOLS command from the guest VM.  It first copies the STIR-
related symbol mappings (in a list of <symbol id, address>) from the guest kernel using 
the XenAccess [38] virtual machine introspection library.  Next, it merges the addresses 
in the mappings to the STIR summary signature database (Figure 34) for that guest, using 
the symbol id as a search index. 
 In our implementation, each guest has its own instance of the STIR summary 
signature database.  This database is initialized by a template generated from the STIR 
Analyzer (Section 3.3.3.1), where the addresses of the function symbols are undefined 
(therefore the signatures are initially symbolic signatures).  When the 
REGISTER_STIR_SYMBOLS command is executed, these symbols are resolved, and 
the corresponding signatures become resolved STIR summary signatures. 
 The symbol-address mapping registration must be carried out in a secure way, to 
ensure that the malware is unable to register a malicious callback function.  Therefore we 
assume that some other measure is taken to ensure that this registration is performed only 
when the guest OS is in a “known good” state.  Since a guest OS is less likely to be 
compromised in the early stage of its life (e.g., during a secure boot [3]), our current 
implementation approximates this requirement by dividing the life time of a guest OS 
into a symbol registration phase (e.g., the initialization time in Figure 34) followed by a 
guarding phase (the evaluation time in Figure 34), where symbol mappings can be 
registered only in the symbol registration phase (during this phase the guest OS is 
assumed to be in a “known good” state).  We further perform the phase transition 
automatically for the guest kernel when it performs such registration for the first time, 
which is intended to minimize the attack window where a malware can misuse the 
VMCALL interface to insert malicious address mappings.  However, a side effect of this 
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particular implementation decision is that all legitimate LKMs that use soft timers must 
be loaded prior to the registration phase. 
 We note that this requirement may be undesirable for on-demand kernel module 
loading, but it can be resolved by other implementation options, such as verifying the 
runtime integrity of the guest kernel using Copilot [40] before allowing symbol mappings 
to be registered for a second time.  Addressing these issues would improve the usability 
of the system, but security is already assured based on our assumptions.  For these 
reasons, the usability issues are beyond the scope of this dissertation, and we leave them 
as future work. 
3.3.3.2.3 Implementation of the STIR Checking 
 As shown in Figure 36, the current STIR Checker is implemented in a security 
VM running on Xen. Its core function is check_stir, which performs verification of 
pending STIRs. As Figure 37 shows, check_stir takes as input two integer parameters: 
function and data, and returns true (success) or false (failure). It uses the resolved STIR 
summary signatures that are transformed from symbolic STIR Signatures by the STIR 
Symbol Resolver. 
 The function deref in Figure 37 uses the APIs provided by XenAccess [38] to 
dereference the data pointer (data) passed from the guest kernel (e.g., 
 
Figure 37: Pseudocode of check_stir 
boolean check_stir (unsigned long function, unsigned long data){  
Use function as index to look up the resolved STIR summary signature database. 
If no signature is located, return false. 
Otherwise, if the assertion part of the located signature is empty, return true. 
                  Otherwise, return assertion (data). 
} 
boolean assertion (unsigned long data){ 
     for each predicate (deref equals functionlist){ 
           if deref(data) matches no address in functionlist 
           return false. 
     } 
     return true. 
} 
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data−>tx_timeout). The offset information is statically computed by using the 
output of the STIR Analyzer. For example, in order to dereference 
data−>tx_timeout, where data is of type struct net_device *, we statically 
compute the offset of the field tx_timeout by analyzing the definition of struct 
net_device. 
 Finally, the soft timer dispatching logic of the guest Linux kernel is modified to 
make a VMCALL into Xen. Specifically, when a STIR in the pending timers queue 
expires, the guest kernel invokes a VMCALL, with the command CHECK_STIR, plus 
the function and data fields of the STIR as parameters. If the VMCALL returns true, 
function is called as normal. Otherwise, a warning message is generated and function is 
not invoked. 
3.3.3.3. Evaluation of Linux Case Study 
3.3.3.3.1 Effectiveness of Malicious STIR Detection 
 To evaluate the efficacy of our approach, we experimentally confirmed that our 
implementation of the STIR Checker is able to detect the key logger, the CPU cycle 
stealer and the alter-scheduler discussed in section 3.2.3.  We first installed our three 
“malware” kernel modules into an unprotected guest Linux kernel and confirmed that 
they are able to achieve their intended malicious purposes (e.g., stealing key strokes). We 
then activated the STIR-Aware environment containing the modified guest kernel, the 
Lares-patched Xen VMM, and the security VM running the STIR-Checker.  We first 
instructed the STIR Symbol Mapper in the guest kernel to register symbols with the STIR 
Symbol Resolver; currently this is initiated by loading the Symbol Mapper LKM.  Then 
we installed the malware kernel modules.  The STIR Checker is able to immediately 
generate warnings about the suspicious STIRs used by the newly loaded modules, and the 
malware functions are not invoked by the guest kernel as a result. The “malware” 
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modules have been implemented using both attack techniques mentioned in Section 3.3.2. 
These results confirm that our approach can stop both types of STIR attacks. 
 False Positives.  Under the assumption that the STIR Analyzer processes the 
complete source code of the guest kernel (including all legitimate modules), the STIR 
Analyzer correctly carries out function pointer analysis, and the guest kernel installs all 
necessary and legitimate modules before registering symbol-address mappings, our 
detection can have no false positives. This is because all potential legitimate STIRs have 
been captured in the resolved STIR summary signature database before the guest Linux 
enters the guarding phase (Section 3.3.3.2.2).   
 False Negatives.  Due to our detection methodology, in order to obtain control, 
the malware must reuse legitimate STIR callback functions (such as dev_watchdog in 
Figure 33), and manipulate the parameter passed to the STIR callback function in such a 
way that control will eventually go to its malicious code.  One way to leverage 
dev_watchdog has been shown in Figure 33. However, our detection techniques 
counter this type of attack by calculating and verifying the legitimate functions that can 
be assigned to dev−>tx_timeout as shown in Table 17, thus closing this possibility. 
 However, it is possible for the malware to search deeper in the control flow for 
opportunities, such as looking at the function ace_watchdog in Table 17, since 
ace_watchdog takes dev as the input parameter. This approach will also fail because 
the transitive closure analysis covers this case. 
 In summary, we believe that our detection can have no false negatives under the 
threat model in Section 3.3.2.1.  However, since we may be facing a powerful adversary, 
our detection is not a panacea. A determined attacker may find a way not covered by our 
threat model to evade detection, although the STIR checking clearly raises the bar for an 
attacker. 
 Attacks on the STIR checking mechanism and our counter-measures.  We 
anticipate that attackers may use either of two different kinds of attacks in an attempt to 
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defeat the STIR checking.  (1) The malware may disable the modification to the soft 
timer dispatcher so that it does not make the VMCALL, or ignores the return value.  We 
protect against this by using Lares to make the code page of the soft timer dispatcher 
read-only.  (2) The malware may try to register false mappings for legitimate symbols.  
By performing the phase transition (Section 3.3.3.2.2), such actions are ignored and 
therefore have no effect. 
3.3.3.3.2 Performance Overhead 
 In order to measure the performance overhead of the STIR Checker, we ran a set 
of synthetic workloads: cat - read and display the content of 8000 small files (with size 
ranging from 5K to 7.5K bytes) in a complicated directory tree. ccrypt - encrypt a text 
stream of 64M bytes, where ccrypt3 is an open source encryption and decryption tool. 
gzip - compress a text file of 64M bytes using the --best option. cp - recursively copy a 
Linux kernel source tree. make - perform a full build of the Apache HTTP server (version 
2.2.2) from source. 
Table 18: Overhead measurement of the STIR Checker in execution time 
(seconds) 
 cat ccrypt gzip cp make 
Original 20.85 3.30 5.92 43.95 217.95
STIR-aware 20.96 3.30 6.01 46.61 218.58
Overhead 0.52% 0% 1.52% 6.05% 0.29% 
Callbacks/Sec 46.9 46.3 47.3 61.4 81.6 
 
 
 Table 18 shows the execution times of the workloads under the original Linux and 
the modified Linux (denoted STIR-aware). The VMM used in these experiments is Xen 
3.0.4, and the guest Linux kernel is version 2.6.16. The host CPU is an Intel Core 2 Duo 





running at 2.4 GHz with VT-x enabled.  The host is allocated 1.5 GB of memory and the 
HVM (i.e., fully virtualized) guest is allocated 512 MB of memory. 
 From Table 18 we can see that the performance overhead of the STIR Checker on 
the synthetic workloads is low (less than 7%). Our testing found that out of the 365 STIR 
callback functions identified by the STIR Analyzer, only 74 are present in the guest 
kernel at runtime, and the majority of these STIR callbacks are dormant most of the time 
(although there may be multiple STIRs sharing the same call back function), therefore the 
frequency that a STIR actually expires (e.g., the frequency of the callbacks) is not high. 
For example, the baseline frequency of callbacks is around 45 per second. Table 18 
shows the average frequency of callbacks during the experiment, which is similar to the 
baseline frequency. 
 We also evaluate the overhead of the STIR Checker by running the Iperf-2.0.2 
benchmark4.  In this experiment the security VM ran the Iperf server, and the guest VM 
ran the Iperf client.  Iperf is used to measure the maximum throughput between the 
virtual NIC in the guest VM (the front end) and the virtual bridge in the security VM (the 
backend). The experiment is run for 60 seconds, using 64KB buffers and 10 concurrent 
connections.  The average throughput in the original environment is 717.9 MB/s, and it is 
688.4 MB/s in the STIR-Aware environment.  This suggests a performance drop of 4.1% 
(decrease in network throughput). In addition, we measured the frequency of STIR 
callbacks during the Iperf experiment and found that it increased to 287 per second, 
which explains the slightly higher overhead of the STIR Checker compared to the 
synthetic workloads. 
 In summary, the performance overhead for the STIR-Aware environment is small 
compared to the added security benefit that it provides. 
                                                 
 
 
4 http://dast.nlanr.net/Projects/Iperf/  
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3.4. A General Defense against K-Queue Driven Transient Control Flow Attacks 
 While our defense in Section 3.3 addresses the soft-time-driven attacks, there are 
other instances of K-Queues (Section 3.2.2) that can be leveraged in a similar way to the 
soft timer by an attacker to maintain stealthy control of the victim kernel.  Therefore, we 
have extended our defense against soft-timer-based attacks to address the more general 
class of K-qeueue-driven control flow attacks.  Our contributions are (1) a unified static 
analysis framework and a set of tools that can generate summary signatures and the 
corresponding checking code for different K-Queue instances. (2) A runtime reference 
monitor that validates K-Queue invariants and guards such invariants against tampering. 
(3) A comprehensive experimental evaluation of our tools on a series of Linux kernel 
configurations. 
3.4.1. A Unified Static Analysis Framework and Tool Set 
 We build a unified static analysis framework (Figure 38) and develop a set of 
tools that can be used to derive specifications of legitimate K-Queue requests, based on 
the following observation: although details of different K-Queues may vary, their 
specifications can be derived by a common set of analysis tasks. For example, the top-
level legitimate K-Queue callback functions can be derived by a points-to analysis of the 
function pointer embedded in the respective K-Queue request data structures (Figure 26 – 
Figure 28); and every legitimate K-Queue callback function that takes a data parameter 
needs to go through a transitive closure analysis. It is more scalable and efficient to 
separate such analysis requirements out and allow the different K-Queue analyzers to 
share them.  This way, future K-Queue analyzers will not have to repeat the effort of 
existing K-Queue analyzers. Therefore, we develop basic analysis tools and an analysis 




 Our analysis framework has the following advantages: 
 General: the same framework engine can be used by any K-Queue instance, 
with only different starting seed analysis tasks. Other than that, all K-Queue 
analysis proceeds in a similar fashion.  This ensures that our framework can 
handle future K-Queue instances not covered in Section 3.2.2. 
 Incremental: our framework uses a database to store basic analysis results.  
This database enables accumulation of static analysis results over time, and 
more importantly, it facilitates sharing of basic analysis results among the 
different K-Queue analyzers. 
 Automated: we develop a set of static analysis tools that can process the kernel 
source code and generate stubs of the corresponding checker code.  Such 
automation greatly simplifies the job of a human analyzer. 
 Tunable: our analysis framework leverage persistent data (e.g., a file-based 
work list and database tables) that can be easily modified offline, which offers 
an opportunity for correcting errors or omissions made by the analysis tools. 
Then we can have improved analysis precision. 
  
 





3.4.1.1. Basic Analysis Tasks 
 One of the basic analysis tasks is points-to analysis of function pointers, since our 
defense needs to know the legitimate targets of function pointers. For example, the top-
level legitimate K-Queue call back functions can be recognized in this way. We observe 
that there are certain “contracts” between a K-Queue and its requesters that enable 
automated inference of legitimate K-Queue callback functions. Figure 26 – Figure 28 
show the data structures in certain K-Queues that need to be initialized by a requester and 
read by a K-Queue dispatcher.  Among the fields that must be initialized is the callback 
function.  Table 19 summarizes possible ways that a callback function field can be 
assigned for different K-Queues. 
 Direct assignment (DA).  This is an unstructured way of assignment.  The 
requester needs to be aware of the K-Queue data structure, allocate memory for 
it, and initialize its fields. But here a callback function is directly assigned to 
the appropriate field, as oppose to the indirect assignment case below. 
 Indirect assignment (IA) through an intermediate variable. This way is also 
unstructured, but different from the DA case above, a function pointer variable 
is assigned to the callback function field.  For example, do_floppy in Table 
19 may point to several possible functions under different conditions. 
 Assignment through a function parameter (PA).  This is a structured way of 
assignment in which a requester can call a wrapper function which in turn 
initializes a K-Queue data structure. The actual callback function is passed in as 
a parameter to the wrapper function. For example, the task queue callback 
function can be assigned indirectly through a parameter to the function 
schedule_bh, which in turn assigns it to the routine field of a task queue 
structure.  In order to capture this kind of functions, the analyzer must 
recognize every function call to schedule_bh and record the corresponding 
actual parameter. 
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 Accordingly, we can decompose the points-to analysis task into three kinds of 
simpler tasks: direct assignment analysis, indirect assignment analysis, and parameter 
assignment analysis.  
Table 19: Possible ways that a call back function can be assigned in different K-Queues 
 Direct Assignment Parameter Assignment Indirect 
Assignment Structure Field Function Index (from 0) 
Soft timer timer_list function    
IRQ action 
queue 
irqaction handler request_irq 1  
Tasklet queue tasklet_struct func tasklet_init 1  
Task queue5 tq_struct routine schedule_bh 0 do_floppy 
 
 Another basic analysis tasks is transitive closure analysis, which identifies 
constraints on the data parameters passed on to a legitimate target function. For example, 
the K-Queue instances discussed in Section 3.2.2 all pass a requester-supplied data 
parameter to the callback function.  If the callback function makes control transfer 
decisions based on the data parameter, we must make sure that the attacker cannot supply 
a malicious data parameter to induce kernel control flow to the malware (e.g., via a type 2 
attack as the one in Figure 33). 
3.4.1.2. The Analysis Engine 
 The heart of the K-Queue static analysis framework is the analysis engine, which 
repeatedly consumes individual analysis tasks (Section 3.4.1.1) from a work list. This 
work list is dynamically changing: on one hand, tasks are removed from it by the analysis 
engine; on the other hand, new tasks may be appended to it as a result of performing an 
analysis task.  The analysis process is bootstrapped by some seed tasks inserted to the 
work list by a human analyzer, and it finishes when the work list becomes empty. 
                                                 
 
 
5 Task queue in Linux kernel 2.4.32 is the predecessor of work queue found in Linux kernel 2.6 
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 During each individual analysis task, the analysis engine runs one or more of the 
basic tools on the merged kernel source file as necessary and generates three kinds of 
output: (1) source code for the runtime checker to verify the integrity of a pending K-
Queue request, (2) static analysis results that are stored to a database for reuse, and (3) 
detailed logs for in-depth diagnosis by a human analyzer.  
3.4.1.3. The Work List 
 The work list contains pending static analysis tasks.  Each element in this list 
specifies the type of analysis (direct assignment, parameter assignment, or transitive 
closure) and the corresponding input parameters.  One example is <DA, tasklet_struct, 
func, 1>, which instructs the analysis engine to invoke the direct assignment collector for 
the func field of kernel data structure tasklet_struct. This task can bootstrap an analysis 
for the tasklet queue (section 3.2.2.2), one of the K-Queues. 
3.4.1.4. Basic Tools 
 These are the building-blocks of the static analyzer that carry out the basic 
analysis tasks discussed in Section 3.4.1.1. 
3.4.1.4.1 Direct Assignment Collector 
 This tool takes as input the name of a structure (e.g., irqaction) and the name 
of a field (e.g., handler) within that structure, and outputs kernel functions that can be 
assigned to such a field. It traverses each assignment statement (lval = rval) of the 
kernel. If lval ends with a field with the specified name, this field belongs to a structure 
with the specified name, and rval is an actual function, the tool collects rval as a 
legitimate function. If rval is not an actual function (e.g., a formal parameter), the tool 
dumps the exact expression of rval to the log file, which can help a human analyzer 
find corner cases that need other means of analysis (e.g., the Parameter Collector). 
 110
3.4.1.4.2 Parameter Collector 
 This tool collects target functions that are passed to a wrapper function as an 
actual parameter and later assigned to a function pointer (i.e., in the PA case in Table 19).  
It takes as input the name of a wrapper function and the index of the parameter of 
interest.  It traverses the entire kernel searching for each invocation to the specified 
function, and collects the actual values of the parameter at the specified index. 
3.4.1.4.3 Transitive Closure Analyzer 
 This tool is a major component of the tool set.  It takes as input the name of a 
function and a list of its formal parameters that are tainted, i.e., these parameters can 
influence the control flow of the given function. This tool performs a flow-sensitive and 
intra-procedural transitive closure analysis, starting from the given function and 
descending into functions called by the given function and so on.  It is flow-sensitive 
because it propagates taint to downstream functions through parameters.  It is intra-
procedural because only downstream functions defined within the same source file as the 
given function are analyzed.  In case that a downstream function is located in a different 
source file, an external transitive closure analysis task is scheduled for execution later. 
 This tool builds a hash table of all functions defined in the given kernel source 
file, so that it can quickly navigate to any function to continue the analysis. It also 
maintains a list of functions that needs to be analyzed (called a work list).  Initially, the 
work list contains only the function given as the input of this tool.  As this tool processes 
the given function, it may recognize more functions that need to be analyzed; then it adds 
such functions to the work list.  The main body of this tool is a loop over the work list 
until it becomes empty.  For each function in the work list, this tool performs two kinds 
of tasks: taint propagation and new analysis task recognition. 
 Taint propagation. The tool traverses each assignment statement (lval = 
rval) in the function and taints the variable lval if any part of rval is already tainted. 
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 New analysis task recognition. The tool traverses each function call statement 
fn(args) in the function to see if any part of fn or args or both is a tainted variable.  
If fn is tainted, a new points-to analysis task is generated for fn after the corresponding 
structure name and field name are derived from fn. If args is tainted and fn is an 
actual function, a transitive closure analysis task is generated for fn with the list of 
tainted arguments. 
 The work list maintained by the transitive closure analyzer is called an internal 
work list to differentiate it from the external work list used by the static analysis engine in 
Figure 38. New points-to analysis tasks are added to the external work list.  New 
transitive closure analysis tasks are first added to the internal work list, and if they can 
not be handled because the corresponding function is not defined within the given kernel 
source file, they are added to the external work list with the hope that they will be found 
in some other source file. 
3.4.1.5. Kernel Merging 
 One challenge of transitive closure analysis is how to continue analysis on 
downstream functions invoked by the current function – if such downstream functions are 
not in the current source file, the analysis task needs to be recorded somewhere and later 
tried on a different source file.   Although our external work list can satisfy this 
requirement, this kind of interprocedural transitive closure analysis can be very 
inefficient, because many kernel source files may need to be sifted through before the 
body of a function is found.  To optimize transitive closure analysis, we merge the entire 
kernel (given a configuration) into a single source file, so that the interprocedural analysis 
tasks are all turned into intraprocedural analysis.  We test our analysis engine on a series 
of merged kernel source files in Section 3.4.6.2. 
3.4.1.6. Result Database 
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 In our initial implementation, each kind of K-Queue analyzer runs independently. 
We quickly find out that there are redundant analysis tasks among the K-Queue analyzers 
that can be avoided.  For example, the fact that the task queue analyzer has performed 
points-to analysis on structure scsi_cmnd and field done is agnostic to the IRQ action 
queue analyzer even if the latter needs to perform points-to analysis on the same pointer.  
A more specific measurement of redundancy is presented in Table 20, which shows the 
number of common analysis tasks among pairs of the K-Queue analyzers.  When such 
sharing is significant, an analyzer may waste much time processing analysis that has been 
handled.  As Table 21 shows, without sharing, the soft timer analyzer runs for 284 
minutes on a kernel of 482,369 lines of code, but with sharing it only needs 127 minutes 
on the same kernel.  This means that enabling sharing among the K-Queue analyzers can 
have significant time savings.  Therefore, we introduce a database of individual points-to 
and transitive closure analysis results that is shared among the different K-Queue 
analyzers. This database contains two tables: pointsTo and transClosure, the formats of 
which are shown in Table 22 and Table 23, respectively. 
Table 20: Number of common analysis tasks among different K-Queues 
 Transitive Closure Points-to 
IRQ action queue  vs. soft timer queue 97 51 
IRQ action queue  vs. task queue 4 2 
Task queue vs. soft timer queue 4 3 
  
Table 21: Benefit of sharing on the K-Queue analysis time 
K-Queue Without sharing With sharing % time savings 
Task queue 155 minutes 147 minutes 5.2 
Tasklet queue 360 seconds 314 seconds 12.8 
IRQ action queue 175 minutes 166 minutes 5.1 
Soft timer queue 284 minutes 127 minutes 55.3 
 
 When the analysis engine (Section 3.4.1.2) sees a points-to analysis task, it first 
uses the structure and field names as a key to query the pointsTo table.  If a row is found, 
it directly uses the returned points-to set.  Otherwise, it invokes the points-to analysis 
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tools (e.g., the Direct Assignment Collector and the Parameter Collector) and inserts the 
results to the pointsTo table.  The analysis engine uses the transClosure table in a similar 
fashion except that it uses the function name and the list of tainted arguments as search 
keys. 
Table 22: Format of the table pointsTo 
Field Type Meaning 
sname varchar[40] Structure name 
fldname varchar[40] Field name 
p2set blob Set of function names 
 
Table 23: Format of the table transClosure 
Field Type Meaning 
Fname varchar[40] Function name 
Arglist varchar[20] List of tainted arguments 
pointer_set blob Set of function pointers used 
 
3.4.2. Code Generation for the K-Queue Checkers 
 The analysis tool generates code stub for the runtime checker.  The generated 
code includes two kinds of functions: those for verifying the control flow integrity of a 
function pointer and those for verifying the control flow integrity of a real function. 
Figure 39(a) shows the function pointer checker code for structure irqaction and field 
handler, and Figure 39(b) shows the checker code for the real function rtl8139_interrupt. 
 The main body of the code in Figure 39(a) performs a series of comparisons to 
match the runtime value of a function pointer to a real function in its points-to set.  If a 
match is found, the integrity of the function pointer is reduced to that of the matching real 
function.  If no such match is found, the function pointer has no integrity because it 
points to something unexpected (e.g., the malware code).  In other words, the integrity of 
a function pointer is the disjunction (logical OR) of the integrity of all its legitimate 
targets (real functions). 
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int  check_pointer_irqaction_2_handler_01(unsigned 
int data){ 
  unsigned int fp; 
  int offs[1] = {-1}; 
 
/* Fetch the function pointer value into fp */ 
  fp = deref_data(offs, data); 
  if (fp == 0) return 1; 
      
  if (fp == 0xc010c6cc) 
     return check_func_math_error_irq_01(data); 
  … 
  if (fp == 0xc01b4f50) 
     return check_func_rtl8139_interrupt_01(data); 
  … 
  unlock_kqueue_regions(); 
  return 0; 
} 
int check_func_rtl8139_interrupt_01(unsigned int 
data){ 
 
 return 1 
        && 
check_pointer_mii_if_info_2_mdio_read_110(data)
        && 
check_pointer_pci_ops_2_read_word_100(data) 




Figure 39: Generated code for a function pointer (a) and a real function (b) 
 
 Similarly, the integrity of a real function is the conjunction (logical AND) of the 
integrity of all function pointers that it transfers control to, and if no such function 
pointers are used, the function has integrity by default.  For example, rtl8139_interrupt in 
Figure 39(b) invokes three function pointers.  One of these function pointers has structure 
name mii_if_info and field name mdio_read. 
 Note from Figure 39(a) that the function pointer checker uses constant address 
(e.g., 0xc010c6cc) to recognize actual target functions at runtime.  This is an optimization 
performed by the static analyzer to avoid address translation at runtime, which is possible 
for target functions built into the kernel.  Specifically, the code generator looks up the 
kernel symbol map generated by the normal kernel compiler to carry out such 
translations. 
 Also note from Figure 39(a) that before comparison the code fetches the runtime 
value of the function pointer by calling deref_data (Figure 40).  deref_data takes 
as input an array of integers (i.e., offsets) representing byte offsets. The exact content 
of this array is not supplied by the current implementation, because the automatic 
derivation of a function pointer expression by dereferencing the data variable is still an 
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ongoing research problem. For now, the output of the transitive closure analyzer contains 
enough information for a human analyzer to derive such an expression.  Once that is 
done, our offset analyzer (Section 3.4.3) can automatically analyze the given pointer 
expression and generate offset information to fill in the offset array in Figure 39(a). 
unsigned long deref_data(int *offsets, uint32_t data){ 
  unsigned long i = 0; 
  uint32_t tmpval, uint32_t guest_p = data;   
 
  while (offsets[i] != -1){   /*offsets array ends with -1*/ 
    if (guest_p == 0)   return -1;          /* refuse to dereference null pointer */ 
 
    lock_kqueue_region(guest_p + offsets[i], guest_p + offsets[i] + sizeof(uint32_t)); 
 
    if (lares_copy_from_guest(&tmpval, guest_p + offsets[i], sizeof(uint32_t))) 
        return -1; 
 
    guest_p = tmpval; 
    i++; 
  } 
  return (unsigned long) guest_p; 
} 
Figure 40: Source code for retrieving the value of a function pointer from a guest VM 
3.4.3. The Offset Analyzer 
 Since our runtime K-Queue checker employs the same architecture as the STIR 
Checker discussed in Section 3.3.2.3, there exists a semantic gap between the K-Queue 
checker and the guest kernel that resides in a different address space. Specifically, before 
the K-Queue checker can evaluate a pointer expression in the guest kernel, it needs to 
convert the structure field information into byte offset information; because what the K-
Queue checker can access are just raw memory pages of the guest kernel.  Therefore, we 
provide an offset analyzer for this purpose. 
3.4.3.1. Computing the Byte Offsets for Individual Fields 
 Given the definition of a structure, in order to compute the byte offset of a 
particular field within this structure, a naïve offset analyzer would just sum up the bytes 
occupied by the fields preceding the given field. However, this approach may give wrong 
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results because of the padding of structure fields by the compiler.  Specifically, a modern 
compiler can pad additional bytes between a field and its successor so that the latter will 
be properly aligned in memory [47]. Normally, such padding is invisible to the 
programmer.  However, when we want to fetch the value of a field from the raw memory, 
we must have the correct offset information taking the padding into account. 
 Although the C standard6 specifies the expected way of structure alignment and 
padding, statically computing the padding is error prone and non-portable because the 
exact number of bytes to pad depends on several factors, mainly the compiler and the 
machine architecture.  On the other hand, at runtime, we can reliably get the offset of a 
field by using the ‘&’ operator.  I.e., to compute the offset of field f within a structure s, 
we can simply compute &s.f-&s. Therefore, we take a hybrid approach which proceeds 
in several steps: 
 (1) Statically generate code that defines a variable for each structure type in the 
kernel and calculates the offset of each field within its structure when running. For 
example, for struct s and field f defined in Figure 41(a), our approach generates the code 
snippet in Figure 41(b). 
struct s{ …  struct foo f;  …}; 




struct s s_v; 
printf(“s f %d foo 0\n”, 
               (unsigned int) &s_v.f - (unsigned int) &s_v); 
 
(b) 
Figure 41: Code generation for offset analysis 
  
 The code in Figure 41(b) also displays the type name of field f (i.e., foo) and 
whether f is a pointer (“0” means “no”, and “1” means “yes”).  Such information is used 
to make further dereference starting from f (e.g., s.f.bar), which will be discussed in 
more detail shortly; 
                                                 
 
 
6 ISO/IEC Standard 9899:1999 
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 (2) Compile the generated code on the target architecture. The major caveat is to 
include proper header files of the kernel in the generated code so that it can compile, 
which can be tricky.  We solve this problem by merging all type definitions of the kernel 
into the generated code. 
 (3) Run the generated code on the target architecture and collect the output. 
 (4) Transform and store the output into the offset database table for future 
inquiries.  This table has five attributes: structure name, field name, field offset, field type 
(structure name), and whether the field is a pointer. 
3.4.3.2. Computing Offset Information for Arbitrary Pointer Expressions 
 Given a function pointer expression nfffS .... 210 L , the offset analyzer returns an 
array of non-negative offset integers using the information in the offset database table.  It 
first uses ( 10 , fS ) to query the offset database table, if the result is not empty, it should 
contain the byte offset of 1f  within structure 0S , and the type name of 1f  if it is a 
structure type (let’s call the type 1S  for now). If 1f  is a structure type, the offset analyzer 
uses ( 21, fS ) to query the offset database table to obtain the byte offset of 2f  within 1S . 
This process continues until the offset of nf  within structure 1−nS is found from the 
database. 
 
Figure 42: Dereferencing of complex function pointers 
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 The offset database table records whether a field is a pointer, because this 
attribute influences the number of memory accesses when we evaluate a function pointer 
expression at runtime (i.e., the length of the array returned by the offset analyzer). 
Consider the above example again, if 1f  is a pointer as shown in Figure 42(b), in order to 
retrieve the value of 2f  we need to have two memory accesses, the first one retrieves 0S  
to get 1f , and the second one retrieves 1S  to get 2f .  However, if 1f  is not a pointer as 
shown in Figure 42(a), we only need one memory access because 1f  is a structure 
embedded in 0S , so 2f  can be obtained by reading directly from the byte offset 
offset1+offset2 of structure 0S . 
3.4.4. Guarding of K-Queue PTIs at Run-time 
3.4.4.1. TOCTTOU Attack against the K-Queue Defense 
 So far our defense validates (checks) a K-Queue PTI before the guest kernel uses 
it (i.e., invokes a K-Queue callback function).  However, if the guest kernel is multi-
threaded, which is the case for the current Linux kernel, such a defense is vulnerable to a 
TOCTTOU (Time-Of-Check-To-Time-Of-Use) attack: right after the K-Queue PTI is 
checked, but before the K-Queue call back function finishes, a malicious control flow in 
the guest kernel can potentially modify a function pointer involved in the PTI, so that the 
call back function transfers control to the malware.  This constitutes a TOCTTOU race 
condition.  Such attacks may be hard to mount and succeed, but they are possible.  
3.4.4.2. Countermeasures to the TOCTTOU Attacks 
 To counter the TOCTTOU attack against our defense, we protect the function 
pointers participated in a K-Queue PTI from tampering during the execution of the K-
Queue call back function.  Specifically, we temporarily write-protect memory regions in 
the guest domain that hold such function pointers until the guest kernel finishes the K-
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Queue call back function.  To support this kind of write-protection, we extend the shadow 
page table manager of the hypervisor so that it masks a memory page as read-only if it 
contains a protected memory region.  In case there is a legitimate write to the same page 
but out of the protected region, we use emulations. We add a hyper call for the security 
VM to request that a memory region for any guest VM be protected or unprotected. 
 During the K-Queue PTI checking, each participating structure field is first write-
protected (i.e., locked by lock_kqueue_region in Figure 40) and then checked. The 
addresses of the structure fields protected so far are recorded in an array, so that when the 
checking fails at any point, the already protected structure fields can be unlocked (i.e.  by 
unlock_kqueue_regions in Figure 39(a) ).  If the checking succeeds, the unlocking 
is deferred until an acknowledgement is received from the guest VM that the call back 
function has finished. 
 We take careful measures to unlock structure fields as soon as possible.  This is 
because of the performance penalty caused by page-level write-protection.  Since 
hardware support for fine-grained memory protection is not widely available, we have to 
satisfy with a suboptimal page-level protection. 
 Our memory region protection can defeat the TOCTTOU attacks mentioned 
above.  Since we lock a structure field before using it, the attacker cannot change the 
verification result. If the attacker modifies a legitimate function pointer before it is locked 
(and thus verified), the checker will discover this modification and not follow (use) the 
function pointer.  On the other hand, the attacker cannot modify the function pointer 
immediately after it is verified, because it has been locked.  By the time the attacker can 
modify the function pointer, it has been used (i.e., the callback function has finished), so 
the modification is harmless.  Note that if we first verify then lock, then there is a 
possibility that an attacker modifies the verified function pointer before it is locked, thus 
the attack can still succeed.  So verifying then locking is a wrong design. 
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3.4.5. Implementation 
3.4.5.1. The K-Queue Analyzers 
 We implement the static analyzers for the IRQ action queue, the tasklet queue, the 
task queue, and the soft timer queue based on our static analysis framework.  Such 
analyzers are extended from the STIR analyzer (Section 3.3.3.1), so they use the same 
CIL [37] tool.  We implement the analysis engine in Shell scripts, which invokes the CIL 
modules that implement the basic analysis toos (Section 3.4.1.4). These modules are 
written in Objective Caml7.  We use MySQL8 (version 5.1.34) to store the result database 
(Section 3.4.1.6), and write a Java program to insert into or query the result database. 
3.4.5.2. The K-Queue Defense 
 We implement runtime defense for the IRQ action queue, the tasklet queue, and 
the task queue, based on the STIR Checker in Section 3.3.3.2, which includes a security 
VM component and a guest VM component. The STIR Checker also has a better 
implementation because of the code generation. We define several new commands in the 
parameter structure passed through the VMCALL from the guest kernel to the security 
VM; these commands correspond to invocations and completions of the new K-Queue 
requests. 
 The K-Queue checkers in the Security VM are implemented based on the code 
stubs generated by the K-Queue analyzers.  They inspect the runtime status of the guest 
kernel via the XenAccess [38] library, and they use the offset information returned by the 
Offset Analyzer (Section 3.4.3).  We implement the Offset Analyzer in a mixture of CIL 
module, Shell script, and Java program, and the offset result database is again MySQL. 






 Finally, we modify the dispatching logic of the IRQ action queue, the tasklet 
queue, the soft timer queue, and the task queue in the guest kernel (version 2.4.32), so 
that a VMCALL is made into Xen to start the K-Queue checking before a pending K-
Queue request is invoked. The guest kernel is suspended until the result comes back from 
the security VM.  Table 24 summarizes the modifications to the guest kernel. 
Table 24: Modifications to the guest kernel 
K-Queue instance Kernel function(s) modified Location 
Tasklet queue tasklet_action, 
tasklet_hi_action 
kernel/softirq.c 
IRQ action queue handle_IRQ_event arch/i386/kernel/irq.c 
Task queue __run_task_queue kernel/softirq.c 
Soft timer queue run_timer_list kernel/timer.c 
 
3.4.6. Evaluation of the K-Queue Defense 
3.4.6.1.Security Properties 
 Our K-Queue defense has no false negatives because all function pointers 
occurring in the control flow of the callback function are validated no matter if they are 
actually invoked by the callback function or not.  Specifically, the transitive closure 
analyzer searches through every possible execution path (starting from the callback 
function) and recognizes function pointers along the way. Some of the function pointers 
may not be called in a particular invocation, but the analyzer conservatively reports all 
such function pointers for points-to analysis. 
 On the other hand, our implementation of the K-Queue defense may have false 
positives, due to the limitations of the points-to analysis module in our K-Queue analyzer. 
Our current implementation of the K-Queue analyzers covers direct assignment (DA) and 
some cases of parameter assignment (PA), but not indirect assignment (IA).  Therefore, a 
real function assigned through IA is not collected into the points-to set by the tools 
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automatically.  This will result in a false alarm at runtime should such a function is 
invoked. 
 One example of IA is through do_floppy, a global function pointer variable 
that can point to different functions (main_command_interrupt, 
seek_interrupt, recal_interrupt, or reset_interrupt) under different 
situations. To fully capture the IA case would require an alias analysis which is by itself 
an open research area [27]. 
 Our current implementation does not support function pointer arrays, either. For 
example, bh_action in kernel/softirq.c invokes bh_base[nr] where nr is the data 
associated with bh_action in a tasklet request.  Fortunately, the integrity of 
bh_base[nr] can be verified by finding the known-good values of the global array 
bh_base, which is assigned by the init_bh function call.  By analyzing all calls to 
init_bh and collect the second parameter, we can figure out the known-good values of 
this array. 
Table 25: Complicated function pointers encountered by the task queue analyzer  
Pointer specification Parameter Assignment Indirect Assignment 





ata_queued_cmd scsidone ata_scsi_qc_new 3 n/a 
buffer_head b_end_io init_buffer 1 “callback” in fs/xfs/linux-
2.4/xfs_buf.c, function 
_pagebuf_page_io 
pci_socket handler pci_register_callback 1 n/a 




 Despite the limitations, our implementation can satisfy the majority of pointer 
analysis tasks in the K-Queues that we found.  For example, out of 55 points-to analysis 
tasks for the task queue, 50 use direct assignment (DA).  The corner cases include five 
parameter assignments (PA) and two indirect assignments (IA), as listed in Table 25. The 
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most complicated case is a PA analysis for ata_queued_cmd->scsidone, which 
involves multiple levels of PAs. But our manual analysis only took several minutes to 
find that the points-to set is {scsi_done, scsi_old_done, scsi_eh_done}. 
3.4.6.2. Performance and Scalability of the K-Queue Static Analyzer 
 We test the performance of our K-Queue static analyzer on a series of 10 
configurations of a Linux kernel with increased complexity.  The kernel version used in 
the evaluation is 2.4.32. The first configuration is a minimal kernel that can boot the 
guest virtual machine. It contains 482,369 lines of code, with essential support for IDE 
disk, ext3 file system, and TCP/IP networking. Each successive configuration includes 
more device drivers.  The most complex kernel configuration contains 1,010,196 lines of 
code. A summary of these 10 kernel configurations is presented in Table 26. 
Table 26: Configurations and complexity of the kernels used in the evaluation 
Configuration Description Lines of code (LOC) 
1 Baseline, minimal configuration 482,369
2 + Multi-device support + Networking options + 
Telephony Support 
563,944
3 + ATA/IDE/MFM/RLL support 592,472
4 + SCSI support (part I) 633,021
5 + SCSI support (part II) 685,526
6 + SCSI support (part III) 765,729
7 + e100 network device support (part I) 820,610
8 + e100 network device support (part II) 882,138
9 + e1000 network device support 948,183
10 + wireless network device support 1,010,196
 
 Each experimental run covers four kinds of K-Queues in the following order: task 
queue, tasklet queue, IRQ action queue, and soft timer queue.  Initially the analysis result 
database is empty. As the analysis proceeds the analysis results are accumulated in the 
database. Each K-Queue instance takes advantage of analysis that has finished, including 
its own analysis tasks and the K-Queue instance(s) ahead of it.  For example, the analysis 
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for the soft timer queue uses some results of the IRQ action queue, so it takes less time 
than if it has no existing results to use. 
 The experimental run for each kernel configuration proceeds as follows.  Each K-
Queue analysis starts with a points-to analysis task. When the points-to set is determined, 
a round of transitive closure analysis is performed, one for each function in the points-to 
set.  As the result of the transitive closure analysis, new points-to analysis tasks may be 
recognized.  If this is the case, another round of points-to analysis is performed, which 
may lead to one more round of transitive closure analysis.  This iterative process 
continues until the last round of transitive closure analysis recognizes no new points-to 
analysis tasks. 



















Figure 43: Cumulative Analysis Time (in minutes) 
  
 The first thing that we measure is the execution time of the K-Queue analysis.  
Figure 43 shows the cumulative execution time at four milestones for different kernel 
configurations.  For example, the curve marked as “IRQ action” represents the total 
analysis time for the task queue, the tasklet queue, and the IRQ action queue. The X-axis 
is the complexity of the kernel configurations measured in KLOC or “thousand lines of 
code”, and the Y-axis is the cumulative execution time in minutes.  The ten points on 
each curve correspond to the measurements for the ten kernel configurations, the left-
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most point corresponds to configuration 1, and the right-most point corresponds to 
configuration 10. 
 From Figure 43 we can see that in general the analysis time increases as the 
complexity of the kernel increases.  However, it seems that the execution time is not a 
simple function of the kernel size.  In fact, we can see flat segments as well as steep 
slopes on the curves, suggesting a non-uniform distribution of the K-Queue requesters in 
the kernel.  For example, the first steep slope occurs on the IRQ action queue curve from 
configuration 2 to configuration 3. This is because configuration 3 requires more analysis 
tasks.  For example, from configuration 2 to configuration 3, the points-to analysis for 
structure hwif_s and field ide_dma_test_irq returns six more actual functions. 
These functions belong to the device drivers for several kinds of IDE controller chipsets 
(including the CMD64 series of chipsets and the HPT36X/37X chipset) that are added in 
configuration 3.  These new actual functions demands more transitive closure analysis 
than configuration 2.  However, from configuration 3 to configuration 4 the IRQ action 
queue curve is pretty flat, because there are few new analysis tasks. 
 The way that the execution time curves look like is expected, because our choice 



















Figure 44: Number of External Transitive Closure Analysis 
 
 Figure 44 shows the number of external transitive closure analysis for the four 
kinds of K-Queues and different kernel configurations.  Since we use merged kernel 
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source files, all such analysis is due to new results from points-to analysis.  Clearly, this 
number increases as the kernel size increases.  The reasoning is as follows.  As the size of 
the kernel grows, more source code is analyzed; then the number of requesters for a 
particular K-Queue is potentially increased.  This leads to a larger points-to set for the top 
level function pointers, thus more functions that need transitive closure analysis.  The 
new transitive closure analysis may lead to new points-to analysis tasks, which result in 














Figure 45: Number of Points-to Analysis 
 
 The above reasoning is supported by Figure 45, in which we show the 
measurement of the number of points-to analysis during the experiments. We can see that 
for all four kinds of K-Queues, the number of points-to analysis tasks indeed increases 














Figure 46: Number of Cumulative Internal Transitive Closure Analysis 
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 Figure 46 shows the cumulative number of internal transitive closure analysis 
during the experiments.  The curves have a similar trend as the number of external 
transitive closure analysis and points-to analysis, but at a much larger scale (20x).  This 
demonstrates the benefit of kernel merging: if it is not used, a large number of such 
internal transitive closure analyses would become external transitive closure analyses; 
then the total analysis time would increase dramatically. This is because an external 
transitive closure analysis is more time-consuming than an internal transitive closure 
analysis. Each external transitive closure analysis has a constant overhead of 
preprocessing and parsing the entire kernel source code, while internal transitive closure 
analysis does not incur such overhead. As the kernel becomes more complex, such 
overhead becomes more and more significant. 
 One interesting point on Figure 46 is that up until configuration 6 the soft timer 
queue accounts for the most internal transitive closure analysis among the four K-Queues.  
But starting from configuration 7, this dominance is lost to the IRQ action queue, and the 
number of internal transitive analysis for the soft timer queue even drops from 4,457 in 
configuration 6 to 2,715 in configuration 7.  This is a correct behavior, because the 
number of internal transitive closure analysis for the IRQ action queue increases 
dramatically from 3,449 in configuration 6 to 9,485 in configuration 7, in such a way that 
they cover a significant portion of the analysis for the soft timer queue.  As a supporting 
evidence, the analysis for the IRQ action queue took 1,548 minutes in configuration 7, 
which is significantly longer than that for configuration 6 (630 minutes), as shown in 
Figure 43. 
 The Simplest K-Queue 
 From the evaluation, it seems that the tasklet queue is the simplest K-Queue.  The 
numbers of points-to and transitive closure analysis stay very low until the nineth 
configuration. The entire analysis can be finished in less than 15 minutes in most cases.  
This suggests that tasklet is not heavily used in Linux kernel 2.4.32. 
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3.4.6.3. Benefit of the Code Generation 
 Our K-Queue static analysis tools generate the corresponding checker code as a 
by-product.  For example, they generate over 5,800 lines of code for kernel configuration 
1 in Table 26.  Without automated code generation, it would be very time-consuming to 
develop such checker programs manually. 
3.4.6.4. Performance Overhead of the K-Queue Checker 
 To measure the runtime overhead of our K-Queue Checker, we run the five 
benchmarks used to measure the overhead of the STIR Checker (Section 3.3.3.3.2). 
These benchmarks run on a 2.66 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo with VT-x support, the security 
VM (Domain 0) is allocated 512 MB of RAM, and the guest VM is allocated 256 MB of 
RAM. The hypervisor is Xen 3.3.0, and the guest kernel is Linux 2.4.32 with 
configuration 1 (Table 26). Each experiment is run 10 times and the mean and standard 
deviation of the measurements are computed. Table 27 shows the preliminary results. 
 Table 27 contains three kinds of results. The “Original” results are collected on 
unmodified Xen and guest kernel and serve as the baseline. The results marked as “K-
Queue-aware, no lock” are collected on the modified Xen and guest kernel, but with the 
page-level memory protection (Section 3.4.4.2) turned off. Finally, the results marked as 
“K-Queue-aware, lock” are collected on the full-fledged defense mechanism including 
the modified Xen, the modified guest kernel, and the page-level memory protection. 
 From Table 27, we can see that our implementation of the K-Queue Checker 
incurs performance overhead ranging from 11% to 25 times slow down. This is much 
higher than the overhead measurement for the STIR Checker (Table 18). 
 In order to understand the result, we carry out an event analysis of the K-Queue 
runtime defense and identify three reasons for the high overhead: (1) the K-Queue 
defense needs to protect more K-Queue instances (four instead of one) and some K-
Queue call backs happen at a high frequency. For example, IRQ action call back 
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functions happen at the rate of roughly 136 per second, and tasklet call back functions 
have a similar frequency, not to mention the other two K-Queues. (2) More importantly, 
some K-Queue call back functions are very complicated, so they require a large number 
of function pointer verification.  For example, ide_intr, the IRQ action call back function 
for the IDE disk, requires a total of 192 function pointers to be verified, which leads to 
648 cross-domain introspections.  On the other hand, the most complicated soft timer call 
back function dev_watchdog needs only three function pointer verification and five cross-
domain introspections, and the second most complicated soft timer call back function 
neigh_periodic_timer needs only two function pointer verification and two cross-domain 
introspections. This explains why the overhead measurements in Table 18 are much 
lower than those in Table 27. For example, the cp benchmark has the highest 
performance penalty in Table 27, because cp demands frequent disk operations and 
accordingly frequent callbacks to ide_intr (42 times per second), and we know that the 
verification of ide_intr is very complicated. (3) The coarse-grain locking of memory 
pages by our defense causes a large number of legitimate memory write operations to be 
emulated in software, which adds more performance overhead.  This is consistent with 
the results in Table 27. For example, the cp benchmark sees a 25 times slowdown with 
the memory protection turned on, but once the memory protection is turned off, the 
slowdown drops to 14 times. 
Table 27: Overhead of the K-Queue Checker 




































Overhead 31% 40% 14% 2,519% 63%
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 Complexity of the K-Queue Checker 
 To further understand the performance overhead, we define and measure two 
complexity metrics of the K-Queue Checker program: layer and fanout.  First we give an 
informal definition of the layer of verification: each layer is associated with a function 
pointer. The checker starts in layer 1, where the associated function pointer is the top-
level K-Queue function pointers embedded in the K-Queue data structures.  At layer i the 
value of the function pointer is first verified against a white list; if the verification is 
successful then the integrity of the target function itself needs to be verified, which may 
require the checking of a new function pointer. In this case the verification enters a new 
layer i + 1.  When the verification for a target function completes, the checker returns to 
the previous layer (i.e., layer i).  We also define the fanout of a function as the number of 
function pointers whose integrity needs to be checked for that function. 
 For our K-Queue Checker program, the maximum layer during the verification of 
the IRQ action queue is seven, which happens when the top-level call back function is 
ide_intr (linux-2.4.32/drivers/ide/ide-io.c). And during the checking of the IRQ action 
queue, the maximum fanout is 15 (for the function idedisk_error in linux-
2.4.32/drivers/ide/ide-disk.c).  
3.5. Related Work 
 Defenses against Stealthy Attacks. Defense techniques against attacks that 
change kernel code include Tripwire [32], a file system integrity checker, IMA [48], a 
load-time kernel and application code integrity checker, and Copilot [40] and Pioneer 
[54], runtime kernel code checkers.  Representative defenses for attacks that change 
kernel data include CFI [1] and SBCFI [42]. 
 To the best of our knowledge, there have been few concrete instances of attacks 
that do not change kernel code or data, but insert transient execution units into a 
schedulable queue.  The Blue Chicken [46] uses a KTIMER in a Windows Vista kernel to 
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reinstall the Blue Pill hypervisor, which is an example of how a kernel-level malware can 
use soft timer to maintain control of the victim platform. The “cheat” attack described in 
[56] may be regarded as a user-level example, since it uses the to-be-scheduled task 
queue. Known malware detection methods have difficulties with transient kernel control 
flow attacks.  For example, signatures of known malicious STIRs can be created by 
reverse engineering the malware.  This approach suffers from the same problems seen in 
the anti-virus community.  Specifically, they are unable to detect or prevent zero-day 
attacks, and the process of finding appropriate signatures is difficult and error prone.  For 
these reasons, signature checking alone is insufficient to mitigate this threat. 
 Another possible approach for detecting these attacks is to extend control flow 
integrity techniques such as SBCFI [42] and CFI [1].  SBCFI is a checker for persistent 
kernel control flow attacks.  It starts by looking at kernel global variables and performs a 
garbage-collection style traversal of kernel data structures to verify that all of the function 
pointers target trusted addresses in the kernel.  SBCFI can potentially catch a type 1 
malicious STIR, since the function pointer targets can be validated when SBCFI scans the 
kernel variables.  However, SBCFI can not detect type 2 STIRs because it does not 
follow the uninterpreted data field included as part of the callback: it is not defined as a 
pointer type.  The definition of data is intended to allow maximum flexibility for different 
call back functions. In order to make SBCFI work on type 2 STIRs, accurate type 
information for the data field in each call back function must be added, which would 
require a static analysis of all STIR callback functions.  Such an approach would then be 
similar to our STIR Analyzer (Section 3.3.2.2). 
 A more general approach, CFI [1] uses inline reference monitors [22] to compare 
the dynamic execution flow of a program against a statically computed control flow 
graph (CFG).  CFI is a general framework that can be instantiated into an alternative 
implementation of the STIR Checker, however the exact checks that must be performed 
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against the STIR callback functions would still need to be constructed by tools such as 
the STIR Analyzer. 
 Secure Kernel Extensions. K-Queue driven malware exploits an interface 
exposed by the core kernel to its extensions. There has been some effort to achieve finer-
grained divisions within a monolithic kernel, with the goal of improving security. For 
example, Palladium [15] demotes the privileges of the kernel extensions so that 
misbehaving or malicious extensions cannot harm the core portion of the kernel. 
However, such approaches can only prevent the malicious extensions from corrupting the 
core kernel, but cannot prevent sensitive information stealing (section 3.2.3.1) and denial 
of service attacks (Section 3.2.3.2). 
 Points-to analysis. There has been a large body of research work on points-to 
analysis.  However, this problem has not been completely solved yet because in general 
points-to analysis is undecidable.  As a result, a large number of approximation 
algorithms have been proposed, with various trade-off between efficiency and precision. 
Interested readers are referred to a survey by Hind [27]. Our K-Queue analyzer provides 
specialized points-to analysis algorithms (e.g., direct assignment collector and parameter 
collector) for the Linux kernel, which are not intended for a general solution to the 
points-to analysis problem. 
 Applications of Static Analysis in Systems and Security Research. In recent 
years, static analysis of software has been used for many purposes including deriving 
application behavior models for intrusion detection systems [60], building control flow 
graphs of an application [1], and determining type and global variable information for the 
Linux kernel [42].  This technique has also been applied to finding bugs in both kernel 
and application code [13, 21, and 35].  In this dissertation, we add one more use case by 




 The K-Queue case study demonstrates another example of para-transactional 
invariants (PTIs):  that the control flow resulting from a legitimate K-Queue callback 
function should always target trusted code of the kernel.  The scope of such K-Queue 
invariants is from the verification of the K-Queue request to the end of the execution of 
the callback function. 
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CHAPTER 4                                                                       
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 Attacks exploiting inherent shortcomings of today’s operating systems (e.g., 
missing transactional support) are the most difficult to defend because they are often 
stealthy and non-obtrusive. Yet such attacks are on the rise to become a major security 
threat.  This dissertation argues that we can defend these attacks by identifying and 
guarding specific correctness models. To exemplify our approach, we solve two classes 
of important security problems: TOCTTOU and K-Queue.  TOCTTOU is a file-based 
race condition that represents a high security risk due to the wide-scale deployment of 
multiprocessors, and K-Queue driven attacks misuse the schedulable queues interface to 
inject transient and malicious control flows in the victim kernel and can evade the 
detection of state-of-the-art kernel integrity checkers. We propose the CUU model that is 
capable of enumerating all potential TOCTTOU vulnerabilities and our CUU-guided 
defense mechanism and implementation are also complete. We apply automated static 
analysis and code generation that infer the correct usage model of the K-Queues (called 
summary signatures) and generate the corresponding guards that enforce the usage model 
at runtime.  Our work suggests that improving the correctness of operating systems 
enable powerful defense against certain classes of malicious attacks, and that automated 
software engineering techniques are very helpful in increasing the productivity of such 
efforts. 
4.1. Future Work 
 Reduce the runtime overhead of the K-Queue Checker 
 The current K-Queue Checker incurs unacceptable overhead in some cases. But 
the overhead can be reduced in at least two ways. First, we can optimize the Checker 
software to verify different function pointers in the same data structure together and 
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avoid redundant pointer verifications. This is because the function pointers often cluster 
in a small number of data structures (such as hwif_s and tty_driver), and different target 
functions often require the same function pointer to be verified. Second, we can employ 
architectural support for fine-grain memory protection (e.g., Mondrian [64]) once they 
are available, to reduce the overhead of our defense against the TOCTTOU attacks on our 
K-Queue Checkers. 
 Support for polymorphic or obfuscated code. Our current design assumes that 
there is a fixed memory layout for the guest kernel; therefore, it cannot support 
obfuscated guest kernels which apply techniques such as address space randomization.  
Under the current assumption, the runtime addresses of the kernel functions are known in 
advance and therefore can be built into the K-Queue checker.  However, when the 
address space of the guest kernel is obfuscated, the runtime addresses of the kernel 
functions can not be known in advance.  In order to support such guest kernels, we need 
to generate checker code that refers to kernel functions by name rather than address, and 
we need to add a runtime service in the guest kernel that maps function names to their 
actual addresses.  
 Support for loadable kernel modules. Due to a constraint imposed by the CIL 
merger, our current implementation of the K-Queue defense does not support loadable 
kernel modules. We plan to make CIL merger run over individual kernel modules, so that 
we can capture K-Queue requests made by them. These results can then be merged into 





Table 28: Exploitable TOCTTOU Pairs in Linux 
Invariant TOCTTOU Pairs 
∅=)( fresolve  
<stat, creat> <stat, open> <stat, mknod> <stat, rename> <access, creat> <access, open> 
<access, mknod> <access, rename> <unlink, creat> <unlink, open> <unlink, mknod> 
<unlink, rename> <rename, creat> <rename, open> <rename, mknod> <rename, rename> 
<stat, mkdir> <stat, rename> <access, mkdir> <access, rename> <rmdir, mkdir> <rmdir, 
rename> <rename, mkdir> <rename, rename> <stat, link> <stat, symlink> <stat, rename> 
<access, link> <access, symlink> <access, rename> <unlink, link> <unlink, symlink> 
<unlink, rename> <rename, link> <rename, symlink> <rename, rename> 
bfresolve =)(  
<stat, chmod> <stat, chown> <stat, truncate> <stat, utime> <stat, open> <stat, execve> 
<access, chmod> <access, chown> <access, truncate> <access, utime> <access, open> 
<access, execve> <creat, chmod> <creat, chown> <creat, truncate> <creat, utime> <creat, 
open> <creat, execve> <open, chmod> <open, chown> <open, truncate> <open, utime> 
<open, open> <open, execve> <mknod, chmod> <mknod, chown> <mknod, truncate> 
<mknod, utime> <mknod, open> <mknod, execve> <rename, chmod> <rename, chown> 
<rename, truncate> <rename, utime> <rename, open> <rename, execve> <link, chmod> 
<link, chown> <link, truncate> <link, utime> <link, open> <link, execve> <symlink, 
chmod> <symlink, chown> <symlink, truncate> <symlink, utime> <symlink, open> 
<symlink, execve> <rename, chmod> <rename, chown> <rename, truncate> <rename, 
utime> <rename, open> <rename, execve> <chmod, chmod> <chmod, chown> <chmod, 
truncate> <chmod, utime> <chmod, open> <chmod, execve> <chown, chmod> <chown, 
chown> <chown, truncate> <chown, utime> <chown, open> <chown, execve> <truncate, 
chmod> <truncate, chown> <truncate, truncate> <truncate, utime> <truncate, open> 
<truncate, execve> <utime, chmod> <utime, chown> <utime, truncate> <utime, utime> 
<utime, open> <utime, execve> <open, chmod> <open, chown> <open, truncate> <open, 
utime> <open, open> <open, execve> <execve, chmod> <execve, chown> <execve, 
truncate> <execve, utime> <execve, open> <execve, execve> <stat, chmod> <stat, chown> 
<stat, utime> <stat, mount> <stat, chdir> <stat, chroot> <stat, pivot_root> <access, chmod> 
<access, chown> <access, utime> <access, mount> <access, chdir> <access, chroot> 
<access, pivot_root> <mkdir, chmod> <mkdir, chown> <mkdir, utime> <mkdir, mount> 
<mkdir, chdir> <mkdir, chroot> <mkdir, pivot_root> <rename, chmod> <rename, chown> 
<rename, utime> <rename, mount> <rename, chdir> <rename, chroot> <rename, 
pivot_root> <link, chmod> <link, chown> <link, utime> <link, mount> <link, chdir> <link, 
chroot> <link, pivot_root> <symlink, chmod> <symlink, chown> <symlink, utime> 
<symlink, mount> <symlink, chdir> <symlink, chroot> <symlink, pivot_root> <rename, 
chmod> <rename, chown> <rename, utime> <rename, mount> <rename, chdir> <rename, 
chroot> <rename, pivot_root> <chmod, chmod> <chmod, chown> <chmod, utime> 
<chmod, mount> <chmod, chdir> <chmod, chroot> <chmod, pivot_root> <chown, chmod> 
<chown, chown> <chown, utime> <chown, mount> <chown, chdir> <chown, chroot> 
<chown, pivot_root> <utime, chmod> <utime, chown> <utime, utime> <utime, mount> 
<utime, chdir> <utime, chroot> <utime, pivot_root> <mount, chmod> <mount, chown> 
<mount, utime> <mount, mount> <mount, chdir> <mount, chroot> <mount, pivot_root> 
<chdir, chmod> <chdir, chown> <chdir, utime> <chdir, mount> <chdir, chdir> <chdir, 
chroot> <chdir, pivot_root> <chroot, chmod> <chroot, chown> <chroot, utime> <chroot, 
mount> <chroot, chdir> <chroot, chroot> <chroot, pivot_root> <pivot_root, chmod> 
<pivot_root, chown> <pivot_root, utime> <pivot_root, mount> <pivot_root, chdir> 
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